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The Battle of Big Bend was the last significant battle of the Rogue River Indian
Wars. The battle occurred 27-28 May 1856 in the Oregon Territory. The location of
the battle was along the Rogue River at a place known as the Big Bend, approximately
eight miles up river from the modern town of Agness, in Curry County, Oregon. The
battle was fought between one reinforced Army company; Company "C", 1st
Dragoons, and a large group of Indians from many different bands. Captain Andrew
Jackson Smith was the commanding officer of Company "C" during the battle, and
Chief John, a member of the Dakubetede Indian band, lead all the warriors. After the
first few hours of fighting, the soldiers had suffered so many casualties that they could
not break out of their surrounded position without abandoning their dead and
wounded. But on the other hand, the soldiers had established their defensive position
on a ridge line which provided them a strong tactical advantage which the Indians could
not overcome in spite of their early battle success. After thirty hours of combat,
Company "G", 1st Infantry, under the command of Captain Christopher C. Augur,
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came to the aid of the surrounded soldiers. When Company "G" entered the fight, the 
Indian warriors elected to quit fighting, and under moderate pressure moved off the 
field of battle into the surrounding mountains. The purpose of this research was to 
definitively identify the location of the defensive position used by Company "C", and 
perform data recovery for the Forest Service using archaeological field methods. The 
field strategy relied heavily on metal detectors to locate battle related artifacts over the 
battle area. Using data collected during fieldwork, and correlating it to primary 
reference sources and materials, the battle position of Company "C" was located for 
the United States Forest Service. Battle of Big Bend
 
by
 
Jeffery A. Applen
 
A THESIS
 
submitted to
 
Oregon State University
 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the 
degree of 
Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies 
Presented December 3, 1997
 
Commencement June 1998
 Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies thesis of Jeffery A. Applen presented
on December 3, 1997
APPROVED:
Major Professor, representing Anthropology
Comiliittee Member, representing Anthropology
Commit e Member, representing Geography
Chair 
Dean of Gr te School
gy
I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon
State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any
reader upon request.
Jeffery A. Applen, Author
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for PrivacyACKNOWLEDGMENT
 
This paper could not have been written without the encouragement provided by my 
wife, family, and professional friends. Specifically, thanks are due to my wife Michele 
for accepting my need to be challenged, to Dennis Gray and Kate Winthrop for their 
professional encouragement and friendship, to Janet Joyer and the U.S. Forest Service 
for allowing me to perform field research at the Big Bend, and to Dr. David Brauner 
for being my graduate advisor, mentor and friend. Thanks are due to James Johnson 
for drawing the artifacts illustrated in this paper, to Tom Howie and Bob Gardener for 
their professional contribution to the mapping effort of the battle site, and to Gary 
Martinek, Dena Nickell, and Ben Breon for assembling and coordinating the volunteer 
field crew through the Forest Service's "Passport In Time" project. Thanks are due to 
the many individuals listed below who volunteered as members of the field crew: 
Cheryl Douglas  David Gray  Vic Harris 
Wendel Wilkes  Linda Leonard Nading  William Lundquist 
Walt Schroeder  David Crane  John Anderson 
Joel Kuper  Emil Saleska  Anita Seda 
Carl Suhr  Believe Smith  Bill Moore 
Julie Klapperich  Tina Ames  Susan Moore 
Rachael Olds  Judy Holmes  Gretchen Flansburg 
Cheryl McIntire  Frank Cramer  Keith Paul 
Larry Kelm  Laurie Calef  John Hackett 
Gordon Myrah  Deane McConnell  Joanna Yax 
Blaine Clark  Everett Blickenstaff  Kelly Forsy 
Jimmy Greenfield  Benjamin Clarence  Connie Flanagan 
Gregory Applen  Gail Scriven  Blaine Clark 
Amy Myrah ACKNOWLEDGMENT (Continued) 
Finally, I owe special thanks to the United States Marine Corps for training me in the 
fundamentals of infantry tactics and for giving me the opportunity to practice the trade 
for several decades. TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
Page 
1.	  INTRODUCTION  1
 
Overview of the Battle of Big Bend  5
 
Hypothesis  7
 
Research Perspective  7
 
Patterned Human Behavior, Tactics, and Predictability  8
 
Fundamentals, Tactics, Defense  9
 
Discernible Actions and Captain Smith  11
 
Research Objectives and Significance of Project  12
 
Research Questions  12
 
Thesis Organization  13
 
2.	  HISTORICAL SETTING, A SYNOPSIS  15
 
3.	  CULTURAL SETTING  22
 
Bands Along the Lower Rogue River  22
 
Lifeways: An Ethnographic Portrait  24
 
Lifeways: A Portrait of Change  27
 
4.	  PHYSICAL SETTING  29
 
Location  29
 
Setting  29
 
Hills and Mountains  30
 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
Temperature and Rain During May 1856	  32 
Vegetation and Logging	  34
 
5.	  THE BATTLE OF BIG BEND  37
 
Meeting At Oak Flat, 20-21 May 1856  43
 
Captain Smith Moves Company "C" (Rein.) to the Big Bend, 24 May 1856  44
 
Weather at the Big Bend, 25 May 1856  47
 
Captain Smith Moves Company "C" (Rein.) to High Ground, 26 May 1856  47
 
The Battle, 27-28 May 1856  48
 
The Rogue River Indian War  38
 
Winter of 1855-1856  39
 
The Stage Is Set  43
 
Soldier's Load  45
 
Weapons  45
 
Army Battle Casualties  52
 
Indian Battle Casualties  53
 
Bands Participating In the Battle  53
 
Post Battle  54
 
Volunteers  54
 
War Ends  55
 
End of War Inventory  56
 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
6.  ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY  58
 
Field Methods  58
 
General Procedures  59
 
Orientation Phase  59
 
Inventory Phase  60
 
Survey  61
 
Recovery  63
 
Recording/Collecting  64
 
Testing Phase  64
 
Block Excavation  65
 
Augur Holes  67
 
Inventory Evaluation Phase  67
 
Laboratory Methods  67
 
7.  DESCRIPTIVE ARCHAEOLOGY  69
 
Findings  69
 
Artifact Distribution  72
 
Soil  72
 
Artifact Description  74
 
Tobacco Smoking Pipe  74
 
Musket Ball Extractor (Gun Worm)  77
 
Metal Button  79
 
Leather, Metal Eyelet's and Square Nails  82
 
Lead Slag  83
 
Projectiles  86
 
Lead Bullets  86
 
Iron Canister Balls  88
 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
Round Lead Musket and Pistol Balls  90
 
Shot  96
 
Percussion Caps	  100
 
8.	  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  106
 
Discernible?
 
BEND
 
BATTLE SITE
 
BIG BEND, 27-28 MAY 1856
 
Research Questions Addressed  106
 
Where was the Defensive Position of Company "C"?  107
 
Where was the Battle Fought?  114
 
Can the Battle Area Be Defined?  118
 
What Types of Artifacts Can be Expected to be Found?  121
 
What Learned, Patterned Cultural Battlefield Behavior Might (or Should) be  122
 
Conclusion  124
 
REFERENCES CITED  127
 
APPENDICES  135
 
Appendix A AFTER ACTION REPORTS OF THE BATTLE OF BIG  136
 
Appendix B CAPTAIN ORD'S SKETCH MAP OF THE BIG BEND  142
 
Appendix C LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED AT THE BATTLE OF  143
 
Appendix D ARTIFACT CATALOGUE  145
 
Appendix E LEGEND  167
 LIST OF FIGURES
 
Figure	  Page 
1.	  Project and Site # ORCU003 location  2 
2.	  Place names and major geographical features of southwestern Oregon and  16 
northwestern California (LaLande 1991: 2) 
3.	  Generalized territories of major ethnographic groups in southwestern Oregon  23 
(LaLande 1991: 3) 
4.	  Grid overlay and contour map, Big Bend Battle Site (Site # ORCU003)  31 
5.	  Location of test units  66 
6.	  Distribution of battle - related artifacts across the site  70 
7.	  Representative soil profiles  73 
8.	  Red clay smoking pipe, "stem" or "effigy," FS # 1  75 
9.	  Lead musket ball extractor, "Gun Worm," FS # 29  78 
10.	  One piece cast metal button with thread fragment, military or civilian trouser,  80 
size 28 lines, FS # 16 
11.	  Distribution of miscellaneous artifacts across the battle site  81 
12.	  Lead musket ball, .53 caliber, with ramrod impression, and trimming scare, FS  86 
# 92 
13.	  Distribution of lead musket balls and bullets across the site  87 
14.	  Carved .40 caliber lead pistol bullet, FS # 6  88 
15.	  Distribution of iron canister projectiles across the site  92 
16.	  Lead musket ball, .65+ caliber, with three shot impressions, FS # 80  96 
17.	  Spent lead musket ball, with textile impression, FS # 19  97 
18.	  Distribution of shot artifacts across the battle site  98 LIST OF FIGURES (Continued) 
Figure	  Page 
19.	  Caliber .69 cartridge, "Buck and Ball," and caliber .58 cartridge, "Buckshot"  99
 
20.	  Distribution of percussion caps and fragments across the battle site  105
 
21.	  Big Bend Battle Area, direction of movement used by Indian warriors on 27  110
 
May 1856, and direction of attack used by Company "G" on 28 May 1856
 
22.	  Defensive perimeter of Company "C", locations of the breastworks, howitzer,  111
 
dragoons and infantry within the defensive perimeter, and directions of initial
 
Indian assaults on 27 May 1856
 LIST OF TABLES
 
Table	  Page 
1.  List of trees growing on site	  36
 
2.  List of Army casualties at the Battle of Big Bend	  53
 
3.  Demographics of individual Indians surrendering by 31 May 1856  55 
4.	  Indian weapons captured during the Rogue River Indian War of 1855-1856  57
 
5.	  Block excavations, unit size and numbers  65
 
6.	  Categories, sub-categories, and amounts of artifacts collected at the Big  72
 
Bend Battle Site
 
7.	  Locations of recovered lead slag  85
 
8.	  Locations iron canister projectiles were recovered from on the battle site  91
 
9.	  Locations where lead projectiles were recovered on the battle site  93
 
10.	  Locations shot artifacts were recovered  102
 
11.	  Locations percussion caps were recovered from on the battle site  103
 BATTLE OF BIG BEND 
1. CHAPTER 
INTRODUCTION 
The Battle of Big Bend was the last significant battle fought between the United 
States Army and the Indians of southwest Oregon during the Rogue River Indian War of 
1853-1856. The battle occurred during May 1856 along the Rouge River at the Big 
Bend (Figure 1.). 
I became aware of the Battle of Big Bend at a November 1995 meeting of Southern 
Oregon archaeologists. Janet Joyer, archaeologist for the Siskiyou National Forest, 
mentioned that the battle had been fought on land now managed by the United States 
Forest Service, and that the area of the battle was being periodically looted. Ms. Joyer 
mentioned there was a need for an archaeological project to identify the exact location of 
the battle site, and to recover and save remaining battlefield artifacts. Additionally, if 
located, the battle site might become an adjunct to the Rogue River hiking trail that 
passes near the battle site. Being a retired United States Marine Corps Lieutenant 
Colonel and infantry officer, as well as a graduate student at Oregon State University, I 
expressed an interest in the project as a Master's Thesis topic. 
At a subsequent meeting held at the Big Bend of the Rogue River in December 1995, 
I was introduced to the site (ORCU3) by Janet Joyer and Gary (Tex) Martinek 
(archaeological technician) of the Siskiyou National Forest Service. As a three person 2 
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Figure 1.  Project and Site # ORCU003 location. 3 
group, we walked north from Foster Creek, up a steep toe slope to the top of a ridge to 
a point thought to be near the southern portion of the battle site. At this point a shallow 
"U" shaped depression was observed on the ridge top. The top of the "U" was oriented 
towards the south, and it was believed that the depression might date to the time of the 
battle. From this location there was a fairly narrow kidney shaped ridge line running 
generally north/south for approximately 200 meters. As we walked north along the ridge 
crest we noted that the east/west width of the ridge top varied from approximately 10 to 
25 meters. We also observed that the slope off the ridge to the west was cliff-like, while 
the slope to the east became less steep as we walked north. During our survey north 
along the ridge crest, it became clear that with only one dangerous avenue of approach 
from the north/northeast, the kidney shaped ridge top would have been an ideal position 
to defend. 
Having briefed myself on the battle prior to our survey, I knew the historical events 
leading up to the battle's commencement, the big picture; the mission Captain Smith was 
assigned, the number of soldiers involved, the number of soldier casualties, and the 
duration of the battle (Beckham 1971; Carey 1936; Cresap 1953; Dodge 1969; Drew 
1973; Sutton 1969). Knowing from my own military training and experience that terrain 
and the capabilities of a unit's weapons influence the manner a commander decides to 
defend from a threat; it became obvious as we walked the ridge line that Captain Smith's 
tactical options were extremely limited. In view of his limited options, it seemed that 
Captains Smith's defensive position could be located using primary resource materials, 
and an archaeological strategy that included the use of metal detectors. The research 4 
strategy envisioned was similar to that used by Scott and Fox (1987) at the site of the 
Battle of the Little Big Horn in Montana. 
The battle positions of the Indians were not included in the primary effort of this 
project. Nevertheless, their positions might be determined incidental to the primary 
objective of locating Captain Smith's position. Logically, Indian battle positions would 
be located on terrain that offered advantage: be in direct line of sight of the soldier's 
defensive perimeter, be within effective range of their own weapons, or in defilade (a 
position in which the occupant can not be hit by direct fire weapons, [i.e. beyond the 
crest of a mound, knoll or hill, and used for safe movement or casualty collection, etc.]) 
where possible. 
Based on historical documents, it was believed no human remains were buried on the 
ridge line. Captain Smith (1856), see Appendix A., reported that during the battle Indian 
casualties were quickly taken away by Indians, and the soldiers who died during the 
battle, were believed to be buried on the meadow near the Big Bend (Winthrop and Gray 
1988). 
Beginning with my introduction to the goals and objectives of this project, it appeared 
the project was perfectly suited for an archaeologist to practice his trade as described by 
".  the interpretation of past human activity, at a specific site, during a particular period . . 
of time" (Brauner 1994). 
Subsequent to our site visit, the project was approved by the United States Forest 
Service. The fieldwork was planned for and accomplished during 13-21 July 1996. 
Field research and data recovery was completed as a Forest Service "Passport in Time" 5 
project that enlisted the help of local volunteers as the field crew. Forest Service 
representatives, Janet Joyer and Gary Martinek, coordinated community involvement, 
press coverage, crew housing, and daily transportation. Tom Howie and Bob Gardner, 
Forest Service surveyors, surveyed the site and created a contour map of the area 
investigated. James Johnson, a student at Southern Oregon University, drew the 
artifacts illustrated in this paper. The author conducted archival research on the history 
of the Big Bend Battle, developed the field strategy used for data recovery, supervised 
the execution of the fieldwork, and performed the artifact analysis. All artifacts 
recovered during this project will be returned to the United States Forest Service for 
curation per contract number 00-0M00-6-0092. 
Overview of the Battle of Big Bend 
At this point in the introduction, it seems logical to provide the reader with a brief 
overview of the Battle of Big Bend. I believe the battle site can be archaeologically 
located, and a familiarity with the battle will facilitate understanding the rational 
presented for believing the battle site's location can be positively determined. 
On the evening of 26 May 1856 Captain Andrew Jackson Smith and his command 
were at the Big Bend of the Rogue River waiting to accept the surrender of several 
Indian bands when he was warned that he might be attacked. During the night he moved 
his command to a ridge line west of the Big Bend meadow and prepared for either a fight 
or the surrender of the Indians as planned. 6 
The "Battle of Big Bend" was fought on 27 and 28 May 1856 between a reinforced 
Company of United States Army Dragoons; Company "C", 1st Dragoons, under the 
command of Captain Smith, and an eclectic group of Indian warriors lead by Chief John, 
leader of an Indian band from the Applegate River Valley. After 30 hours of fighting the 
soldiers were in extreme peril. The battle situation was simple and uncomplicated; the 
soldiers were surrounded by Indian warriors and had suffered so many casualties that 
their fighting efficiency and capabilities had been degraded by at least 28% based on 
casualty figures alone. For the soldiers, after the first few hours of combat, their tactical 
options became limited, a breakout maneuver was not possible without abandoning their 
dead and wounded. Consequently, they were limited to fighting the battle to its 
conclusion where they stood. For the Indians, because their initial assaults failed to 
overpower the soldiers of Company "C", their options too became limited. Without 
overwhelming strength in manpower to defeat the soldiers outright, the Indians were 
limited to containing the soldiers within their defensive position, and reducing their 
strength by fire. Given time, this course of action would ultimately lead to the erosion of 
the soldier's capability to resist until, by weight of numbers, the Indians could carry their 
position. 
It was at this point in the battle that Company "G", 4th Infantry, under the command 
of Captain Christopher C. Augur, arrived on the battle scene and altered the situation. 
Captain Augur and his company entered the fray from the south, keeping the Rogue 
River to his right. He initially attacked north for approximately one mile across a large 
open meadow and put to flight Indian women and children. On the northern edge of the 7 
meadow he wheeled his company to the west and attacked the Indian warriors on the 
hills, breaking their hold on the defensive position of Company "C". 
It is highly probable that up to the point of Captain Augur's arrival on the battle 
scene, neither opposing force would have predicted the battle's outcome. For the Indian 
warriors it was literally a defeat snatched from the jaws of victory. For the soldiers it 
was at best not a defeat. Nevertheless, the result of the battle broke the fighting spirit of 
the Indians and essentially concluded the Rogue River Indian War of 1853-1856. 
Hypothesis 
"The basic tenet upon which archaeology rests is straightforward. Human behavior is 
patterned" (Scott and Fox 1987: 6). This is the hypothesis upon which this project is 
based. 
Research Perspective 
Scott (1991: 16-17) wrote:
 
Battlefields may seem to be a simple type of archeological site. .  A
 . . 
battlefield might be expected to be the least likely place to find 
archaeological definable behavioral patterns, but, those who engage in 
combat fight in established manners and patterns in which they have been 
trained. It is precisely this training in proper battlefield behavior that 
results in the depositions of artifacts which can be recovered by 
archeological means and interpreted in an anthropological perspective..  . 
.  Battlefields are no less an expression of culture, albeit a violent one, 
than are architectural elements. . . In concurrence with Scott's view of battlefields and with his statement ".  that 
patterned archeological data from combat situations are interpretable relative to the 
originating culture(' s) ideal(s) of proper battlefield behavior" (1991: 19) I believe that 
the site of the Battle of Big Bend can be located. The relevant concept is that 
archaeological remains are ".  simply another cultural expression of battlefield behavior . . 
that can be anthropologically explained through archeological study" (Scott 1991: 19). 
Battlefields contain the remains of violent cultural events that can be located and 
interpreted as if they were the remains of any cultural activity area. Captain Smith took 
action on the evening of 26 May 1856 to protect Company "C" from a possible attack 
the following morning. He moved the company to terrain which offered a defensive 
advantage. The terrain that he selected 150 years ago is interpretable using primary 
historical references and archaeological research. With the 15 hours he had to work 
with, Captain Smith constructed a deliberate defense. Captain Smith's actions would 
have been the result of his training as an infantry officer and therefore, in selecting a site 
to defend, his behavior would have been patterned and interpretable. 
Patterned Human Behavior, Tactics, and Predictability 
Patterning of human behavior is especially evident in groups whose survival is 
dependent on disciplined action based on education, training, and resources. Infantry 
soldiers of the United States Army are now, as well as in the 19th century, members of 
such a disciplined group. The Army has published regulations and training manuals 
directing and demanding behavior that is expected and therefore, patterned. Patterned 9 
behavior is the objective of tactical training for officers and soldiers alike. Infantry 
officers are trained to employ units in accordance with their human and technological 
strengths and capabilities. Commanders are taught fundamentals of tactical maneuver 
and the use of terrain to their advantage. Terrain is to be used as a tactical asset, a force 
multiplier, to gain advantage in order to accomplish assigned missions. Fundamentals 
become doctrine, and doctrine becomes the basis for all tactical decision making. 
Training of the officer corps ensures that doctrine is not violated, particularly through 
ignorance. However, under unusual circumstances doctrine is violated by commanders 
for compelling reasons, but always at the commander's own peril. Therefore, Captain 
Smith's tactical actions should be predictable based on patterned behavior dictated by 
doctrine and influenced by terrain. 
Fundamentals, Tactics, and Defense 
A short discussion of fundamentals, tactics, and the defense seems appropriate in 
order to establish a base line awareness of their relationship to Captain Smith's actions 
during the Battle of Big Bend. The objective is to make evident that Captain Smith's 
selection of a defensive position is discernible from highly probable actions on his part. 
The fundamentals of tactics have not changed during the last several thousand years. 
Approximately 2500 years ago, the Chinese writer and philosopher Sun Tzu wrote that 
the wise commander must: know himself, know his enemy, take advantage of time, use 
surprise, and defend on high ground (Griffith 1963). During the 18th century, Sun Tzu's 
writings became well known in Europe, and many European generals, including 10 
Napoleon, had access to his thoughts in his work "The Art of War" first published in 
Paris during 1772 (Griffith 1963: 179). And, in turn, during the early 1800s, Napoleon 
was studied by American students of war at the United States Military Academy at West 
Point. Captain Smith entered West Point in 1834 (Faust 1986: 69), and it can be 
hypothesized that he was exposed as a cadet to a tactical training curriculum that 
included the study of ancient military writer/philosophers, as well as Napoleon's exploits. 
Infantry company, platoon and small unit tactics are not difficult to understand. 
Tactics, at the most basic level, are the use of good judgment, coupled with timely 
decision making and a keen awareness of the obvious. Fritz (1995) makes the point by 
quoting Field Marshal Wavell's comments on tactics; ".  the principles of strategy and . . 
tactics  . are absurdly simple." . . 
There are two types of defenses available to a commander, "hasty" and "deliberate." 
Other than the name, the concepts ascribed to these defenses has not changed during the 
past several thousands of years. A hasty defense is comprised of the actions and efforts 
of a unit to defend itself when attacked with little or no warning. An example of a hasty 
defense is when a force unexpectedly meets an enemy head on, and is compelled to 
maneuver and fight on whatever ground they occupy. For example, at the Battle of the 
Little Big Horn, the battalion's of Custer's regiment employed hasty defenses. Custer 
and 214 soldiers perished because their efforts to defend themselves failed; while Major 
Reno, part of Custer's command, and his battalion survived because they selected terrain 
wisely that bought them time to improve their hasty defense into a more deliberate 
defense (Scott and Fox 1987: 9-18). 11 
A deliberate defense is most common. A deliberate defense is the product of actions 
taken to develop a defense with the luxury of time. Terrain is deliberately selected to 
defend based on an advantage or advantages it is perceived to offer. Historical examples 
of deliberate defenses are: castles of Europe, China, and Japan; walled cities of the 
Western Asia, China, South and Central America; forts of the Civil War; and WW II 
defenses on the beaches of Normandy. The point is, given enough time, a commander 
selects terrain to defend that provides an advantage. After 150 years, it is believed the 
ridge lines west of the Big Bend can be studied, and their tactical advantages perceived. 
Discernible Actions and Captain Smith 
On the evening of 26 May 1856, Captain Smith applied tactical fundamentals and 
defensive concepts, which he had been trained to do, when he selected terrain upon 
which to relocate his company for a possible fight. After being warned that his company 
might be attacked, he used roughly 15 hours to prepare a defense. He deliberately 
moved his Company to terrain that offered an advantage, and developed a defensive plan 
based on that advantage. His defensive position was not selected by chance, it was a 
deliberate defense. Therefore, it is probable that his defensive position can be located 
using historical reference materials, and a understanding of military tactics, and 
archaeological methods. 12 
Research Objectives and Significance of Project 
The objective of this project is to find and fix the position of the battle site using both 
primary and secondary historical references and records, and archaeological field 
methods. Primary and secondary historical references established that the Battle of Big 
Bend took place on the ridge line west of the Big Bend along the Rogue River. 
However, prior to this project, the exact location of the site of Captains Smith's 
defensive position had not been defined archaeologically. The significance of this project 
is that it locates a Rogue River Indian War battle site, occupied for less than 48 hours, 
using traditional archaeological field techniques augmented by the use of metal detectors, 
and discovers something about learned human behavior. 
Research Questions 
Captain Smith's (1856) after action report (Appendix A.) and Captain Ord's (1856) 
sketch of the general area of the battlefield (Appendix B.) were utilized to provide 
evidence to guide the archaeological fieldwork. The following research questions appear 
to be answerable using archeological methods applied at the site: 
1. Where was the defensive position of Company "C"? 
2. Where was the battle fought? 
3. Can the battle area be defined? 13 
4. What types of artifacts can be reasonably expected to be retrieved from a battle 
site occupied for approximately 48 hours (15 hours of preparation, and 30 hours of 
combat)? 
5. What learned, patterned cultural battlefield behavior might (or should) be 
discernible? 
Thesis Organization 
This paper is organized as follows:  1. Chapter, "Introduction," introduces the thesis 
topic, discusses the thesis hypothesis, provides an abridged introduction to the battle, 
rationale for assuming the project objective can be achieved, and presents the research 
questions; 2. Chapter, "Historical Setting," is a brief review of the contact period (i.e., 
the years during which there was limited and sporadic interaction between native 
Americans and Euro-Americans), and provides the historical context leading to the 
Battle of Big Bend; 3. Chapter, "Cultural Setting" discusses the lifeways of the Native 
Americans of southwestern Oregon, and the area in the vicinity of the Big Bend along 
the Rogue River; 4. Chapter, "Physical Setting," describes the natural environment of the 
area surrounding the Big Bend; 5. Chapter, "The Battle Of Big Bend" relates the events 
leading up to, and including the Battle of Big Bend; 6. Chapter, "Archaeological 
Methodology" is a discussion of project methodology; 7. Chapter, "Descriptive 
Archaeology" presents the results of fieldwork, and describes battle related artifacts, 
their use, and their historical contexts; 8. Chapter, "Discussion and Conclusions" reviews 
the research questions, and how well they were satisfactorily answered . 14 
Appendix A., "After Action Reports of the Battle of Big Bend," are quoted from 
primary reference materials to allow the reader access to primary reference sources 
quoted in this paper. Appendix B., "Captain Ord's Sketch of the Battle Area," is 
included for comparison between a 30 May 1856 sketch map of the area of the Big Bend 
Battle and modern maps. Appendix C., "List of Killed and Wounded at the Battle of Big 
Bend, 27-28 May 1856," is quoted from primary reference sources, and is attached for 
additional information. Appendix D., "Artifact Catalogue," is an inventory and 
description of all recovered artifacts. And, Appendix E., "Legend," is an explanation of 
abbreviations used in this paper, appendixes, and tables. 
Figures and tables are included to illustrate artifacts and present data. Weights have 
been annotated in both grams and grains; and lengths in inches and millimeters. In tables 
projectile sizes are referred to in caliber's as it is customary to do in the United States. 15 
2. CHAPTER 
HISTORICAL SETTING,
 
A SYNOPSIS
 
Throughout the contact period hostilities between native inhabitants and white 
newcomers in southern Oregon continued to escalate until widespread armed conflict 
between members of the two cultures ignited in 1853 and again October 1855. 
The background behind the ill will between the Indian and whites can be succinctly 
stated: it was related to the use of land, space and resources, coupled with ethnocentric 
biases. This situation evolved over the years until it completely spun out of control and 
into widespread warfare (Carey 1922; Gilmoore 1952; Schwartz 1991; Walling 1884). 
The evolution of ill will between the cultures can be concisely related. When initial 
contact was made between the cultures along the southwestern coast of Oregon, 
relations can be characterized as generally friendly. Trading vessels made brief visits 
which were tolerated by most coastal Indians. But when white settlers first attempted to 
establish a permanent settlement on the southern Oregon coast at Port Orford in 1851 
(Figure 2.), their attempt was met with hostility from the local Coquille Indians (Carey 
1922: 568-569). 
In the interior, contact between Indians and whites first occurred when white fur 
trappers and U.S. Expeditionary personnel passed through southern Oregon (ca 1826­
1841. Like seamen visiting the southwestern coast, these first visitors to the interior not 
interested in establishing a permanent presence, so their visits were tolerated for the 
most part by local Indians. 16 
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Figure 2. Place names and major geographical features of southwestern Oregon and 
northwestern California (LaLande 1991: 2). 17 
The second group of whites observed by interior Indians were emigrants principally 
interested in passing through the area in route north to the Willamette Valley, or south to 
California. After 1846, emigrants began using the Applegate Trail, a route that passed 
through the Rogue Valley, in ever increasing numbers. As previously mentioned, some 
used the Applegate trail to travel north to the Willamette Valley, while others used it to 
travel south from the Willamette Valley to California. When the California bound 
emigrants reached the southern end of the Rogue Valley, they connected with the 
California-Oregon Trail and followed it over the Siskyou Mountains to the Sacramento 
Valley (Carey 1922: 570; Dodds 1986: 84; Gilmoore 1952: 246; Walling 1884: 240; 
Winther 1950: 118). This additional emigrant traffic through the area during the late 
1840s contributed to increased conflict between the two cultures (Atwood and Gray 
1995: 61; Dodds 1986: 84). Conflict escalated to clashes between Indians and white 
emigrants traveling on trails. Clashes were by chance and were opportunistic, primarily 
based on random meetings between individuals of one culture or the other. Indians at 
times ambushed white travelers, trappers, and packers with the intention of 
obtaining/stealing property; while white travelers and drovers on occasion killed and 
wounded Indians whom they suspected to be threatening (Beeson 1857; Dodds 1986: 
84; Walling 1884: 249-250; Winther 1950: 118). 
When gold was discovered near Jacksonville, Oregon in 1851, hostilities escalated 
even more in southern Oregon (Dodds 1986: 84). Miners flocked to Jacksonville and 
the town's adjacent hills and mountains (Atwood and Gray 1995: 61; Carey 1922: 570, 
597; Winther 1950: 105). This rapid influx of Euro-Americans into southwestern 18 
Oregon caused conflict to spread into the hills and mountains where miners toiled at their 
work (Atwood and Gray 1995: 62). Conflict was no longer associated primarily with 
routes of emigration and travel; it followed the miners as they moved over the landscape 
(Colvig 1903: 231). At this point in history, the Indians were being crowded in their 
home territories by miners whose mining activities clashed with their traditional Native 
lifeways (Atwood and Gray 1995: 62; Gilmoore 1952: 246). 
During the fifteen year period between 1840 and 1855 thousands of transient miners 
and permanent settlers entered southern Oregon. Merchants followed the miners, and 
farmers followed the merchants. Encouraged by the Donation Land Act of 1850 
(Atwood and Gray 1995: 61), the vast majority of the newcomers who became 
permanent residents entered the area during the years between 1850 and 1855 (Gilmoore 
1952: 302). The consequence of this increased emigration was competition between the 
cultures for space and resources. This situation, coupled with racial and ethnocentric 
biases, eventually lead to armed conflict breaking out in 1853 (Atwood and Gray 1995: 
62; Beckham 1977: 137; Carey 1922: 572; Colvig 1903:232; Giles 1896; Gilmoore 
1952; Pollard 1946: 128; Walling 1884: 253). As observed by Beckham, the Indians 
resentment of the miners and settlers was well founded: 
Above all else, the Indians in the region had been reduced to starvation 
and to surviving virtually as refugees in their own homeland. The miners' 
debris had ruined the fish runs. The settler's hogs had eaten the acorns 
and the cattle had cropped off the camas. The pioneer had erected 
laboriously-made, split-rail fences and would not let the Indians burn the 
fields and hillsides as they had done for ages to produce new seed crops 
or keep down the brush for good hunting. Further, the whites with their 
modern weapons had taken a heavy toll on the deer and elk in the region. 
Repeatedly the Indians had been driven from their old villages as farmers 
moved in to file for lands under the Donation Land Act of 1850, or as 19 
miners decided to overturn the river bars in search of gold (qtd, in 
Atwood and Gray 1995: 62). 
"The hostilities of 1853 were brutal but brief' (Atwood and Gray 1995: 62). The 
Indians of the interior Rogue River Valley signed a treaty ceding most of the Rogue 
Valley to the whites settlers in return for a reservation near Table Rock. As hostilities 
subsided in the interior, gold was discovered in the beach sands along the southern 
Oregon coast, and the rush of miners to that area had the same effect on the coastal 
Indian as it did on the interior bands; violence and warfare ensued (Atwood and Gray 
1995: 62). 
Life on the Table Rock Reservation during 1854-1855 was devastating to the Indian 
population; a lack of food, a severe winter, and diseases ravaged the people. Without 
relating a chronology of all the killings perpetrated by one side or the other during this 
time period, it is fair to conclude that hostilities between the two competing cultures was 
on-going (Carey 1922, Colvig 1903: 227-240; Giles 1896; Gilmoore 1952; Walling 
1884: 246). Even after individual people had made friends with members of the other 
culture, fear and suspicion of all other members of the competing culture was the norm 
(Giles 1896). However, it needs to be mentioned that there were individuals in both 
cultures who were able to see beyond their differences, and hoped for peaceful relations. 
Chief Sam and John Beeson are examples of men who did not want war to break out 
between their people (Beckham 1977: 137; Beeson 1857: 143; Beeson [n.d.]: 125; 
Walling 1884: 273). Literature of the times portrays a social environment that required a 
great deal of caution be exercised on a daily basis by members of one group or the other 
in order to insure one's personal safety (Beeson 1857; Giles 1896). 20 
The event that ignited general warfare in southern Oregon was the killing of "23 or 
more" Indians (mostly women, children, and old people) during October 1855 (Atwood 
and Gray 1995: 62; Beckham 1977: 138; Carey 1922: 598; Gilmoore 1952: 265-269). A 
group of white "Volunteers" ambushed a group of Indians while sleeping in their camp 
on or near the Table Rock Reservation. These killings caused many Indians to go to war 
with the whites in hopes of reclaiming their traditional lands and to avenge the deaths of 
those people slain by the volunteers (Atwood and Gray 1995: 62; Beckham 1977: 138; 
Beeson 1857; Davis 1994: 119). Many Indians left the reservation for the security of the 
Rogue River Canyon and the coastal mountains to the west, and as they fled west they 
attacked and killed miners and settlers along the Rogue River from Gold Hill to Galice 
Creek (Atwood and Gray 1995: 6) The whites went to war with the Indians with the 
intentions of avenging the deaths of those settlers killed immediately after hostilities 
broke out and removing the Indians from southern Oregon completely (Beckham 1977: 
145; Carey 1922: 599; Schwartz 1991: 163; Walling 1884). 
The Army, in spite of its alleged sympathies for the Indian's plight and its skepticism 
of the motives of the volunteers (Alvelrod 1993: 172; Schwartz 1994: 256), entered the 
conflict in support of the settlers (Carey 1922: 272; Gilmoore 1952: 272; Utley 1984: 
53; Weatherford c. 1950: 36). It was General Wool, United States Army, whose plan of 
action eventually defeated the hostile Indians who had taken refuge deep in the Rogue 
River Canyon (Horner 1924: 95; Walling 1884: 275-276; Weatherford c. 46-81). 
Collectively, the hostile activities perpetrated by members of both cultures during the 
period 1853 and 1856 have come to be known as the Rogue River Indian War. 21 
Captain Smith and his soldiers came on the scene in southern Oregon near the end of 
the contact period (1853). Garrisoned in the Rogue Valley at Fort Lane (Figure 2.), near 
the Table Rock Reservation, the soldiers originally endeavored to maintain peace 
between two competing cultures (Beeson 1857; Walling 1884: 38). However, in the 
end, and in spite of their original mission or intentions, they were the instrument that 
brought an end to the lifeways of the Native people of southwestern Oregon. By 
avoiding defeat at the Battle of Big Bend, Captain Smith and his reinforced company of 
Dragoons crushed the hopes and dreams of the Indians to remain in their native lands. 
After the battle, Captain Smith and his soldiers escorted their defeated adversaries out of 
the mountains of southern Oregon forever. At the moment control of their Indian 
prisoners passed to other authorities, the contact period ended in southwestern Oregon. 22 
3. CHAPTER 
CULTURAL SETTING 
Bands Along the Lower Rogue River 
The Indian agent, J.L. Parrish, conducted a census of all Indians living in the Port 
Orford district, and reported his findings in a letter to his superiors dated 10 July 1854 
(Dodge 1969: 104). Dodge quotes Parrish's report including ethnohistorical 
observations of the Indians living on the lower Rogue River. The portion of the Rogue 
River that he refers to in his report was from the Pacific Ocean upriver to the Big Bend. 
In his report, Parrish cites three Athabaskan-speaking Indian bands (Tututni) as actually 
living along the Rogue River in this area; the To-To-Tin (123 people), the Mack-an-o-
Tin (145 people), and the Shas-te-koos-tees (146 people), (Figure 3.). 
Winthrop and Gray (1988: 2-20) wrote: "The Big Bend has been the focus of both 
prehistoric Native American and historic Euro-American settlements, as well as the 
location of interactions between people from both groups. The Shis-tj-koos-tee (Shasta 
Costa) band of Athabaskan-speaking Rogue River Indians inhabited this stretch of the 
Rogue, from the Illinois River to the Big Bend." An 1853 census counted 145 members 
of this band (Dodge 1898: 105). Two prehistoric sites, SK-157 and SK-272, have been 
located at the confluence of the Rogue River and Billings and Foster Creeks (Winthrop 
and Gray 1988: 12, 2-21). Figure 3. Generalized territories of major ethnographic groups in southwestern Oregon 
(LaLande 1991: 3). 24 
Lifeways: An Ethnographic Portrait 
First hand information on the traditional lifeways of the early inhabitants of the 
Klamath mountains of southwestern Oregon is "quite scanty" (Aikens 1993: 223). 
Nevertheless, relying extensively on the ethnographic word picture painted by Aikens 
(1993), who in turn relied extensively on the works of Gray (1987) and LaLande (1990), 
broad and general inferences can be made to cover most of the Native peoples of the 
Siskiyou and Klamath Mountains, including those who lived along the Rogue River and 
its tributaries. These inferences would naturally include the Shis-tj-koos-tee band, who 
as previously noted, lived along the Rogue River near the Big Bend (Winthrop and Gray 
1988: 2-20), as well as the Penutian-speaking Takelma Indians who lived up river and 
occupied the middle course of the Rogue River (Gray 1985: 30-37). 
The Shis-tj-koos-tee were "hunter-fisher-gathers" (Aikens 1993: 223; LaLande 1991: 
16). They subsisted on a wide variety of natural resources that were found along the 
Rogue River and in the hills and mountains near the Big Bend. 
Settlements or villages along the Rogue River consisted of a few houses each and 
were generally located on alluvial terraces adjacent to major streams (LaLande 1989: 29, 
1991: 29). At the Big Bend this pattern remains true; two prehistoric sites, SK-157 and 
SK-272, are located on an alluvial terraces near streams (Winthrop and Gray 1988: 2­
20). These sites served as a "home base" (Aikens 1993: 223) from which the inhabitants 
ranged out over considerable distances to exploit their surrounding environment (Oregon 
Council for the Humanities 1991: 16-20; Winthrop and Gray 1988: 12-13; Zucker et al. 
1983: 29-30). Important, exploitable food sources were: salmon, trout, sucker, 25 
crayfish, and fresh water mussel from rivers and streams; deer, elk, bear, squirrel, rabbit, 
acorn, pine nut, berries, and other items from meadows and forests; and camas, 
sunflower seeds, and tarweed seeds from grassland located in the nearby hills and 
mountains (Aikens 1993: 223; Oregon Council for the Humanities 1991: 16; Winthrop 
and Gray 1988: 12-13; Zucker et al. 1983: 24-25). 
Winter living quarters served as semi permanent-dwelling locations (LaLande 1989: 
29). These locations would be nearly abandoned in early spring ".  . as people scattered . 
widely into small hunting-gathering camps" (Aikens 1993: 223). During spring and 
summer, camas roots were dug, baked in earth ovens and stored for the coming winter. 
In fall, acorns were gathered and processed as another winter staple (Aikens 1993: 223­
224; Winthrop and Gray 1988: 12-13). 
In summer and fall, the salmon harvest was a particularly important event for all 
inhabitants of the Siskiyou and Klamath Mountains. Fish weirs were constructed across 
rivers and streams to constrict the passage of salmon, forcing them through narrow 
gateways to locations where they could be netted or speared. In conjunction with weirs, 
basket traps were used to collect fish; elsewhere, fish were taken with hook and line 
(Aikens 1993: 224; Zucker et al. 1983: 15-20). 
As winter approached, people returned to their riverside homes. They stayed busy 
throughout the winter season with food gathering efforts that remained profitable, along 
with routine domestic chores. Hunting and fishing went on year round along the river, 
but was most intense during the fall and winter when food gathering activities were no 26 
longer possible in the mountains due to hostile weather conditions and snow 
accumulations. 
Settlements and villages consisted of closely related families whose social and 
political organization was relatively simple (Aikens 1993: 224; Council for the 
Humanities 1991: 16-17). Each village was a self-ruling unit bound to no larger group. 
However, purposeful and short-lived alliances with other groups did exist (Aikens 1993: 
224). Each settlement was led by one or more respected elders who enjoyed social 
standings and levels of influence above that of the average resident (LaLande 1989: 30). 
LaLande (1989: 30) wrote; "Although living as small groups of hunter-gatherers, the 
Indians of southwestern Oregon were hardly egalitarian in their social structure; 
according to the ethnographies, wealth and rank seem to have mattered a great deal." 
Within the group, an individual's status was derived from wealth and measured in goods 
such as dentalium shells and woodpeckers scalps; social standing was dependent on his 
mother's bride price (Oregon Council for the Humanities 1991: 16; Winthrop and Gray 
1988: 12; Zucker et al. 1983: 41). 
Territoriality was strongly felt by some groups, especially the Athabacan-speakers, 
and skirmishes were fought over the issue of trespassing (Aikens 1993: 224; LaLande 
1989: 32-33; Winthrop and Gray 1988: 12-13). However, there were occasions when 
different groups came together for ceremonial events or met at especially productive 
fishing and gathering locations. Additionally, since it was the custom to seek mates 
outside their home community, families were linked to other families in all directions by 
ties of kinship and marriage (Aikens 1993: 224; Oregon Council for the Humanities 27 
1991: 16). Brides went to live with their husbands in his home village (Winthrop and 
Gray 1988: 12). In sum: 
"The degree to which people maintained definite inter-group 
boundaries seems to have varied according to circumstances. Societies 
maintained home settlements, but localities where different groups 
converged to hunt, gather, or fish at certain seasons were also well 
documented. It is probably accurate to conclude that each group had 
both a heartland where it was the dominate presence, and a hinterland 
that it shared in common with neighboring peoples" (Aikens 1993: 225). 
Lifeways: A Portrait of Change 
The lifeways of the native people of southwestern Oregon slowly changed throughout 
the 80 year span of time referred to as the contact period. A word picture describing 
their lifeways portrays a diverse Indian population living much as their ancestors had 
until 1856 when it all ended with their forced relocation from the area. It can be 
discerned from the ethnohistorical observations made during the contact period that 
social and settlement patterns, rituals, diets, and subsistence activities resisted change. 
However, in the realm of the Indian's material culture, change was willingly accepted, 
and in the end, contributed substantially to the alteration of their traditional lifeways. 
For example: (1) the adoption of firearms changed the methods hunting and combat were 
conducted; targets could be addressed from greater distances (Russell 1957: 36-37); (2) 
the increased use of firearms created a dependence on a supply source for powder and 
lead, requiring non-traditional trade networks to be created (Russell 1957: 131-136); and 
(3) their acquired preference for metal and iron over stone (e.g. obsidian and chert) to 
make tools, as well as their adoption and use of textiles (e.g. cloth clothing and blankets) 28 
for body warmth, likewise required non-traditional trade sources to be established. The 
desire for material goods encouraged the Indian's interaction with white traders and 
other newcomers that eventually eroded their self-reliance; contributing to culture 
change. 
Change in the Indian's material culture was gradual (La lande 1991: 38). As the two 
cultures began interacting with one another frequently during the contact period, the 
method of acquisition of material goods by some Indians through killing and stealing lead 
to ever increasing conflict and social animosities between the cultures. With the 
exception of firearms (LaLande 1991: 41), trading by Indians amongst the white culture 
for goods was not a problem (Winther 1950: 89), but killing and stealing for these goods 
became an increasing problem (Carey 1922: 597-598). As the perception grew in the 
white community that these incidences were becoming more frequent, they contributed 
to an environment of greater animosity towards all Indians by newcomers. Over time, 
animosities between the two competing cultures grew until slow, evolutionary change in 
the lifeways of the Indians was no longer possible because armed conflict overtook the 
process and resulted in the removal of all Indians from southwestern Oregon (Carey 
1922: 597-605; Gilmoore 1952: 239-291; Schwartz 1991: 335; Walling 1884: 271-282). 
A picture of slow, inevitable change in the lifeways of the Native Culture Indian can 
be hypothesized, but the collision of the cultures that occurred in the early 1850s 
disrupted the process, and mutes the point. Nevertheless, up to the end, the Indians of 
southwestern Oregon continued to live as their ancestors had, and for the most part, in a 
manner that their forefathers would have recognized. 29 
4. CHAPTER 
PHYSICAL SETTING 
Location 
When the Battle of Big Bend was fought on 27-28 May 1856, it took place in what 
was at the time the "Oregon Territory" (Smith 1856). Today, the battle site location is 
in Curry County, southwestern Oregon. Curry County is located in an area of rugged, 
deeply dissected hills and mountains that are part of a region of mountains commonly 
referred to as the Siskiyou (Atwood and Gray 1995; Winthrop and Gray 1988) or 
Klamath Mountains (Aikens 1993; Franklin and Dyrness 1973), (Figures 1. and 2.). 
Setting 
The Battle of Big Bend took place along the west side of the Rogue River at a 
location known as the "Big Bend" or "Meadows" (Walling 1884; Weatherford c. 1950). 
The Big Bend is a wide sweeping bend in the river that is located 35 miles up river from 
the coast and approximately 10 miles upriver from the modern town of Agness. It is also 
located within an area along the river designated "Wild and Scenic" (Illahe Quadrangle 
1989). 
To the west of the Big Bend of the Rogue River is a large terrace, covering 
approximately 135 acres (Winthrop and Gray 1988: 2-20). The terrace is now, and has 
been historically, a meadow. Two streams provide water to the meadow: to the north, 30 
Billings Creek crosses the meadow's north/northeast edge to enter the Rogue River from 
the northwest; and, to the south, Foster Creek crosses the meadow's southern edge to 
likewise enter the Rogue from the west (Illahe Quadrangle 1989). The meadow is broad 
and flat, with moderate tree-covered slopes rising to the north and west to form hills, and 
beyond the hills, mountains. Today, the flat is pasture with dense grasses and tangles of 
berries; other riparian vegetation grows along the river's edge (Winthrop and Gray 1988: 
2-20). 
Hills and Mountains 
The meadow at the Big Bend is surrounded by both hills and mountains. Hills are 
adjacent and are located west of the meadow. These hills rise approximately 400 feet 
from the elevation of the meadow to form a ridge line that runs generally north/south 
(Illahe Quadrangle 1989). Off this ridge line the slopes are generally steep, cliff-like on 
the southwest, and steep to moderately steep on the east. The northeastern slope leading 
to the ridge line from the meadow is the least steep and can be described as gentle. To 
the south, the ridge line terminates at a steep toe slope overlooking Foster Creek. From 
the break on the southern toe slope toward the north, the ridge line is a kidney-shaped 
landform that is approximately 200 meters long. The northern edge of the kidney shaped 
land form overlooks a small east/west oriented saddle, Across the saddle toward the 
north, the ground again rises to meet a ridge line that runs north/northeast to 
south/southwest. The ridge lines described above essentially run together to form a "T" 
with a sloppy or tilted cross top (Figures 1. and 4.). During the battle, both ridge lines 31 
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Figure 4. Grid overlay and contour map, Big Bend Battle Site (Site # ORCU003). 32 
played important roles in how the battle was conducted for the opposing forces (Smith 
1856; Walling 1884). 
Beyond the hills to the west, north, and east across the Rogue River, mountains rise 
to elevations of more than 3000 feet within 3.5 miles of the Big Bend (Illahe Quadrangle 
1989). These mountains are steep and have been highly dissected by water erosion 
(Franklin and Dyrness 1973). The hills and mountains of southwestern Oregon consist 
of ".  thin bedded, alternating dark-gray mudstone and sandstone  ." (Geological . .  .  . . 
Map 1961). The kidney shaped landform upon which Captain Smith established his 
defense consists primarily of thin soils over mudstone. 
Temperature and Rain During May 1856 
The winter of 1856 was reportedly one of the coldest noted in Oregon history. 
Captain H.M. Judah, commanding officer of Fort Jones in northern California, wrote in a 
13 December 1855 letter to his superiors at the United States Army's Department of the 
Pacific, ".  .  .  the winter set in with unusual severity" (Davis and Frank 1994: 128); and 
snow, 18 inches deep, was reported on the floor of the Rogue Valley (Gilmore 1952). 
During May 1856 weather conditions were reportedly rainy at the Big Bend. It was 
mentioned that heavy rains and runoff delayed most Indians from making their way to 
the Big Bend for their 26 May 1856 rendezvous with Captain Smith (Smith 1856). At 
the time, Captain Smith thought it reasonable that poor weather conditions caused the 
Indians to be delayed, and wrote in his 30 May 1856 report ".  the 26th being rainy and . 
disagreeable, the Indians did not come in according to promise, and made that excuse 33 
which of itself was plausible enough." Drawn from primary and secondary sources, the 
above mentioned references to poor weather conditions is evidence that suggests both 
the soldiers and Indians had experienced a severe winter, along with wet weather just 
prior to the battle, but not necessarily during the battle. 
The daily temperature ranges experienced by the combatants during May 1856 can 
only be conjectured. Recently gathered weather data collected at the Illahe weather 
station has revealed that during the last 39 years, the average daily maximum 
temperature for May has been 85.81 degrees Fahrenheit and the average daily minimum 
temperature for May has been 58.32 degrees Fahrenheit (Climate 1960). Additionally, 
though the total yearly rainfall averages 80+ inches per year in the area of the Big Bend 
(Hall 1957), May rain averages have been less than 3 inches for the same period (Climate 
1996). Extrapolating from this information; and assuming that the daily temperature 
ranges for May haven't varied a great deal over the last 150 years; and because Captain 
Smith did not mention weather as a factor in his report of the battle, it can be assumed 
that during the period of the battle, weather was neither too hot, too cold, nor too wet. 
However, sunny, dry, and open slopes may have contributed to the soldiers level of 
discomfort and added to their requirements for drinking water. In Walling's (1884) 
account of the battle; during the night of the 27 May, Captain Smith sent soldiers to 
obtain water from the "river." If this account is true, then the river was probably not the 
Rogue River, and was most likely Foster Creek by reason of its proximity to the soldier's 
positions above the creek. But in view of the fact that Captain Smith neglects to 
mention sending soldiers for water in his report, it is suspected that the event did not 34 
take place. This rationale is based on the following: during the night of 27 May the 
battle situation was extremely precarious for the soldiers; they remained encircled by 
Indian warriors and had sustained serious combat losses throughout the day; and the risk 
seems too great to have taken place and not be mentioned in the battle after-action 
report. It is not as though Captain Smith neglects to mention events that took place 
throughout the night of the 27th, because in his report he notes that during the hours of 
darkness his men improved their defensive positions by digging ".  rifle pits to contain . . 
. from two to five men each  ." and erecting a "breastwork" (Smith 1856). It seems odd 
to mention defensive house keeping chores and not an action (obtaining water) that 
appears more significant. Sending soldiers to the creek for water would not have been 
easily accomplished undetected and would have taken some skill and bravery to 
accomplish without further lose of life and combat power. Today, the kidney shaped 
landform that Captain Smith established his defense upon is dominated by Douglas-fir 
and large Pacific madrone trees which now provide ample shade. 
Vegetation and Logging 
The Big Bend, and its surrounding area, is classified as being in a mixed conifer and 
mixed evergreen vegetation zone (Franklin and Dyrness 1973). Today, the slopes west 
of the meadow at the Big Bend are covered with an open forest which consist of a 
mixture of vegetation including low shade tolerant plants and 70 foot tall/high sun 
seeking trees that canopy. Fifty foot Pacific madrone and dead manzanita on the forest 
floor attest to the fact that the present vegetation regime has not always been as it is 35 
today. Winthrop and Gray (1988) specifically addressed this point. From their 1987 
interviews with long time local residents Mr. Buster Billings and Mr. Ernie Rutledge, 
they wrote (1988: 8) ".  the countryside was more open in the past than it is now, with . . 
fewer conifers and more oak. Native Americans managed the landscape by periodically 
burning off the brush, opening areas for deer browse, and encouraging oak and 
hazelnuts." Additionally, they noted (1988: 8) ".  .  .  that after the turn of the century 
much of the land [along the Rogue River began to be managed by the Forest Service],  . 
. .  and has been subjected to a consistent policy of fire suppression. As a result, 
Douglas-fir has encroached upon the oak and madrone, and the formerly open aspect 
along the river has become considerably more forested." 
Past logging activity in the area of the battle site appears to have been localized on 
the north/northeast to south/southwest ridge and the northern edge of the kidney shaped 
landform. Individual tree stumps remain scattered over the area, however, the scattered 
nature of the stumps argues that trees were harvested selectively, as opposed to clear 
cutting. The ground surface is generally not disturbed, nor scarred by heavy equipment 
or the skidding of logs. Nonetheless, there is evidence of heavy equipment having 
moved along the top of the kidney shaped land form from north to south for 
approximately 80 meters. The last logging activity in the area reportedly took place 
during the early 1950s (Rutledge 1996), and it appears that since that occurrence, the 
ridges have been allowed to grow unencumbered by human activity. 
During May 1856 it is probable that the soldiers and Indian warriors observed a 
different vegetational landscape than exists presently at the site. The landscape they 36 
encountered was presumably more open (Augur 1856) and sunny since it had been 
altered by intentional burning (Winthrop and Gray 1988: 8). However, it can be 
assumed that the mixed forest vegetation now growing on the site (Franklin and Dyrness 
1973) was present in 1856, but in different combinations of dominating plants and trees. 
Table 1. lists tree species now growing on the slopes and ridge lines. Other types of 
vegetation; ferns, grasses, manzanita, and poison oak, are present throughout the area, 
but are collectively less in evidence (Applen Oct. 1996; Seda June 1997). 
Table 1. List of trees growing on site. 
Common Name:  Scientific Name: 
Big Leaf Maple  Acer macrophyllum 
Buckthorn  Rhamnus 
California Black Oak  Quercus kelloggii 
Canyon Live Oak  Quercus chrysolepis 
Douglas-fir  Pseudotsuga 
Golden Chinkapins  Castonopsis chrysophylla 
Hazel  Corylus avellana 
Incense-cedar  Calocedrus decurrens 
Oregon White Oak  Quercus garryana 
Pacific Madrone  Arbutus menziesis 
Ponderosa  Pinus ponderosa 
Sugar Pine  Pinus lembertiana 
Tanoak  Lithocarpus densiflorus 37 
5. CHAPTER
 
THE BATTLE OF BIG BEND
 
The Battle of Big Bend was a thirty hour affair fought during 27 and 28 May 1856. 
The combatants were Company "C", 1st Dragoons, a reinforced (Rein.) company of 
dragoons, under the command of Captain Andrew Jackson Smith, and a diverse group of 
hostile Indians lead by Chief John (Buchanan 30 May 1856; Smith 1856). The battle is 
significant for two reasons: (1) the battle was the last major effort by Indians of 
southwestern Oregon to resist the loss of their lands (Homer 1924); and (2) as a result of 
the way it concluded, the Rogue River Indian War was declared over (Buchanan 10 July 
1856). 
A full account of the entire Rogue River Indian War is considered beyond the scope 
of this paper and is not attempted. However, in order to set the historical stage, to 
provide context, and to make the occurrence of the affair sensible, a brief account of 
events occurring during the winter of 1855-1856 will be mentioned. Only enough detail 
will be offered in order to give purpose to both Captain Smith's and Chief John's 
actions. For detailed historical narratives of this period and the entire Rogue Indian War, 
the works by Walling (1884), Carey (1922), Watson (c. 1942), Robison (1943), 
Weatherford (c. 1950), Gilmore (1952), Beckham (1987), and Schwartz (1994) are 
recommended. Additionally, an Army perspective of the war can be gained by reading 
the 1856 after-action reports written by the Army's tactical commanders, LtCol. 
Buchanan, Captain Smith, Captain Augur and Captain Ord's diary. 38 
The Rogue River Indian War 
"The Rogue River [Indian] War" was characterized by Pollard (1946: 120) as "a long 
drawn out affair of few engagements," and yet Weatherford (c. 1950: 43) described it as 
a "bloody contest." Both authors are no doubt correct, their point dependent on the 
perspective they chose to articulate. The war essentially consisted of many small 
engagements until the final battle. It was fought primarily along trails, streams, and 
rivers near the coast and in the mountains of southwestern Oregon. Except for the war's 
last few months, the Indians controlled the initiative. The Indians made it a "bloody 
contest" by selecting targets vulnerable to their style of fighting. For the most part, they 
chose when and where to attack, primarily selecting individuals, and small groups of 
miners, packers, travelers, and settlers as their targets. The Indian's fighting style 
incorporated ambush and surprise to take the fight to their enemies, and when pursued 
by either Army or volunteer forces, they controlled whether significant battle would be 
offered. Nevertheless, in spite of their early successes, by the close of the winter of 
1855-1856 the Indians found themselves being hunted by Regular Army and volunteer 
forces whom they could not decisively defeat, and by the end of May 1856 they were 
compelled to surrender. But before accepting removal from their home lands, many 
chose to fight, and endeavored to drive the whites out of the mountains with one major 
effort, the Battle of Big Bend (Horner 1924; Schwartz 1994, 1997; Weatherford c. 
1950). 39 
Winter of 1855-1856 
The winter of 1855-1856 was both friend and foe to the combatants involved in the 
Rogue River Indian War. The winter weather was reported to have been unusually cold 
in the mountains (Davis and Frank 1994: 128), thus permitting both opposing forces to 
take advantage of the snow and cold to break contact, and to winter-over in camps and 
forts along the Rogue River or in more traditional housing such as Fort Lane and Fort 
Orford, Figure 2. (Gilmore 1952; Weatherford c.1950). For the Army and the volunteer 
forces, the snow in the mountains made the Indian's camps difficult to find, and even 
more difficult to surprise and attack (Gilmore 1952). For the Indians, the snow and cold 
in the mountains provided an element of security for their winter camps. But, because 
many of the Indians were wintering in non-traditional winter quarters, without sufficient 
amounts of stored foods from the previous collecting/gathering/hunting season, the 
winter was difficult (Gilmore 1952; Weatherford c. 1950). 
After hostilities broke out in October 1855, the Oregon Territorial Government 
formed "volunteer" organizations of citizens to fight the Indians, and the Army planned a 
spring campaign with the objective of containing and defeating the Indians in the 
mountains (Weatherford c. 1950: 37-46). This situation became possible because, after 
conflict broke out, the hostile Indians took refuge in the Rogue River Canyon where they 
were pursued by both Army and volunteer troops (Gilmore 1952), In October and 
November 1855 the pursuing Army and volunteer forces fought two battles in the Rogue 
River Canyon with these hostile Indians; one at Galice Creek on 17-18 October, and the 
second near Grave Creek on 31 October - 1 November, Figure 2. (Carey 1922; Colvig 40 
1903; Gilmore 1952; Schwartz 1994; Weatherford c. 1950). The 31 October - 1 
November engagement has come to be "known variously as the battle of Hungry Hill, 
Bloody Spring and Grave Creek Hills" (Carey 1922: 602). The Indians are reported to 
have won these engagements by compelling the Army and the volunteer forces to 
abandon the fight (Carey 1922: 602; Colvig 1903; Gilmore 1952; Weatherford c. 1950). 
After these engagements, the Indians moved even deeper into the Rogue River Canyon 
and wintered over in camps near the Big Meadows, Figure 2., (approximately 28 miles 
down river from Grave Creek) and other camps below that location (Atwood and Gray 
1995; Gilmore 1952; Schwartz 1997). A volunteer force followed the Indians into the 
canyon and established a winter camp on the Big Meadows upriver from the Indians, 
blocking the Indians ability to pass up river beyond the Big Meadow (Gilmore 1952). 
Along the coast, hostilities continued throughout the winter. Snow was not a factor 
to dissuade hostile coastal Indians from taking the initiative and attacking at will. As a 
result, in February 1856, most settler cabins were burned as the Indians nearly cleared 
the coast of non-Indians (Schwartz 1997). The Indians put to siege the citizens of Gold 
Beach and panicked most whites from Port Orford south to Crescent City with their 
depravations, Figure 2. (Carey 1922; Gilmore 1952). Many miners, settlers and packers 
were killed, including Ben Wright, the locale Indian agent (Carey 1922). These early 
successful Indian attacks alarmed the entire white community living in northern 
California and most of Oregon (Carey 1922). Their success created an environment of 
fear, sparked newspaper editorials calling for the "extermination," and/or the complete 41 
removal of all Indians from the area by either the Army or volunteer forces (Gilmore 
1952). 
In the spring of 1856 General Wool, Commanding Officer of the Army's Pacific 
District, placed brevet LtCol. Robert C. Buchanan in charge of all Army tactical forces in 
northern California and southern Oregon (Colvig, 1903; Weatherford, c. 1950). LtCol. 
Buchanan's orders were to attack all hostile Indians, to remove all survivors and friendly 
Indians from the area, and to place them on newly created reservations (Buchanan 1 
April, 22 May 1856; Gilmore 1952; Schwartz 1997; Weatherford c. 1950). In 
preparation for his mission, LtCol. Buchanan utilized the winter months to organize and 
consolidate his forces at Crescent City, Fort Orford, and Fort Lane, Figure 2. He used 
the winter to establish supply procedures, build a hospital at Fort Orford, and finalize his 
spring attack plan into the mountains (Buchanan 15, 27 March, 1 April 1856; 
Weatherford c. 1950). 
As the situation between the opposing forces developed, LtCol. Buchanan's plan was 
simple and direct. Since volunteer forces had followed the Indians down the Rogue 
River Canyon and had established a blocking position at the Big Meadows, LtCol. 
Buchanan's plan was for the volunteers to maintain their position while regular Army 
forces attacked eastward, up the Rogue River from the coast (Horner 1924: 95; 
Schwartz 1997). His plan was to push all hostile Indians together until they could be 
compelled to surrender or be attacked and killed (Buchanan 1 April 1856; Carey 1922; 
Horner 1924: 95). 42 
During the winter the tactical situation between the two opposing forces developed 
differently. The winter months allowed the Army and volunteer forces to become 
stronger by consolidating their forces in preparation for their spring offensive, while in 
the mountains, the Indians became weaker by virtue of the depletion of their food and 
other resources. Time was on the side of the opponent that could resupply itself; and the 
Army held this advantage and, to a lesser extent, so did the volunteers (Schwartz 1994: 
300). On the other hand, resupply was not easily accomplish in the field. Resupply was 
done by pack trains which were particularly vulnerable to attack by mobile Indian 
warriors. Because the Indians chose when and where to attack, they held an advantage 
in this area which was of particular concern to LtCol. Buchanan. This situation 
compelled LtCol. Buchanan to attach an infantry company to each resupply pack train 
for security purposes as it moved through the mountains or along the coast (Buchanan 
30 May 1856). This solution had the unintentional effect of consuming a large degree of 
the Army's combat power in southern Oregon, degrading its lethality. Security for pack 
trains, although a highly legitimate and reasonable concern, nearly cost Captain Smith a 
defeat. As events unfolded prior to the battle, Captain Smith's difficult situation resulted 
from LtCol. Buchanan's decision to position his reserve company on ground closer to his 
routes of resupply, rather than at a position from which he could quickly reinforce 
Captain Smith at the Big Bend (Buchanan 30 May 1856). 43 
The Stage Is Set 
By early spring the stage was set for combat in southern Oregon. The Army was on 
the move along the coast by April 1856; making forays into the mountains, searching out 
Indian villages, killing their inhabitants, and destroying houses and food stores 
(Buchanan 27 March 1856; Ord 1856, 1970). The volunteer forces remained in their 
blocking position at the Big Meadows, approximately 9 miles up river from the Big Bend 
(Gilmore 1952). The Indians were living in scattered camps along the Rogue and Illinois 
Rivers and beginning to feel the pressure of the Army moving up river. Realizing they 
were essentially boxed in, some groups of hostile Indians began to show signs of desiring 
to terminate hostilities (Buchanan 22 May 1956; Gilmore 1952). 
Meeting At Oak Flat, 20-21 May 1856 
On 20 May 1856 LtCol Buchanan convened a meeting at Oak Flat, on the Illinois 
River, with the chiefs of the hostile Indian bands (Buchanan 22 May 1856). He met with 
Chiefs John, George, and Limpy. After all the principles had stated their positions, and 
had deliberated for more than 24 hours, Chiefs George and Limpy agreed to surrender. 
They promised to surrender themselves and their people at the Big Bend on 26 May 
1856 (Buchanan 22 May 1856). Chief John refused to surrender and is reported to have 
made the following statement prior to his departure from Oak Flat: 
You are a great chief. So am I. This is my country. I was in it when 
those large trees were very small, not higher than my head. My heart is 
sick with fighting, but I want to live in my own country. If the white 
people are willing, I will go back to Deer Creek and live among them as I 
used to do. They can visit my camp, and I will visit theirs; but I will not 44 
lay down my arms and go with you on the reserve. I will fight. Goodby 
(Gilmore 1952: 286-287). 
Captain Smith Moves Company "C" (Rein.) to the Big Bend, 24 May 1856 
On 24 May 1856 Captain Smith and Company "C" (Rein.) departed Oak Flat for the 
Big Bend with orders to receive Chiefs George and Limpy's people on 26 May 1856 
(Buchanan 22 May 1856; Walling 1884: 279).  Having attended the 20 May Oak Flat 
meeting, Captain Smith was familiar with the meeting's outcome and the tactical 
situation; Chief George and Limpy had agreed to surrender while Chief John remained 
hostile (Buchanan 22 May 1856). Captain Smith's command arrived at the Big Bend on 
the evening of 24 May 1856 (Buchanan 30 May 1856; Smith 1856). 
Captain Smith's command consisted of Company "C", 1st Dragoons, reinforced by 
30 soldiers from Company "E", 4th Infantry, under the command of Lt. Sweitzer, 1st 
Dragoons. Additionally, Company "G", 4th Infantry, under the command of Captain 
Augur, was attached for the move to the Big Bend. Captain Augur's orders were to: (1) 
accompany Captain Smith to the Big Bend and (2) then return to Oak Flat with Captain 
Smith's pack animals; a task accomplished on 25 May (Buchanan 30 May 1856). 
On 24 May the force initially consisted of three regular line officers, one army 
surgeon, 150 enlisted men, and one civilian guide, Mr. Foster (Atwood 1978; Buchanan 
30 May 1856; Dodge 1969; Smith 1856; Weatherford c. 1950). On 25 May Captain 
Augur's company left Captain Smith's force to escort pack animals to Oak Flat; 
consequently depleting the strength of Captain Smith's commands by one regular line 45 
officer and 54 enlisted men. Additionally, Captain Augur's departure with the pack 
animals cost Captain Smith transport mobility and limited his future tactical options 
because he was without animals and completely on foot. 
Soldier's Load 
When Captain Smith's soldiers departed Fort Lane on 8 May, they were reported to 
have been carrying 60 rounds of lead ball ammunition and powder (Weatherfordc. 
1950), and seven days rations (Buchanan 1 April 1856). Their rations would have been 
consumed on their trek to the area of Oak Flat, but because they were not involved in 
any fighting, their ammunition allowances would not have been depleted. Additionally, 
Smith's force had one mounted howitzer (Smith 1856), with possibly 50 rounds of 
canister ammunition and powder (Weatherford, c. 1950). 
Weapons 
Captain Smith's enlisted soldiers were armed with two dissimilar types of muskets 
because it was the policy of the US Army of the 1850s to equip dragoon and infantry 
regiments differently. The Army's rationale behind equipping regiments with different 
types of muskets came from the expectation that dragoon and infantry soldiers would be 
employed differently in battle. Dragoons were expected to ride to the battle on horse 
back, while infantry soldiers walked (Keegan and Holmes 1986: 73). Consequently, 
dragoons were equipped with musketoons that were shorter in length than infantry 46 
muskets, 26 inches versus 30 inches (Garavaglia 1984: 132). The shorter musket 
enabled the mounted dragoon to reload while riding (Garavaglia 1984: 134). 
Unfortunately, there was a trade-off in order to achieve this capability; the musketoon 
was inaccurate, possessed a very short effective range, and had a large "kick" (Dillon 
1996; Garavaglia 1984; Russell 1957). It was further described by Walling (1884: 271) 
"as [an] ill-featured fire-arm that was alike aggressive at both ends." The musketoon 
was a smooth bore, .69 caliber weapon, while the infantry soldier's musket was a smooth 
bore, .54 caliber weapon (Garavaglia 1984: 132, 134; Russell 1957). 
The musketoon's capabilities requires further discussion in order to demonstrate how 
its peculiarities affected the conduct of the battle. As mentioned above, the musketoon 
was an inaccurate weapon and could not be relied upon to effectively hit targets at 
ranges greater than 50 meters (Dillon 1996). This characteristic of the weapon, though 
not significant to mounted soldiers who could close quickly with their targets while 
riding, had the unintended effect of placing dismounted dragoons at a distinct 
disadvantage while fighting as infantry. Dismounted dragoons could not expect to hit 
their targets until the target was well within the 50 meter effective range limitation. 
Therefore, to increase hits on a target, a dragoon would need to close the distance 
between himself and the target. This explains why Smith's men would "charge" out of 
their defensive perimeter "to force the Indians to retire" (Smith 1856). The musketoon's 
short range limitation would not preclude dragoons from firing at targets at ranges 
greater than 50 meters, however, a hit on a target would be more akin to an accident 
than to good marksmanship (Dillon 1996). But, on the other hand, it must be noted that 47 
the musketoon fired such a large sized ball that when the ball hit a target it caused 
extreme damage (Russell 1957). The inaccuracy of the musketoon placed Captain 
Smith's command at a disadvantage during the battle that was to come (Drew 1860). 
Weather at the Big Bend, 25 May 1856 
The day of 25 May 1856 was "rainy and disagreeable" (Smith 1856). Poor weather 
conditions were "plausible enough" for Captain Smith to explain why few Indians had 
arrived at the Big Bend "as promised" by that date (Smith 1856; Walling 1884: 279). 
Captain Smith Moves Company "C" (Rein.) to High Ground, 26 May 1856 
During the morning of 26 May 1856 several Indians came into Captain Smith's camp 
at the Big Bend and related that Chief George was "some nine miles" up river, 
"endeavoring to make his way down with all his people including the Applegate, Galice 
Creek, & Cow Creek bands (Figure 3.), and if not prevented by Old John & the 
Klamaths, would reach" camp at the Big Bend that day (Smith 1856). 
"Late in the afternoon" on 26 May 1856 Captain Smith was "informed by some 
Indian boys [that had been in his camp for several days], that it was the talk * * * * the 
Indians that Old John was to attack .  early the next morning [27 May], with all the . . 
Indians he could muster, on the north side of our camp & the Lower River Indians on the 
south side" (Smith 1856). 48 
After being warned of a possible attack, Captain Smith sent Lt. Sweitzer to "examine 
our adjacent hill with a view of occupying it if found suitable" (Smith 30 May 1856). Lt. 
Sweitzer's report was favorable, and after dark, Captain Smith moved his command to 
high ground (Smith 1856). The high ground selected was a kidney shaped ridge line, 
approximately 200 meters long, oriented generally north/northeast to south/southwest, 
located about one mile west of the Rogue River (Smith 1856; Augur 1856), (Figures 1. 
and 4). 
Captain Smith (1856) described the move to the high ground: "  .  .  having to . 
transport my howitzer ammunition, stores, etc. on the backs of my men." This laborious 
effort was a consequence of LtCol. Buchanan's order to return all pack animals to Oak 
Flat. 
The Battle, 27-28 May 1856 
As previously mentioned, the battle was a 30 hour affair. When the battle began on 
the morning of 27 May 1856, Captain Smith's command was on high ground, in position 
to defend itself, and/or to accomplish its original mission of receiving surrendering 
Indians. Describing when he brought his command to the ready, Captain Smith (1856) 
wrote: 
Early on the morning of 27th several Indians came in camp, some of them 
George's people, and told me the Indians were coming in, I soon saw a number 
of canoes land and small parties moving up the hill, all apparently friendly, though 
being armed I would not permit them to enter camp, up to ten o'clock in the day 
their number ever increasing, and as soon as I ascertained that many of John's 
people were among them I placed my whole command under arms, not 
suspecting up to this time their treachery. 49 
. Even though Captain Smith (1856) uses the words ".  . not suspecting up to this time 
their treachery" in his report, he had already taken precautions against being surprised 
and overwhelmed by moving his command to high ground, increasing security on his 
perimeter, and placing his howitzer in a position that it could do its destructive work. 
Describing the opening of the battle, Captain Smith (1856) wrote: 
I increased my salient on the left brow of the hill that is steep and covered 
with timber and heavy brush with orders not to fire the first gun. By this 
time they had entirely surrounded the hill & their movements seemed 
hostile. The Indians fired the first gun about eleven o'clock and a large 
body of them were seen moving up the northern slope of the hill, and as 
they appeared above the crest, they were met by a discharge of canisters 
from the Howitzer followed by a charge of the men occupying that 
portion of the hill, which drove them out of sight into the thick brush. 
From the above, it can be hypothesized that when the Indians charged the northern slope 
of the ridge into the killing zone or cone of fire of the howitzer, they had no idea where 
the howitzer was located. 
Tactical decisions made by Captain Smith and Chief John can be determined from 
Captain Smith (1856) statement: "at the same time [referring to the above mentioned 
"charge "] they attempted to charge the hill on the left and center, but were gallantly met 
by Lt. Sweitzer who had charge of the southern slope of the hill." This statement 
explains two separate tactical decisions: (1) that Captain Smith located his 30 attached 
infantry soldiers, with their longer reaching and more accurate weapons, on the southern 
end of the ridge line near N 60 / E 60 (Figure 4.); and (2) that Chief John's opening 
attack focused on two separate points on Captain Smith's perimeter. The efforts of 
Chief John's warriors were probably directed at locations in the vicinity of N 240 / E 
120, and N 160 / E 120, (Figure 4.). 50 
After the Indian's initial assaults were broken, they took positions that provided a 
cross fire on the soldiers occupying the northern end of Captain Smith's perimeter. 
Smith (1856) wrote: 
The Indians then took a position on a ridge to our left, on the slope 
leading up to our camp from which they procured a cross fire on the men 
in position on the flank, and succeeded in wounding so many in the 
course of two hours that I had to withdraw them some ten or twenty 
yards behind the crest of the hill, from which position a continuous fire 
was kept up during the days and charges made at different times that 
force the Indians to retire. 
From the above, it can be hypothesized that the Indians occupied positions on the ridge 
line running generally north/northeast to south/southwest, in the vicinity of N 260 / E 
020 to N 400 / E 120, and that the soldiers who were wounded and killed at the 
beginning of the battle, were initially located in the vicinity of N 240 / E 120, and moved 
to positions near N 200 / E 120, (Figure 4.), 
By nightfall on 27 May 1856, Smith's command had suffered four men killed and 15 
wounded (Smith 1856; Appendix A and C). At this point in the battle, Captain Smith's 
force had lost 19.7% of its effective strength. This loss of combat power limited Captain 
Smith's tactical options and put the soldiers in serious jeopardy. The soldiers lacked the 
combat strength and mobility to break out of their encirclement without abandoning their 
wounded. Therefore, the written evidence suggests the soldiers began preparing for the 
worst. Captain Smith wrote in his report (1856): 
About eleven o'clock at night, Lt. Sweitzer with all the men that could be 
spared, commenced a breastwork on the southern part of the hill 
composed of blankets, saddles, tents, provision, etc., & with the aid of 
our * * * * so far completed it by daylight as to form a tolerable protection 
for our wounded & a small portion of the command. On the outside of 
this work I had dug a number of rifle pits to contain from two to five men 
each & which were found to assure the desired purpose. 51 
From the above, it appears that Captain Smith prepared a smaller, more consolidated 
defensive position on his southern flank. It appears that it was oriented towards the 
north in order to meet an assault from that direction, (Figure 4.). 
During the early morning hours of 28 May 1856 the Indians became aware of the 
activity of the soldiers to improve their defensive position and began firing again at about 
4 a.m. Smith (1856) wrote: "As soon as the Indians discovered our movements they 
raised signal fires and by four o'clock in the morning of the 28th renewed their attack 
which they kept up by brisk fire until 4 p.m. & making several attempts during the day to 
charge us." 
At about 4 p.m. on 28 May Company "G", 4th Infantry, under the command of 
Captain Augur, "entered the plain [meadow] at the 'Big Bend' (Augur 1856, see 
Appendix A). He "entered" the meadow near the point where Foster Creek enters the 
Rogue River, (Figure 1.). Captain Augur (1856) described the battle scene in his report: 
"I found the crests and river slopes of these hills covered with indians, some of them 
women and children who ran for the river at the point terminating the hill so soon as the 
company appeared." 
After seeing the situation on the slopes, Captain Augur decided to attack across the 
meadow at the "double quick" to intercept the women and children. But before he could 
run his company across the meadow to their location, approximately one mile distant, all 
the Indian women and children had crossed the Rogue River in canoes (Augur 1856). 
After crossing to the northern edge of the meadow, Captain Augur turned his 
company west and, in a line of skirmishes, began an assault on the hills that the Indian 52 
warriors occupied (Augur 1856). Taking cover behind scattered oak trees, Indian 
warriors remained on the slopes until the soldiers of Company "G" drove them away. At 
the top of the hill, Captain Augur rested his company for ten minutes, and then continued 
his attack on the positions to which the Indians had fallen back (Augur 1856). 
When Captain Augur's assault began to have an effect on the Indians by driving them 
away from and off the ridge lines north of the soldier's position, Captain Smith ordered 
Lt. Sweitzer and the attached Company "E" soldiers to attack the Indians ".  then . . 
occupying the hills on our front and ridges to the left" (Smith 1856). This decision 
indicates that Captain Smith's southern flank was no longer threatened, and could be 
defended by dragoons and the walking wounded located within the breastworks. The 
written evidence indicates that upon the appearance of Captain Augur's company, the 
Indians on the southeast facing slopes felt pressure to retire, as they had soldiers to their 
front and rear. 
Army Battle Casualties 
The numbers of battle casualties suffered by the Army are known; those of the 
Indians are not. Captain Smith's report of 30 May 1856 contained a combined list of all 
Army casualties suffered during the Battle of Big Bend, (Appendix C). The Appendix is 
quoted from Captain Smith's report and lists all casualties by name, rank, parent 
company and regiment; whether killed, mortally wounded, or wounded, and the specific 
location of each wound. Table 2. is extrapolated from Captain Smith's casualty report to 
illustrates the numbers of casualties suffered by the Army during the Battle. 53 
Table 2. List of Army casualties at the Battle of Big Bend. 
Parent Company  Killed  Mortally Wounded  Wounded 
Company "C"  5  2 9 
Company "E"  0  1  5 
Company "G"  2  0  3 
Total  7 3  17 
Indian Battle Casualties 
The number of Indian casualties is unknown, but were estimated to be considerable. 
Captain Smith (1856) wrote: "It is well known that during the first day a number of 
Indians were either killed or wounded, but it is impossible to state with any degree of 
accuracy the number as they were instantly dragged from the field." 
Bands Participating In the Battle 
Beckham (1977: 145) identifies the hostile Indian bands participating in the Rogue 
River Indian War as the Takelma, Tututni, Chetco, Upper Coquille, and Upper Umpqua 
bands. Captain Smith (1856) refers to "Klamath" warriors being in the company of 
Chief John prior to the commencement of fighting on 27 May 1856, and LtCol. 
Buchanan's  10 July 1856 report included "Kiamaths" as having surrendered. It is highly 
probable that individual warriors from all the bands mentioned above participated in the 
Battle of Big Bend. 54 
Post Battle 
On the evening of 28 May 1856 the Battle of Big Bend was over. Upon its 
conclusion, Indians began surrendering to the Army. By 30 May 1856 one hundred and 
eighty-five individuals from various bands had surrendered themselves to the Army at the 
Big Bend. To illustrate the demographics of the Indian individuals who had surrendered 
by 31 May 1856, Table 3. has been extracted from LtCol. Buchanan's 31 May report. 
During June and July 1856, all Indian prisoners were removed from the mountains of 
southwestern Oregon, and moved to the Siletz Indian Reservations (Buchanan 10 July 
1856). 
Volunteers 
On 30 May 1856 a volunteer force arrived at the Big Bend from the Big Meadow up 
river. Their actions appear to have been in concert with LtCol. Buchanan's tactical plan 
to block Indian movements up river. On 27 May, volunteers began pursuing Indians 
down river from their blocking position at the Big Meadow. The volunteers killed 
several individuals, both male and female, and took several prisoners. Unfortunately, the 
people they had attacked were from George and Limpy's bands who thought of 
themselves as out of the war because they did not participate in the attack on Captain 
Smith (Schwartz 1994, 1997). After discussions with LtCol. Buchanan, the volunteers 
turned their prisoners over to the Army. 55 
Table 3. Demographics of individual Indians surrendering by 31 May 1856. 
Name of  Residence  Men  Women  Boys  Girls  Children  Total 
Band  Under 8 Years 
of Age 
George's  Upper  24  40  6  9  19  98 
Rogue 
River 
Limpy's  15  18  7  5  4  49 
Applegate  Applegate  6  15  7  2  3  33 
Cow  Cow  2  3  5 
Creeks &  Creek & 
Klamaths  Klamath 
River 
Aggregate = 185 
War Ends 
LtCol. Buchanan declared the war "closed" in his 10 July 1856 report to General 
Wool. Additionally, in the report he mentions that "Old John" had surrendered on 29 
June 1856 and notes the number of Indians who had turned themselves in. He mentions 
that up to the date of his report, 1225 Indians had surrendered and that there were fewer 
than 35 Indians remaining in the military district between the Klamath River and the 
Coquille River (Buchanan 10 July 1956). Additionally, he mentions the disposition of all 
Indian prisoners, identifies which officer(s) and Army units had escorted the various 
groups of Indians to their separate locations on the reservation, and their means of 
travel, either by walking or by steamer. 
In his 10 July 1856 report, LtCol. Buchanan mentions his pride in the fact that a 
policy of "extermination" was not adopted by the Army or himself. He believed a policy 56 
of extermination would have been impossible to carry out and, had it been adopted, it 
would have taken far longer than the four month campaign he had waged. LtCol. 
Buchanan also refers disparagingly to the "quasi" troops (volunteers) who had taken to 
the field with orders "not to take prisoners." 
End of War Inventory 
As part of his end of war administrative responsibilities, LtCol. Buchanan ordered an 
inventory of all Army property on hand at Fort Orford be completed. The inventory, 
dated 11 July 1856, is interesting; it not only lists all Army property on hand, weapons, 
tools, and food stuff, but it also lists Indian weapons captured during the war. Table 4. 
below, is extracted from the inventory as it pertains to captured Indian weapons. The 
table demonstrates that a relatively small number of Indian fire arms were accounted for, 
specifically, only eighty-five direct fire weapons were recovered. 
Table 4. demonstrates that the  11 July 1856 inventory likely failed to account for all 
of the weapons used by hostile Indians during the war. Captain Smith's (1856)  casualty 
list explicitly states that all his casualties were caused by "rifles," and LtCol. Buchanan's 
conservative estimated of one hundred and fifty Indians involved in the fight (Buchanan 
30 May 1856), argues for more weapons involved in the war than were accounted for in 
the 11 July inventory. Two possibilities might explain the small number of rifles 
inventoried: (1) Indians warriors cached their most serviceable weapons in anticipation 
of returning to their homes, and/or (2) the most serviceable weapons were taken as 
trophies by volunteers arriving at the Big Bend after general surrendering had begun 57 
(Walling 1884; Weatherford c.1950). A combination of the two possibilities seems 
probable. However, in view of the Army's poor regard for the "volunteer" soldier, it is 
not likely that they would have allowed many serviceable weapons to fall into the hands 
of the volunteer companies. 
Table 4. Indian weapons captured during the Rogue River Indian War of 1855-1856. 
Number  Weapon Type 
64  Rifles 
12  Shot Guns 
1  Carbine 
3  Pistols 
5  Pistol Revolvers 
2  Swords 
40  Pouches, Powder Horns 58 
6. CHAPTER
 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY
 
Field Methods 
The archaeological methodology used for this project was adapted from the work 
done by Scott and Fox (1987) at the Custer Battlefield in Montana. The field 
investigation was undertaken entirely on the slopes and ridge lines of the hills west of the 
meadow at the Big Bend on the Rogue River. The plan was to focus on the slopes and 
ridge lines (i.e., the likely battle site) and to move to other locations within the battle 
area as the situation on the ground developed, time and personnel permitting. As 
mentioned before, the primary effort of the field investigation was to fix the location 
(boundaries) of Captain Smith's defensive position. 
The fieldwork consisted of four phases: (1) the orientation phase, (2) the inventory 
phase, (3) the testing phase, and (4) the inventory evaluation phase. For the most part, 
the last three phases were conducted concurrently. During the orientation phasea grid 
system was established by which precise artifact locations could be recorded. In the 
inventory phase electronic metal detectors, visual survey methods, pin flagging, 
recording, and collecting procedures were used. The testing phase consisted of two 
procedures, small-block excavation and auger tests. The inventory evaluation phase was 
conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the inventory phase. Details of each phase are 
explained below. 59 
General Procedures 
Standard archaeological data recording methods were used in each phase of the 
fieldwork. Individual artifacts, spatially distinct clusters of identical specimens, or 
associated related specimens received unique field specimen (FS) numbers. Field notes 
were recorded on standardized surface collection and unit excavation forms. Exposed 
excavations were photographed and recorded in black-and-white prints. Color slides 
were taken of selected field work activities. Soil profiles were recorded on standard 
recording forms. 
All metal detector alerts were investigated and finds recorded and collected without 
regard for their period of origination. Even though many non-battle artifacts were 
collected, this was necessary because, if left in place, they would continue providing 
metal detector alerts during the inventory evaluation phase. 
Orientation Phase 
A permanent grid reference system was surveyed and marked by surveyors of the 
Siskiyou National Forest. 
The equipment used for this survey was a Lietz/Sokisha, Set 4, Total 
Station. This is a 5 second instrument with a electronic distance meter of 
6000 foot range. Data was collected by direct download to a Lietz, SDR 
22 Data Collector and mapped using Softdesk engineering software 
running on Autocad 12.0 platform. The geographic position was 
obtained using a Trimble Geoexploerer GPS receiver, This is a 6 channel, 
code receiver. The position was differentially corrected as noted on the 
map (Howie 1997). 60 
In conjunction with the effort to place a grid system over the primary area of 
investigation, a contour map with one foot intervals was created (Figure 4.). 
A grid reference system was laid over the area of the probable battle site in 20 meter 
intervals. A wooden datum stake was placed at the intersection of each coordinate and 
inscribed with the north and east coordinates it represented. The grid was oriented 
north-south at a 90-degree angle from the project area's western and southern 
boundaries. Grid north is 20 degrees west of magnetic north. Grid coordinate N 000 / E 
000, Figure 4., appears west of the ridge line and out of the area of investigation. This 
was purposeful and incorporated to keep the primary area of investigation north and east 
of N 000 / E 000, and to ease the recording process. The site datum is a madrone tree, 
30 inches in diameter at breast height, located one meter from N 060 / E 040 at 139°. 
Inventory Phase 
The inventory phase included three sequential operations: survey, recovery and 
recording/collecting. During survey, artifacts were located and marked. During 
recovery, crews uncovered subsurface finds, leaving them in place. During 
recording/collecting, artifact locations were plotted on forms, collected, and assigned 
field specimen numbers. 61 
Survey 
Survey operations were designed primarily to locate subsurface metallic items with 
the use of electronic metal detectors. Visual inspection of the surface was carried out 
concurrently with the metal detector survey. The survey crew consisted of metal 
detector operators supervised by archaeologists and crew foremen. Each grid 
square/block was assigned to an individual operator who systematically covered the area 
by walking overlapping transects. Continuity in survey operations was maintained by 
utilizing the same personnel as operators during the survey process. The number of 
detector operators per day varied, but normally numbered five to eight. 
Volunteer metal detector operators furnished their own machines, thus a variety of 
models were used during the survey process. Generally, there was little electronic 
interference between machines during survey operations since operators were sufficiently 
separated in space to eliminate frequency problems. The detector operator used a 
sweeping motion to examine the ground as he/she walked a transect over it. When the 
operator's machine alerted to a possible find, the operator placed a pin flag at the 
location of the alert and then continued along his transect within his assigned grid 
square/block. In some instances the location was excavated immediately to provide the 
operator with a check on his machine"s performance. The check procedure was 
occasionally necessary because of the nuances of interpreting a machine's functions (e.g., 
depth readings, metallic and object type-differentiation functions, object-size 
interpretations, and pinpointing of subsurface objects). Machine readings suspected to 
be false were also immediately investigated. The usual procedure was to mark the 62 
location and leave it intact for the recovery crew. It was often necessary for a detector 
operator to return to a pin-flagged location to assist the recovery crew in locating the 
metallic object in the soil. Small pieces of percussion caps were often too difficult to see 
while in duff and soil that was the same color as the object. An on-call operator 
quickened the pace of the recovery/collecting operation and insured that multiple small 
pieces of metal in the same location were all recovered. 
The thoroughness of electronic coverage within the operator's sweep was contingent 
on the distance between the machine's coil and ground surface, the diameter of the coil, 
and the closeness of the sweeps. The results of any given sweep coverage is better 
nearer the surface and diminishes with depth. The detectors used generally provided 
maximum depth readings of ten to fifteen centimeters. 
The visual survey of the surface resulted in no finds. Metal detectors alerted to all of 
the artifact finds. There were no can dumps or formal refuse disposal areas to contend 
with in the entire area investigated. However, individual cans, metal files, pull tabs, 
modern bullets, and cartridges littered the area and were recovered (Artifact Catalogue, 
Appendix D). 
As Scott and Fox (1987: 24) mentioned, there is a "taint of evil" associated with the 
use of metal detectors on archaeological sites because of their association with those 
who use the equipment to loot sites for personal gain. However, the success of this 
project rested on their expert use. The "value of the systematic and controlled use of 
metal detectors has been proved in archaeology" (Scott and Fox 1987: 24). 63 
Recovery 
The recovery crew excavated artifact locations marked by pin flags during the  survey 
process and left the artifacts in place for later recording. The recovery crew consisted of 
excavators and on-call metal detector operators. The number of operators and 
excavators varied from day to day depending on the workload and personal schedules. 
Excavation procedures were based on the concept of artifact patterning. The location 
and depth of the artifact find within the grid square/block was paramount. Clustered 
groups of artifacts were anticipated to yield information on defensive positions. 
Provisions were made for discontinuing excavation of an artifact if/or when bone, 
leather, wood, or other sensitive or perishable materials were encountered. This 
procedure insured that an archaeologist made the decision for appropriate follow-on 
actions. 
Hand tools (e.g., trowels and personal knives) were used to expose artifacts for 
follow- on recovery/collecting. The depth of the find was noted on the pin flag for later 
recording. After exposure, the pin-flag was left upright at the find location to signal the 
recording/collecting crew. 
Exposed artifacts near trails used by visitors were of minor concern. Procedures 
were established to control visitor access. Visitors were escorted by an archaeologist 
through the area on scheduled briefing tours. This procedure insured that individuals did 
not have free access to the site. Additionally, visual security was provided by the sheer 
numbers of authorized staff on site and their familiarity with each other; strangers stood 
out. After hours security was provided by personnel camping on site. 64 
Recording/Collecting 
The recording/collecting crews recorded each artifact's provenience and bagged, 
collected, and carried it to a central point for the assignment of FS numbers. Recorders 
left pin-flags in place as they moved through the area in order to allow visual perception 
of past activity in any specific locale. Recorders noted the artifact's location with 
reference to a corner of the grid square/block. For example, from the NE corner, 210° at 
10 meters. Reference to any specific grid square/block in the Artifact Catalogue, 
Appendix D, notes the address of the find with reference to the block's southwest 
corner. 
Standardization and recording accuracy was maintained by utilizing the same 
personnel on the same task to the extent possible. An archaeologist supervised the 
recording process and double checked the paper work. 
Testing Phase 
Two testing techniques were used during fieldwork: standard small block excavations 
and auger tests. The auger tests were conducted exclusively at the bottom of open block 
excavations to determine soil profiles beneath the last level excavated. All test units 
were referenced to the grid and back-filled upon completion of investigation, 
photography, and soil profiling. 65 
Block Excavation 
Block excavations consisted of test units measuring 1 square meter, 1 meter x 50 cm, 
and 50 cm x 50 cm. All excavated materials were dry screened through 1/8 inch wire 
mesh. Square nose shovels and trowels were used to dig test units. Several units were 
opened next to already open units expanding a 1 x 1 to a 1 x 2, or even a 1 x 3, but the 
additional unit or units are complete units unto themselves for reference and mapping 
purposes. Specifically, units # 1 and 2 are joined, units # 3, 4 and 5 are joined, and so 
are # 15, 16 and 17 (Figure 5.).  Table 5. illustrates the size of the units. 
Unit depth varied with the purpose for opening a unit. Primarily, units were located 
and opened to determine if soil profiles would reveal previously disturbed soils that 
might disclose a trench line and/or two to five man fighting holes. Care was taken to 
compact the back dirt and reshape the surface to its original or natural appearance, 
particularly in the area of the possible trench line. 
Table 5. Block excavation, unit size and numbers. 
Unit Size (meter or centimeters)  Unit Number 
1 m x 1 m  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 
1 m x 50 cm  8 
50 cm x 50 cm  10 .
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Augur Holes 
All test units were dug to sterile soil and then an augur hole was drilled in the test 
unit bottoms to insure the last level did in fact represent culturally sterile soil. The augur 
employed was a two inch, man-powered augur. Most augur holes revealed gray clay or 
gray loam, but very little rock. All holes were back filled along with their associated test 
unit. 
Inventory Evaluation Phase 
The evaluation phase was designed to validate the metal detecting procedure that was 
used throughout the project. The evaluation was straightforward, direct, and simple. 
The grid squares/blocks that had the most pin flags sticking out of the ground at the end 
of the recording/collecting phase were thought to be the areas that had relatively more 
battle activity than elsewhere. Using this rational, grid squares/blocks and those around 
them, were re-surveyed by a different metal detector and operator than the one who had 
originally accomplished the task. More alerts were recorded, as well as artifacts found. 
No numbers were kept on re-evaluation results, but an estimate of one additional find per 
every two grid square/block re-evaluated is probable. 
Laboratory Methods 
The methods employed in cleaning artifacts are the standard laboratory procedures 
used at Oregon State University. Artifacts were cleaned by removing accumulated dirt 68 
and mud. Then the condition of the artifact was determined. Lead musket balls and 
bullets were brushed, not washed, because of the possibility of blood residue remaining 
on them. 
Artifact identification, sorting, and analysis consisted of dividing all artifacts into 
battle related, and non-battle related categories. The Artifact Catalogue (Appendix D) is 
organized by the aforementioned categories. The appendix lists all artifacts by FS #, and 
notes the location (grid square/block) from which it was recovered, its depth, 
description, and whether it was found by detector or in a test unit. 
Presently the artifacts and original supporting notes, records, and other 
documentation are held by the author. Upon completion of the project all artifacts will 
be returned to the Siskiyou National Forest for curation. 69 
7. CHAPTER
 
DESCRIPTIVE ARCHAEOLOGY
 
The artifacts collected from the Big Bend Battle Site are recorded in the Artifact 
Catalogue, Appendix D. All artifacts have been separated into two major categories, 
battle related and non-battle related. Non-battle related artifacts have been further 
subdivided into three sub-categories; pre-battle, post-battle, and undetermined. This 
subdivision was done with the intention of fully accounting for all cultural materials 
collected from the battle site, while at the same time placing them in categories that 
reflect their place in time, before or after the battle. The undetermined sub-category 
contains those artifacts which cannot be definitively associated with the battle or placed 
in time before or after its occurrence. The Artifact Catalogue identifies the location 
from which each artifact was recovered and collected, and describes them in detail. 
The artifact distribution map, Figure 6., refers only to the locations of battle related 
artifacts. The purpose of the map is to depict the distribution of battle related artifacts 
across the site since their individual locations may provide insights into the activities and 
locations of the positions occupied by antagonists during the battle. Non-battle related 
artifacts were not plotted. 
Findings 
Two hundred and thirty-three artifacts were recovered from the battle site (Artifact 
Catalogue, Appendix D). Collectively, these artifacts demonstrate that human activity 70 
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Figure 6. Distribution of battle-related artifacts across the site. 71 
has taken place on the ridge lines above the meadow at the Big Bend from before the 
time of the battle to just before the commencement of fieldwork, Table 6. below lists the 
number of artifacts collected at the site by categories, and sub-categories. Ninety-two 
battle related artifacts were collected. All were located by metal detector. These 
artifacts are discussed and described below in the section titled Artifact Descriptions. 
One pre-battle related artifact was recovered. A single CCS (cryptocrystalline silica) 
pressure flake, artifact FS # 21, was collected in TU 4, level 1 at 9 cm below surface. 
One hundred thirty-two post-battle artifacts were recovered from the site. The vast 
majority are spent cartridge cases, bullets, and bullet fragments dating from the mid-20th 
century. More modern finds, discards, and junk were also collected including metal 
wire, aluminum beverage cans, and wire nails. Several finds appear to have been 
inadvertently lost on site; artifact FS # 53, a round metal file; artifact FS # 93, a beverage 
can opener, and artifacts FS # 18 and # 155, US coins. All post-battle related artifacts 
are accounted for in the Artifact Catalogue, Appendix D. 
Eight artifacts were collected and accounted for in the sub-category of undetermined. 
These eight artifacts are: artifact FS # 22, brass rivet; artifact FS # 139, wire; artifact FS 
# 175, mule shoe; and artifacts FS # 127 and # 184, four unidentifiable metal objects. 
One piece of small animal bone was collected during fieldwork from test unit # 12, 
artifact # 70. 72 
Table 6. Categories, sub-categories, and amounts of artifacts collected at the Big Bend 
Battle Site. 
Categories	  Sub-categories
 
Pre-battle  Post-battle  Undetermined  Total
 
Battle related  92
 
Non-battle related  1  132  8  141
 
233
 
Artifact Distribution 
The distribution of battle-related artifacts is depicted on Figure 6. As can be seen, 
seventy-two battle-related artifacts were located on the kidney shaped ridge line, and the 
ridge line's adjacent slopes. Twenty battle-related artifacts were found on the ridge line 
which forms the top of the sloppy "T" land formation north of the kidney shaped ridge 
line. 
Soil 
Across the site the surface of the soil is not completely covered with duff Small 
patches of bare soil appear intermittently. The areas with the thickest duff accumulation 
are primarily located under mature madrone trees. The thickness of the duff varies 
across the site from 0 to 3-4 centimeters (Figure 7.). The soil on-site is hard clay and 
mudstone with little organic material below 5 centimeters. Few rocks were noted in the 
test units, and those that were noted were generally 2 to 4 centimeters in diameter. Soils 
across the site were dry, compacted, and extremely hard to excavate from the test units. 73 
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Figure 7. Representative soil profiles. 74 
As mentioned before, 17 auger holes were drilled at the bottom of each test unit. These 
holes revealed that the soil colors changed from a light gray to dark gray clay or 
mudstone with pebble like rocks irregularly spaced along the auger core. 
Artifact Description 
Battle-related artifacts are described in this section. Drawings are not to actual scale 
in order to illustrate small details that would otherwise be lost if the artifacts were drawn 
smaller. 
Tobacco Smoking Pine 
Artifact FS # 1 is a glazed, reddish clay tobacco smoking pipe (Figure 8.). This style 
of pipe is commonly referred to as a "stem" or "effigy" pipe because it required a hollow 
wood or reed stem to be inserted into its short socket stem to permit smoking 
effectively, and an effigy pipe because there is a face in the likeness of Nero molded into 
its bowl (Caywood 1955; Humphrey 1964). Artifact FS # 1 is a complete piece with a 
well worn, unreadable name embossed on its short socket stem. 
Artifact FS # 1 was the first artifact discovered and recovered at the Big Bend Battle 
site by members of the project. It was located by a metal detector during preliminary 
field work undertaken to determine the feasibility of using detectors at the site. The 
pipe's tin tobacco screen remained in the bowl and alerted the metal detector operator to 75 
Figure 8. Red clay smoking pipe, "stem" or "effigy," FS # 1. 76 
its presence in the soil.  It was recovered on an east facing ridge slope, in block N 040 / 
E 060, Figure 6., at 5 cm below surface (Artifact Catalogue, Appendix D). 
Effigy pipes were popular in the United States throughout the 1800s. They have 
been unearthed at archaeological sites in the western United States in association with 
the fur trade and civilian and soldier billeting, for example, Fort Vancouver (WA), Fort 
Union (NM), Fort Laramie and Fort Sanders (WY), and in Sacramento (CA) (Caywood 
1955; Wilson 1971). Several apparent duplicates of the Nero-like effigy face are 
mentioned and illustrated in the literature. Caywood (1955) describes and illustrates an 
effigy pipe unearthed at Fort Vancouver that appears to duplicate the Nero effigy face of 
artifact FS # 1, and dates to circa 1829-1860. Snyder (1956) illustrates a second effigy 
pipe recovered at the Old Man House, Puget Sound (WA), that also appears to be 
identical to the effigy face of artifact FS # 1 and is dated to circa 1850. A third pipe, 
discovered in Sacramento (CA), is identical to artifact FS # 1 except that it has 
"FILLMORE" and "PRESIDENT" molded on to opposite sides of the socket stem 
(Humphrey 1964). Humphrey dates use of the Sacramento pipe to circa 1850s. 
Effigy pipes were given as gifts during political campaigns in the mid-1800s. They 
served the same political purpose as modern campaign lapel pins and car bumper stickers 
(Brauner 1996; Humphrey 1964). Upon the completion of a political campaign in the 
east, excess pipes were sent west as trade items. 
Artifact FS # 1 was manufactured circa 1850 (Caywood 1955; Humphrey 1964; 
Snyder 1956). The origin of its manufacture remains in question; Snyder (1956) 77 
suggests a European manufacturer, while Caywood (1955) and Wilson (1971) suggests 
an eastern United States manufacturer. 
Artifact FS # 1 was probably brought to the battle site by a soldier on the 26 May 
1856 and subsequently lost during the confusion of battle. The artifact's excellent and 
complete condition suggests it was lost by its owner during the battle and not discarded. 
The pipe was recovered from an area on the ridge that was within the probable defensive 
perimeter occupied by Captain Smith's soldiers. 
Musket Ball Extractor (Gun Worm) 
Artifact FS #29 is a musket ball extractor (Figure 9.).  It was located by metal 
detector, and recovered from block N 140 / E 120 (Figure 6.), at 10. cm below surface. 
Musket ball extractors, also referred to as "gun worms," were an essential part of the 
equipment carried by all users of muzzle-loading weapons; soldiers, civilians, and Indians 
alike. Their purpose was to remove lead musket balls from musket barrels 
(Russell 1957). Lead musket balls required removing when the ball failed to exit the 
musket's barrel after firing, or when the loaded weapon was intentionally not fired, 
consequently requiring the removal of the musket ball in order to safely store the 
weapon. The extractor was used much like today's modern wine bottle cork remover. 
The procedure was to attach the extractor to the end of a musket ramrod, push the 
ramrod down the barrel of the musket to meet the ball, screw it into the ball's soft lead, 
and pull the ball out (extract). U.S. Army regulations required their use, Russell (1957: 
249) quotes: ".  non-commissioned officers of each company will be provided with gun . . 78 
Figure 9. Lead musket ball extractor, "Gun Worm," FS # 29. 
worms and every day those men who have returned from duty are to bring their arms and 
have their charges drawn. The First Sergeant to receive the powder and ball and deliver 
the same to the quarter-master." 
Western traders included musket ball extractors in their stocks of trade goods, and 
Canadian companies handed them out as gratuities. Indians did not always use the 
screwlike objects for the purpose for which they were intended. For example, while 
traveling on the Columbia River in 1824, Governor Simpson of the Hudson's Bay 
Company observed: "The dress of the men [Chinook Indians] consists of a woodrat skin 
robe or blanket fastened over the shoulder by a gun worm  ." (Russell 1957: 250), and . . 
Joe Meek, a member of Jim Bridger' s 1837 trapping party to Idaho, noted a Blackfoot 
Indian near Henry Lake wearing several gun worms in his hair (Russell 1957). 
Artifact FS # 29 was most likely transported to the battle site as part of a soldier's 
individual equipment on the 26 May 1856 and lost during the confusion of battle. The 79 
location from which the extractor was recovered is within the probable defensive 
perimeter occupied by Captain Smith's soldiers, although in an area assaulted by Indian 
warriors (Smith 1856). In his report, Captain Smith (1856) relates that his position was 
attacked in the center, and that his men would counter attack out of their positions to 
drive Indian warriors away from their lines. The extractor was probably dropped by a 
soldier and lost during one of these episodes of assault or counter assault. It is unlikely 
that it was lost by an Indian during the fight due to its size, caliber .6325. An extractor 
this large could only be used in muskets with bore diameters greater than .6325 because, 
after firing, black powder musket bores became constricted (smaller) with encrusted 
black powder residue, and it is believed that the Indian warriors used muskets smaller 
than caliber .58. 
Metal Button 
Artifact FS # 16 is a four-eyed metal button, 28 lines (lignes) in size, witha small 
knot of thread attached (Figure 10.). It was located by metal detector and recovered 
from block N 100 / E 060 (Figure 6. and 11.), 6 cm below surface. 
Button sizes are expressed in "lines" (or "lignes"). Forty lines equals one inch in 
(diameter). Gillio et al. (1980), suggests buttons of this era size 10 to 20 lines are shirt 
or dress buttons, and buttons 24 to 36 lines are vest, coat, or jacket buttons. 
Unfortunately, Gillio et al., (1980) omits any reference to trouser buttons. However, 
Olsen (1962) describes and illustrates a metal button that appears the same as artifact FS So
 
Figure 10. One piece cast metal button with thread fragment, military or civilian trouser, 
size 28, FS # 16. 
# 16. Olsen wrote: "From about the time of the War of 1812 until the close of the Civil 
War, a plain-cast whitemetal or lead, four-hole button was commonly used on both 
civilians' and soldier's trousers." 
Though highly specific and detailed, neither the United States Army uniform 
regulations (12 June  1851), nor Steven's (1978) work describing and illustrating United 
States Army uniforms and equipment for the period 1851-1880, mentions trouser 
buttons used to close the trousers' fly at the waist. However, buttons of this type have 
been recovered at Fort Hoskins and are thought to have been used on both trousers and 
work shirts (Brauner  1997). 
In comparison, a 28 line button is similar in size to a modern day work trouser or blue 
jeans button. This size similarity to modern day trouser buttons, and its rough 
appearance indicates that its original purpose was probably to support a rough garment, 
larger than a shirt/dress and smaller than a jacket/vest. It is reasonable to suggest that 81 
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Fizure 11  Distribution of miscellaneous artifacts across the battle site 82 
artifact # 16 was originally a trouser button (Olsen 1962). The button was recovered 
well within the defensive perimeter occupied by the soldiers. The button was probably 
transported to the battle site attached to the uniform of a soldier and lost during the 
battle. 
Leather, Metal Eyelet's and Sqnare Nails 
At the location of TU # 9 (Figure 5.), a metal detector indicated the presence of metal 
or lead in the soil. During the examination of soil at the alert location, 1 piece of leather 
and 3 square nails were recovered (artifacts FS # 41). This discovery was the impetus 
for the decision to open TU # 9. Subsequently, artifacts FS # 44 (2 eyelet's and 5 square 
nails) and FS # 45 (leather) were recovered from level # 1, at 2 cm below surface. The 
remainder of level # 1 (8 cm) was sterile and extremely hard undisturbed soil. A decision 
was made to terminate digging TU # 9 (level # 2) due to the fact that the previous 8 cm, 
as previously mentioned, had been sterile, extremely hard, and undisturbed. 
Collectively artifacts FS # 41, # 44, # 45 and # 46 are the remains of foot-wear, 
probably a boot. The square nails further hint that the boot was probably manufactured 
during the period of the mid 1800s, and therefore, possibly carried to the battle site as 
part of a soldier's foot-wear. Bradley Smith (1966) relates that square nails continued to 
be manufactured in various places in the United States until the 1880s even though 
machine produced nails were increasingly taking over the United States nail market 
throughout the period. By extension, it seems reasonable to suggest that the most 
probable locations for the continued manufacture of small square nails would be on the 83 
western frontier, including the Oregon Territory. Additionally, Captain Smith (1856) 
reported that Private Timothy Murry, "E" Company, 4th Infantry,  was wounded in the 
right foot during the battle (list of wounded, Appendix C). Private Murry's boot could 
have become unserviceable and discarded as a result of his wound, or portions of the 
boot could have become separated from the whole at the moment of impact between 
boot and musket ball. It cannot be definitively stated that these artifacts are battle-
related, but it is reasonable to include them in the battle-related class of artifacts 
recovered because of the circumstantial evidence mentioned above and because they 
were retrieved from a location within the defensive perimeter where soldiers are known 
to have been wounded. Captain Smith (1856) stated in his report: "The Indians then 
took a position on a ridge to our left, on the slope leading up to our camp from which 
they procured a cross fire on the men in position on that flank, and succeeded in 
wounding so many in the course of two hours that I had to withdraw them some ten or 
twenty yards behind the crest of the hill,  .  .  .  ."  The location of TU # 9, from which 
artifacts FS # 41, #44, # 45, and # 46 were recovered is probably in the general area 
Captain Smith (1856) referred to as having to "withdraw some ten or twenty yards 
behind the crest of the hill." 
Lead Slag 
Artifacts FS # 38, # 111, # 112, # 113, # 114, # 172, #179 and # 180 are lead slag 
remnants recovered from the battle site. 84 
During the mid 1800s muskets and smooth bore pistols were the primary weapons 
used for combat, self-defense, and hunting on the western frontier. It was customary for 
small bars of lead to be carried into the wilderness by both civilians and soldiers in order 
to have materials to manufacture lead ball projectiles (Russell 1957). 
On field campaigns, soldiers carried their individual allowances of lead musket balls 
on their person as they moved, and unit quartermasters carried molds, lead bars, paper, 
string and gun powder in their supplies for issue to soldier working parties. After hostile 
actions requiring soldiers to deplete their individual allowances of musket balls, it was 
customary for soldiers to be assigned to work details to make additional lead balls in 
order to replenish their individual allowances or their unit's supply (Russell 1957). 
On the western frontier there were several types of molds used to manufacture round 
lead balls. Individuals used small molds made from soap stone or wood and produced 
one or two balls at a time. Fur trading companies and Army units used large brass molds 
and produced up to 24 balls at a time. The manufacturing procedure included melting 
lead, pouring molten lead into ball molds, trimming off of lead "fits" attached to each 
lead ball after a cool down period, and the collection of the trimmings. Lead trimmings 
would not be discarded under normal circumstances as they could be re-melted and 
incorporated into another production cycle (Russell 1957). 
It is probable the lead slag recovered from the battle site is residue left by soldiers 
hastily making projectiles during the night of 26 May 1856, just prior to the battle. As 
can be seen in Figure 11. and Table 7., with the exception of artifact FS # 172, all lead 
slag artifacts were recovered from two closely related locations on the battle site. 85 
Table 7. Locations of recovered lead slag. 
FS #  Location: Block #  Depth  Wt: Gram(s) 
38  N 200 /E 120  6 cm  7.1 
57  N 300 /E 100  5cm  2.5 
111  N 180 / E 080  2 cm  11.8 
112  N 180 / E 080  4cm  2.5 
113  N 180 /E 080  5cm  1 
114  N 180 / E 080  2 cm  1 
172  N 260 / E 120  4cm  7.4 
179  N 180 /E 100  5cm  10 
180  N 180 /E 100  5cm  22.7 
Artifact FS # 192 is a .53 caliber lead musket ball with a ramrod impression on its 
surface, and a scar which appears to be the result of trimming of a lead "tit" during the 
production cycle (Figure 12.), Captain Smith (1856) mentions that he used the night of 
the 26 May 1856 to move his company up the hill to the ridge line and to prepare for the 
next days anticipated actions. It is probable Captain Smith directed soldiers to mold lead 
balls, and make additional cartridges for issue. The lead slag recovered appears to be 
small spills or residual trimmings of lead from molds. The small amount of lead slag 
recovered speaks to a well-disciplined working party performing their duties under 
difficult circumstances, at night under conditions of poor visibility, and imminent hostile 
action. It is remarkable that these soldiers left but a trace of lead behind to hint of their 
toil in preparation for the next day's battle. 86 
Figure 12. Lead musket ball, .53 caliber, with ramrod impression, and trimming scare,
 
FS # 192.
 
Projectiles 
Five types of projectile artifacts were recovered from the Big Bend Battle site, lead 
bullets, round iron canister balls, round lead musket and pistol balls, and shot. 
Lead Bullets 
Three lead bullets were recovered from the battle site: Artifacts FS # 6, # 47, and # 
162. Artifact FS # 6 is a .40 caliber lead bullet recovered from block N 060 / E 040 
(Figure 13.), 2 cm below surface. It is doubtful that artifact FS # 6 was expended during 
the battle considering it displays no evidence of impact. Its shape has been modified by 
carving, after which it appears this bullet was dropped and discarded (Figure 14.). This 
modification seems purposeful because the carving removed lead from the bullet body 
which created a grove around the entire projectile. Dr. Brauner (personal -
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Figure 14. Carved .40 caliber lead pistol bullet, FS # 6. 
communication 1997) noted the resemblance of artifact FS # 6 and other bullets molded 
with groves. A molded grove was incorporated into the design of a bullet for the 
purpose of tying a paper pouch containing black powder to the base of the bullet. 
Artifacts FS # 47 and # 162 are both spent lead bullets with their original shapes 
highly modified by high velocity impact. Neither bullet shows evidence of rifling, 
therefore, both were fired from smooth bore weapons. The base of each bullet remains 
sufficiently intact to be calibrated; .42+ caliber for both. The type of weapon these 
bullets were fired from is probably a smooth bore pistol, either a .44 caliber Army 
Dragoon revolver (Logan 1948), or a .44 caliber Walker Colt (Russell 1956). 
Iron Canister Balls 
Seven iron canister balls were recovered from the Big Bend Battle site: Artifacts FS 
# 4, # 42, # 67, # 84, # 100, # 123, and # 190. 89 
The diameters of the iron balls range from 1,06 to 1.12 inches, and their weights 
average 74.3 grams / 1166 grains. All are iron balls originating from canister shot(s) and 
are comparable in size with a projectile described by Mahan in 1836 as "grape" (Russell 
1957). Russell (1957: 347) quotes Mahan: "To produce a good effect at a distance 
grape ought not to be less than one inch in diameter .  .  Such grape has sufficient 
velocity at 880 yards with 12 pounders [howitzer] and 760 yards with 8 pounders to 
disable men. When the distance is within 500 yards the fire of grape is superior to that of 
ball against troops .  the point blank range of 6-pounder field guns is about 600 yards . . 
and that of 12-pounders about 700 yards." "Point blank" means that the point of aim on 
a target is also the intended point of impact for the projectile, no flight distance is gained 
by arching the projectile's flight to the target. Upon leaving the muzzle, the projectile's 
velocity is sufficient to allow travel to the target in a straight line. 
The use of canister ammunition against Indians was a common practice of both 
United States Army forces and fur trading companies in the west (Macfeely 1856; 
Russell 1957). Captain Smith (1856) wrote in his report that "as they [Indians] appeared 
above the crest, they were met by a discharge of canisters from the Howitzer  ." The . .  . 
practice was to use the howitzer much like a large shot gun; not aimed fire at one 
specific target, but rather at the center of mass of a group of individuals or targets within 
the weapon's range. There were either 41 or 48 iron balls per canister shot (Field 
Artillery Instructions 1820; Russell 1957, respectively). Using canister ammunition, the 
ideal howitzer shot would be to fire the weapon low into a massed enemy allowing the 
grape to ricochet off the ground into their targets to do its destructive work (Field 90 
Artillery Instructions 1820; Russell 1957). High shots were ineffective and wasted 
ammunition; projectiles passing over the enemy causing few if any casualties. 
Additionally, high shots provide an aggressive enemy an opportunity to close with their 
opponent during the time required to reload the howitzer. All six iron canister balls 
recovered from the area of the battle site were from within point blank ranges referred to 
by Mahan above. 
Artifacts FS # 4, # 42, # 67, # 84, # 100, # 123, and # 190 are iron canister balls 
carried to the battle area by soldiers as part of their unit's ammunition allowance. As can 
be seen in Table 8., artifacts FS # 4, # 67, and # 84 were recovered from closely related 
locations within the battle area and may possibly have originated as part of the same 
canister shot. Artifacts FS # 42, # 100, # 123, and # 190 were recovered from separate 
and distinctly different locations of the battle area; these artifacts did not originate from 
the same or any other howitzer canister shot that produced iron balls recovered during 
this project. For ease of reference, Table 8. notes the general locations from which the 
iron canister balls were recovered; Figure 15., and the Artifact Catalogue, Appendix D, 
note the exact locations. 
Round Lead Musket and Pistol Balls 
Thirty-three round lead musket and pistol balls were recovered from the Big Bend 
Battle site: Artifacts FS # 2, # 3, # 5, # 7, # 10, # 17, # 19, # 26, # 28, # 35, # 43, # 48, 
# 56, # 65, # 73, # 80, # 81, # 89, # 102, # 103, # 116, # 117, # 118, # 131, # 132, # 
133, # 156, # 159, # 163, # 185, # 188, # 191, and # 192. 91 
Table 8. Locations iron canister projectiles were recovered from on the battle site. 
FS #  Location: Block #  Depth 
4  N480 /E200  3cm 
42  N 240 / E 060  6 cm 
67  AMP16,010 ° @19.7m  2 cm 
84  AMP 17, 253° @ 11 m / 20 cm  7 cm 
100  N 220 /E 220  5 cm 
123  AMP 4, 260°@ 8 m  surface, imbedded in root 
190  O MP, N 220 / E 240, 067° @  3cm 
66m 
During the 1800s, musket and pistol balls were manufactured smaller than the bore 
of the weapon they were intended to be fired through (Russell 1957; Traister and 
Traister 1996). This practice was adopted to facilitate the ball being seated for firing 
(pushed down and through the barrel) after the diameter of the weapon's bore has been 
constricted by encrusted burnt black powder from previous firings. The size of the lead 
ball was manufactured as much as 2+ caliber's smaller than the bore of the weapon it 
was intended to be expended from. For example, the Model 1795, .69 caliber musket, 
fired a musket ball closer in size to .65 caliber, the .54 Martial Pistol fired a ball that 
measured .525, and the .58 Harpers Ferry Rifle fired a ball closer to .57 caliber (Logan 
1948; Russell 1957; Traister and Traister 1996). 
Table 9. was created to aid in determining the caliber and type of weapon each lead 
ball was fired from, musket or pistol. The intent was to determine the correlation 
between projectile weights and measured projectile sizes. The table is organized by ball 92 
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Fiuure 15. Distribution of iron canister projectiles across the site 93 
weight, largest to smallest. With the exception of artifacts FS # 116, # 117, and # 188, 
which were recovered and remain encased in wood (i.e., roots or tree limbs), all balls 
were weighed, and the weight noted in both grams and grains. The rationale is that, with 
the exception of some minor exfoliation, each lead ball has not lost a great deal of its 
original mass. Therefore, weight remains the only common denominator for all 
recovered lead balls. High velocity impact severely deformed 13 of the 33 balls 
recovered, consequently making calibration impossible. Of those lead balls that can be 
calibrated, only two were completely round. Therefore, weight is the most probable 
indicator as to the ball's original caliber. During the analysis phase the balls that could 
be calibrated were measured with a "Digimatic" (brand name) caliper, and two readings 
were noted, the ball's largest and smallest diameter. Measured readings were noted in 
both inches and millimeters and entered in the Artifact Catalogue, Appendix D. Table 9. 
omits reference to readings noted in millimeters in view of the custom in United States to 
refer to projectile and weapon sizes in inches, or caliber. 
Table 9. Locations where lead projectiles were recovered on the battle site. 
FS #  Desc	  Location:  Size:  Wt:  Prob  Prob Wpn 
Block #  Dia / Inch  Grin / Grn  Ball Cal  Type + Cal 
3  RBL  N 200  .6525  27 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal 
E 120  407 grn 
28  RBL  N 140  E  .655 - .6615  26,3 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal 
100  405 grn 
191  SRBL  N 220  .627 - .675  26.1 grm  .66+ - M = .69 cal
 
E 240  402.1 grn  .67+ cal
 
80  RBL  A MP 16  .629 - .664  25.7 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal
 
399.5 grn 94 
Table 9. (Continued) 
FS #  Desc  Location:  Size:  Wt:  Prob  Prob Wpn 
Block #  Dia / Inch  Grm / Gin  Ball Cal  Type + Cal 
48  SRBL  N 280  25.7 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal 
E 080  398.8 gm 
2  SRBL  N 180  25.7 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal 
E 100  395 gm 
103  SRBL  N 220  25.6 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal 
E 080  396.3 grn 
56  SRBL  N 280  25.5 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal 
E 040  396 grn 
102  SRBL  N 220  .63 - .67  25.4 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal 
E080  392.7 gm 
17  SRBL  N 100  25.1 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal 
E 060  390 grn 
26  SRBL  N 140  .651 - .665  24.4 grm  .66+ cal  M = .69 cal 
E 100  378.2 gm 
43  SRBL  N 240  23.1 grm  .62+ cal  M = .64 cal 
E 060  356 gm 
35  SRBL  N 120  ,59 - .69  22.1 grm  .62+ cal  M = .64 cal 
E 120  342.5 grn 
163  SRBL  N 060  .539 - .603  18.2 grm  .57 cal  M = .58 cal 
E060  281.2 grn 
131  SRBL  A MP  15.2 grm  .54 cal  M = .58 cal 
T 35S, R  236.5 gm 
11, WVVM, 
Sec 18, 1/4 
corner 
118  SRBL  N 240  15 gnu  .54+ cal  M = .58 cal 
E 020  234 grn 
10  SRBL  N 100  .5375 - .56  14.3 grm  .54+ cal  M = .58 cal 
E 040  223.9 grn 
156  SRBL  N 140  .531 - .548  13.9 grm  .54+ cal  M = .58 cal 
E 080  216 grn 
19  SRBL  N 060  13.7 grm  .54+ cal  M = .58 cal 
E 060  213.5 gm 
73  SRBL  N 260  13.6 grm  .53 cal  M = .54 cal 
E 060  214 gm 
192  SRBL  N 220  .525 - .57  13.5 grm  .53 cal  M = .54 cal 
E 240  209 grn 95 
Table 9. (Continued) 
FS #  Desc	  Location:  Size:  Wt:  Prob  Prob Wpn 
Block #  Dia / Inch  Grm / Grn  Ball Cal  Type + Cal 
132  SRBL	  AMP  13.4 grm  .53 cal  M = .54 cal 
T 35S, R  211 grn 
11, WWM, 
Sec 18, 1/4 
corner 
89  SRBL  AMP 17  .53  13.4 grm  .53 cal  M = .54 cal 
208 grn 
159  SRBL  N 100  13.1 grm  .52+ cal  M = .54 cal 
E 040  202 grn 
185  SRBL  N 220  .517 - .538  13 grm  .52+ cal  M = .54 cal 
E 100  201.4 grn 
5  SRBL  N 040  .498 - .534  12.2 grm  .52+ cal  M = .54 cal 
E 060  189 grn 
7  SRBL  N 060  .5395 - 11.4 grm  .53+ cal  M = .54 cal 
E 060  .5555  179 grn 
133  SRBL	  AMP  12.2 grm  .49 cal  M = .50 cal 
T 35S, R  189 grn 
11, WWM 
Sec 18, 1/4 
corner 
65  RBL  N 140  11.1 grm  .49 cal  M = .50 cal 
E 100  175 g grn 
81  SRBL  AMP 16  6 grm  .40 cal  P = .41 cal 
92.7 grn 
The locations from which these artifacts were recovered are noted in general terms in the 
Table 9.; and specifically in the Artifact Catalogue, Appendix D, and Figure 13. 
Several recovered musket balls exhibit surface impressions. Artifacts FS # 2, # 3, # 
80, # 185, and # 191 are the remains of Buck and Ball cartridges. These artifacts exhibit 
circular indentations, or dimples, on their surface where the three shots originally sat 
when the charge was fired, Figure 16. illustrates. Artifacts FS # 19, # 73, # 131, and # 96 
Figure 16. Lead musket ball, .65+ caliber, with three shot impressions, FS # 80. 
132 all exhibit the impression of linen or fabric used as wading when the shot was tired, 
Figure 17. illustrates. Artifacts FS # 192 exhibits a round indentation on the balls surface 
caused by the force the ram rod used to seat the ball for firing.  It was determined in 
July, 1996, at the Far West Gun Exchange, Jacksonville, OR, that the trumpet end of a 
replica military ram rod fits perfectly into the indentations on this ball's surface. 
Shot 
Eleven lead shot artifacts were recovered from the battle site: artifacts FS # 9, # 20, 
# 25, # 27, # 63, #88, # 121 ,#154, # 166, # 178, and #189. Figure 18., and the Artifact 
Catalogue, Appendix D, note the specific locations where shot artifacts were recovered. 
During the 1800s lead shot was used as a projectile in combat, and by the 1850s the 
U.S. Army was manufacturing two different cartridges using shot as one component, the 
.58 caliber buckshot cartridge, and the .69 caliber Buck and Ball cartridge, Figure 19. 
The size of shot used by the U.S. Army was 43 grains (Logan 1948), or .31 caliber 97 
Figure 17. Spent lead musket ball, with textile impression, FS # 19. 
(Russell 1957). As can be seen in the figure. shot was the only projectile in the .58 
caliber buckshot cartridge, and an augmentation to a .69 caliber ball in the Buck and Ball 
cartridge. The .58 caliber buckshot cartridge was highly regarded as it was considered 
versatile, and could be fired from any .58 caliber musket. Logan (1948: 15) described 
the cartridge as the "granddaddy of the present day riot gun charge." 
The addition of the three lead shots to the single .69 caliber ball cartridge was done to 
increase lethality.  It was the practice during the 1800s to fire as large a musket projectile 
as possible in combat. The up side of a large ball was its enhanced lethality, and the 
down side was the shortening of the effective range of the weapon. For example, a 
smooth bore musketoon, firing a .69 caliber ball, was accurate to no more than 100 
meters (Russell 1957), or as little as 50 meters (Dillon 1996). Consequently, with 
effective ranges this short, in order to increase the probability of a hit on target, most 
targets would not be fired upon until they were as close as 50 meters. Under this 
scenario, a human target, on foot, at a distance of 50 meters could close with the -
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.69 CALIBER CARTRIDGE
 
BUCK AND BALL
 
Total length 2% in.
Dark buff  colored  paper
case tied with light brown
cord 
Three 43-gr. lead buckshot
1 433-gr. spherical lead ball
75 grs. black powder
Total weight 662 grs. 
(Logan, 1948) 
.58 CALIBER CARTRIDGE 
BUCKSHOT 
Total length 2316 in. 
Buff colored paper ca.se
12 lead balls weighing 43 
grs­
75 grs. black powder
Total weight 625  grs. 
(Logan, 1948) 
Figure 19. Caliber .69 cartridge, "Buck and Ball," and caliber .58 cartridge, "Buckshot." 100 
musketeer (shooter) faster than the weapon could be fired, reloaded, and fired again 
(Russell 1957). The answer to this threat was to increase the likelihood of a hit on 
target, hence, three .31 caliber shots were added to the .69 caliber ball cartridge; creating 
the "Buck and Ball" cartridge. At close quarters this combination improved effective 
(Russell 1957). 
Table 9. is a consolidated list of the eleven shots recovered. The purpose of the table 
is to determine possible correlation's that might exist. All eleven shot artifacts recovered 
have been miss formed by high velocity impact. Six artifacts are too deformed to be 
calibrated and can only be weighed; while five artifacts, though deformed, can be 
calibrated and weighed. The table notes the general location where each shot was 
recovered, as well as its size, weight, and probable caliber. As can be seen from Table 
9., all shot weights are less than the "43 grains" mentioned by Logan (1948), but their 
calibrated sizes are generally within the ".31 caliber" range mentioned by Russell (1957). 
It seems reasonable to conclude that all shots were expended during the battle in May 
1856. Particularly in view of the following: there has been minor exfoliation over the 
past 150 years that would have lessened individual shot weights; the shot may have been 
manufactured in the field, per the custom of the times, producing non-uniform shot sizes 
and weights due to the vagaries of the field manufacturing process; and, as noted above, 
several recovered lead musket balls exhibit shot indentations, Figure 16. Manufacturing 
lead shot and round lead balls in the field was not an exact science. 101 
Percussion Caps 
There were 16 artifacts related to percussion caps recovered from the Big Bend 
Battle site. Artifacts FS # 23, # 24, # 34, # 76, # 120, # 122, # 142, # 145, # 146, # 147, 
# 148, # 149, # 150, # 153, # 157, and # 167 are copper percussion caps or remnants 
thereof. All were located by metal detector. 
The development of percussion caps came out of experiments conducted in the early 
nineteenth century by Reverend Alexander Forsythe of Belhelvie, Scotland, who 
discovered a particular chemical mixture could be more easily ignited by a blow than by a 
spark (Russell 1957; Traister and Traister 1996). By 1814, additional experiments 
conducted in Europe and America contributed to the use of fulminating powder suitable 
for general use in firing guns of that day. By 1816, the copper percussion cap was being 
manufactured in the United States (Russell 1957; Traister and Traister 1996). After 
originally experimenting with pewter, Joshua Shaw, of Philadelphia, is the individual 
credited with developing the copper percussion cap (Russell, 1957; Traister and Traister 
1996). 
The percussion cap spark firing system was a significant improvement over the 
flintlock, powder, and spark firing system (Russell 1957; Traister and Traister 1996). 
Muskets using the flintlock firing system were nearly impossible to fire in inclement 
weather because their firing powder in the weapon's powder pan would become wet and 
fail to ignite by spark. The development of the percussion cap eliminated this problem. 
It was manufactured in a manner that kept the firing powder dry. Russell (1957: 243) 
wrote: 102 
The cap itself is made of thin-gauged copper. It is slightly conical with a 
flaring rim round the open end. Four slits extend halfway from the rim 
toward the dome of the cap, assuring ready and secure adjustment of the 
cap upon the nipple of the gun. The powder with which the caps are 
charged usually consists of fulminate of mercury mixed with saltpeter. 
Half a grain of this percussion powder constitutes the charge, which is 
compressed into the cap and made waterproof and airtight by a drop 
varnish. In Military service the caps were distributed in bags of strong 
linen, 10,000 in a bag. Such a package weighed only 12 1/2 pounds. 
Table 10. is a list of percussion cap and percussion cap related artifacts recovered 
from the battle site. The table, in addition to Figure 20., demonstrate that battle activity 
Table 10. Locations shot artifacts were recovered. 
FS #  Desc	  Location:  Size:  Weight:  Prob Shot Prob Wpn 
Block #  Dia / Inch  Grm / Gin  Cal  + Cal 
9  SShL  N 100  2.4 grm  .31 cal  musketoon 
E040  38 grn  .69 cal 
20  SShL  N 080  ---- 2.1 grin  .31 cal  musketoon 
E 040  32 grn  .69 cal 
25  SShL  N 140  .297 - .304  2.5 grm  .31 cal  musketoon 
E 100  38 grn  .69 cal 
27  SShL  N 140  .317 - .327  2.9 grin  .31 cal  musketoon 
E 100  40.4 grn  .69 cal 
63  SShL  N 380  .31 - .319  2.5 grm  .31 cal  musketoon 
E 120  38.4 gni  .69 cal 
88  SShL  A MP 17  .293 - .305  2.3 grin  .31 cal  musketoon 
36 grn  .69 cal 
121  SShL  A MP 4  .299 - .324  2.2 grm  .31 cal  musketoon 
35.3 gni  .69 cal 
154  SShL  N 160  2.5 grm  .31 cal  musketoon 
E 060  38 grn  .69 cal 
166  SShL  N 120  2.2 grin  .30 cal  musketoon 
E 080  36 grn  .69 cal 
178  SSIIL  N 180  2.2 grm  .31 cal  musketoon 
E 100  34 grn  .69 cal 
189	  SShL  N 180  2.4 grin  .31 cal  musketoon 
E 140  39.3 grn  .69 cal 103 
using percussion caps was conducted on, and along the two ridge lines running generally 
north/south and northeast to southwest. With the exception of 3 percussion caps (likely 
dropped), all appear to have been fired and discarded. 
Percussion caps are excellent clues to pin-point locations of combatants during the 
course of the battle. After use, caps are discarded, and fall to the ground close to the 
location where expended. The three unspent percussion caps are also excellent clues to 
positions occupied by combatants because they were dropped by individuals who would 
have occupied a location near where they were recovered. Table 11. and Figure 20. 
illustrate the locations where percussion artifacts were recovered on the battle site.  It 
can be hypothesized that battle activity took place at the locations noted in the Table 11. 
and Figure 20. Additionally, it was determined in July 1996 that the three unspent 
percussion caps fit perfectly onto the "nipple" of a replica military musket at the Far 
West Gun Exchange, Jacksonville, OR. 
Table 11. Locations percussion caps were recovered from on the battle site. 
Artifact FS #  Desc	  Location: Block or  Depth 
A MP # 
23  SPc  N 160 / E 080  3 cm 
24  SPc  N 160 / E 080  4 cm 
34  SPc  N 140 /E 120  8 cm 
76  Pc  N 340 / E 100 
120  SPc  N 260 / E 020  4 cm 
122  SPc  AMP 4,  2 cm 
264° @ 4 m 
142  SPc  N 040 / E 040  2 cm 
145  SPc  N 180 / E 080  2 cm 
146  SPc  N 180 / E 080  2 cm 
147  SPc  N 160 / E 060  2 cm 104 
Table 11. (Continued) 
Artifact FS #  Desc  Location: Block or  Depth 
MP # 
148  SPc  N 160 / E 060  2 cm 
149  Pc  N 160 / E 060  4 cm 
150  Pc + frag  N 160 / E 060  1 cm 
153  SPc  N 160 / E 060  1 cm 
157  SPc  N 140 / E 080  2 cm 
167  SPc  N 140 / E 080  2 cm 105 
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8. CHAPTER
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
 
The Battle of Big Bend was significant because it ended hostilities between the Indian 
inhabitants and the Euro-American settlers of southwestern Oregon. Captain Smith and 
his soldiers performed as well as could be expected given the resources they had to work 
with during the battle, but most importantly they avoided defeat. Chief John and the 
Indian warriors nearly succeeded in winning the battle, but were defeated by 
overwhelming force and technology, a pattern repeated throughout frontier America. As 
a result of the way the battle concluded, the contact period in southwestern Oregon 
ended and the Native Americans were exiled from their homeland. 
Research Questions Addressed 
At the beginning of this project five research questions were posed that defined the 
research strategy. These five research questions were: (1) wherewas the defensive 
position of Company "C" (2) where was the battle fought (3) can the battle area be 
defined (4) what types of artifacts can be reasonably expected to be retrieved from a 
battle site occupied for approximately 48 hours, and (5) what learned, patterned cultural 
behavior might (or should) be discernible? The following sections discuss these 
questions based on the results of the archaeological investigation and the historical 
record. 107 
Where was the Defensive Position of Company "C"? 
There is circumstantial evidence in the historical record to suggest the location of 
Captain Smith's positions during the battle. Captain Smith's orders from LtCol. 
Buchanan were to be at the Big Bend on 26 May 1856 to receive the surrender of Chief 
George and Limpy's bands. It appears that Captain Smith believed his mission at the Big 
Bend was to be administrative and possibly even humanitarian in nature. Captain 
Augur's 25 May departure from the Big Bend with Captain Smith's pack animals placed 
Smith in a position of limited tactical options. Captain Smith probably recognized this 
situation but was not sufficiently concerned to take action until after being warned by 
Indian boys on the evening of 26 May of a possible attack by Chief John. It appears 
from his after-action report that after being warned of a possible attack he became 
alarmed and took actions to place his command in a position to accomplish both the 
original mission and meet an attack if necessary. 
Captain Smith's decision on the evening of 26 May 1856 to move his company off the 
meadow to the ridge line was exceptionally timely. By moving his company to terrain 
that was more defensible, he gained a tactical advantage that the Indian warriors were 
unable to surmount. The selection of his defensive position on the kidney-shaped ridge 
line was the result of patterned behavior based on his prior training. 
The transport of his "ammunition, stores, etc." up the ridge "on the backs" of his 
men must have been a fatiguing task for the soldiers (Smith 1856). Although the 
literature fails to mention the amount of supplies on hand, it can be assumed to be 
considerable: food enough to subsist approximately 100 soldiers and 100-200 Indians 108 
for 3-5 days; and tents, stakes, ropes axes, lead bars, ball ammunition, gun powder, 50 
rounds of howitzer ammunition, and the howitzer itself The number of days suggested 
in this example is drawn from LtCol. Buchanan's report. LtCol. Buchanan (30 May 
1856) mentions that he was anticipating the arrival of a pack train at his "Oak Grove" 
(Oak Flat) position from the coast. He was concerned for the inbound pack train's 
security and ordered Major Reynolds' company to move from Oak Flat to reinforce it. 
He mentions that he had ordered Captain Augur's company to return from the Big Bend 
on 25 May 1856 with Captain Smith's pack animals, and that his intentions were to have 
Captain Smith's company receive surrendering Indians on 26 May 1856 at the Big Bend. 
In order to sustain the numbers of people that he anticipated congregating at the Big 
Bend would have required substantial food stores be assemble prior to 26 May 1856. 
Therefore, Captain Smith probably had on hand stores enough to feed several hundred 
people from 24 to 26 May (3 days) on the inside, or enough to feed the same number of 
people from 24 to 28 May (5 days) on the outside. The point being that if these figures 
are near correct, it would then appear that Captain Smith's soldiers used considerable 
time and effort on the night of 26 May moving supplies uphill and preparing a defensible 
position for a possible fight the next day. 
From the results of the archaeological fieldwork, lead slag artifacts were collected 
that are probably remnants of soldiers making lead musket balls during the night of 26 
May 1856. The locations where lead slag artifacts were recovered are highly probable 
areas for soldiers to perform tasks of this nature, not too steep for working comfortably 109 
and located on or just north of the kidney-shaped ridge line. Therefore, it appears that 
Captain Smith's men made additional musket balls during the night of 26 May 1856. 
The location of Captain Smith's howitzer is crucial to defining the defensive position 
of Company "C". The howitzer was used to break up the initial Indian assault from the 
north (Smith 1856) and probably the near simultaneous assault on the "center" of the 
defensive position from the east. The artifacts FS # 4, # 67 and # 84 are canister rounds 
possibly originating from that first shot. These artifacts were recovered from likely 
impact areas (Figure 15.). A canister shot fired from a howitzer located at N 180 / E 
100 across the hill crest at N 220 / 120 would impact in the general area of N 480 / E 
180. Artifacts FS # 100 and # 190 are possibly from a second shot that met and broke 
the Indian assault on the center of the defensive position from the east (Figures 15.). 
Both were recovered from areas where canister rounds fired from a howitzer from a 
position near N 180 / E 100 would impact down slope. Figure 21. illustrates the 
movement of Indian warriors prior to the beginning of combat and Figure 22. illustrates 
the probable axis of attack used by Indian warriors at the commencement of hostilities. 
The gentle slope would have been an ideal axis of attack for Indian warriors. In view of 
the fact that artifact FS # 42 has no other associated artifacts recovered in its direction 
from N 180 / E 100, suggests it could have been a ricochet from the first howitzer shot 
fired. The location from which artifact FS # 123 was recovered is unexplainable, unless 
a howitzer shot was fired at Indian warriors assaulting up the cliff-like slopes to the west 
of the kidney-shaped ridge line. A howitzer shot to sweep targets off the cliff-like slope 
would be highly unlikely because the warriors could not mass together sufficiently to be --
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Figure 22. Defensive perimeter of Company "C", locations of the breastworks, 
howitzer, dragoons and infantry within the defensive perimeter, and directions of initial 
Indian assaults on 27 May 1856. 112 
a worthwhile target requiring the expenditure of canister. Thus it is highly likely that the 
howitzer was located at N 180 / E 100, a position within the defensive perimeter and 
near its northern boundary (Figure 22.). 
The location from which several percussion cap artifacts were recovered also 
indicates there was considerable activity focused along the western edge of the kidney-
shaped ridge line by soldier musketeers. Artifacts FS # 122, # 142, # 147, # 148, # 149, 
# 150, # 153 and # 157 were located primarily to the west of the top of the kidney-
shaped ridge line and indicate that they were dropped after expenditure by shooters 
looking at targets towards the west (Figure 20.). The location of these artifacts, in 
conjunction with the ridge line's sharp drop-off to the west, probably indicates the 
extreme western perimeter of the defensive position of Company "C". 
The smoking pipe, artifact FS # 1, is also evidence as to the location of the defensive 
perimeter. The pipe was recovered from a location along the kidney-shaped ridge line 
that would have offered considerable advantage to a soldier (Figure 11.), The location 
where it was recovered would have offered a good field of fire for a soldier and yet, one 
of considerable safety from incoming fire from almost all directions. An Indian assault 
up the steep slope of the ridge line at the location where the pipe was recovered, as well 
as the entire southern end of the kidney-shaped ridge line, would have been extremely 
difficult and dangerous. Therefore, the location of this artifact aids in defining the 
southeastern boundary of the defensive position. 
The remnants of the "U" shaped trench line on the southern end of the kidney-shaped 
ridge generally delineates the southern boundary of the defensive position. The trench 113 
line indicates that Captain Smith was preparing for a fall-back, worst case scenario. It 
appears that he thought his messenger and request for assistance had failed to reach 
LtCol. Buchanan's position at Oak Flat. Captain Smith was preparing to buy time. He 
knew LtCol. Buchanan was waiting for Captain Ord's supply train at Oak Flat and upon 
its arrival LtCol. Buchanan's plan was to move to the Big Bend. The opening or top of 
the "U" was oriented towards the south indicating it was constructed to meet an attack 
from along the ridge line coming from the north. Even though the trench was not 
expansive in size, its flanks were refused (i.e., curved in order to protect the flanks). No 
artifacts were recovered from the test units investigating the probable trench line.  It may 
be that looters worked the area prior to this project or that little if any combat took place 
in the vicinity of the trench because it was designed as a fall-back position that may have 
been unused for combat. 
Captain Smith also had his men dig several two and five-man fighting holes according 
to his 1856 report. No archaeological evidence remains of these holes. There is a 
depression to the north of the "U" shaped trench line, but there is no evidence to suggest 
that it was a fighting hole. A test unit oriented across half the depression failed to 
definitively suggest that the hole originated at the time of the battle. It might be an 
enlarged looter's hole. 
The scattered nature of other battle-related artifacts associated with individuals, 
including a gun worm, percussion caps, square boot nails, a metal button, and lead slag 
fragments indicates that the defensive perimeter was along the kidney-shaped ridge line 
(see Figure 22.). Figure 22. illustrates the location of the defensive perimeter of 114 
Company "C", the probable position of the howitzer when the battle opened, the position 
of the breastworks, and the likely locations within the defensive perimeter of the 
dragoons and the attached infantry. 
Where was the Battle Fought? 
The research question of "where was the battle fought?" can also be addressed using 
archaeological field methods and primary historical resource materials. To answer the 
question, likely combat activity areas were investigated that included probable locations 
of individual combatants during the battle, terrain on which both forces were suspected 
to have established static positions, as well as probable ground that was assaulted over 
by one opponent or the other. 
The location of Captain Smith's defensive position has already been discussed. 
Needless to say, his defensive position was the primary objective for the Indian warriors 
throughout the battle. As previously mentioned, Figure 22. illustrates where the battle 
was fought and includes: the location of Company "C" defensive position; the location 
of the breastworks; the position of the howitzer; the locations of the dragoons and the 
attach Company "E" infantry soldiers; and the direction of the Indian's assaults on the 
morning of 27 May 1856 and their static positions. 
Based on the historical record and archaeological data recovered, it is likely that the 
static positions held by the Indian's during the battle are as illustrated in Figure 22. The 
historical record relates that after the Indians initial assaults were broken, the Indians 
established positions on a ridge line from which they were able to effectively place "a 115 
cross fire on the men in position on that flank" (Smith 1856). From the historical record 
and the terrain description provided by Captain Smith, the Indian's static positions were 
probably as depicted, since there is only one ridge line from which a cross fire could 
originate and be effective on the northern portion of the soldier's defensive perimeter. 
From the archaeological record, as illustrated in Figures 8., 15., 17., 20., and 22., 
locations where combat activity took place can be determined. The collective 
archaeological record demonstrates that for both the soldiers and the Indians, combat 
activity was relatively more intense on the northern edge of the soldier's positions and 
the southern edge of the Indian's ridge line positions. Nevertheless, it needs to be 
pointed out that Indian warriors occupied positions that generally surrounded the 
soldiers and were either in close physical proximity to the soldier's defensive perimeter 
or in positions that minimally controlled the soldiers egress and freedom of movement. 
The archaeological record demonstrates that fighting took place along the entire kidney-
shaped ridge line. It is probable that the Indians occupied positions north of Company 
"C" as depicted in Figure 22. 
The movements during the battle of both the Indians and soldiers can be reasonably 
determined from the historical record (Smith 1856). When the Indians initially attacked 
on the morning of 27 May 1856, their early movements and axis of attack can be 
ascertained from Captain Smith's after-action report (1856). Comparing Captain 
Smith's terrain description with his account of the way the battle opened, the direction of 
movement and the axis of attack of the Indians can be resolved. Figure 21. illustrates the 
movement of the Indian warriors on the morning of 27 May prior to the commencement 116 
of fighting. This figure elucidates the Indian's direction of movement to the point where 
they logically begin to deploy and began appearing threatening to Captain Smith (1856). 
Figure 22. illustrates the Indian's probable attack axis from the point where they began 
to appear threatening, and where they launched their simultaneous assaults on the 
soldiers at the opening of the battle. Captain Smith (1856) wrote ".  . a large body of . 
them were seen moving up the northern slope of the hill,  .[and] At the same time they . . 
attempted to charge the hill on the left and center, but were met by Lt. Sweitzer who had 
charge of the southern slope of the hill." The historical record is clear and unambiguous, 
particularly when compared to the terrain and slopes described by Captain Smith in his 
after-action report. The Indian's axis of attack for their first two assaults were generally 
from the north and east (Figure 22.). 
The actions of the officers and the locations and movements of the soldiers during the 
battle can also be surmised from the historical record. Captain Smith relates that in the 
first two hours of the battle his soldiers sustained so many casualties that he was forced 
to withdraw his men ".  . some ten or twenty yards behind the crest of the hill.  ." . . 
From the casualty list (Appendix C) it can be seen that the vast majority of the casualties 
sustained on the 27 May 1856 were dragoons. Therefore, it can by concluded that at the 
beginning of the battle, the northern perimeter of the soldier's defensive position was 
manned by dragoons. The dragoons were most exposed to fire from Indian warriors 
along the ridge line north of the dragoon position. Consequently, the southern portion of 
the defensive position was manned by Company "E" soldiers. The casualty list indicates 
that Company "E" soldiers, although in harms way throughout the battle, sustained 117 
fewer casualties on 27 May 1856 than the dragoons, and were, therefore, located on 
relatively safer terrain within the defensive position. Additionally, in view of the fact that 
Captain Smith mentions that Lt. Sweitzer was in charge of the southern portion of the 
defensive position, it is logical that Captain Smith would place soldiers under the Lt. by 
integral/parent unit (i.e., all Company "E" soldiers under Lt. Sweitzer to the south, and 
all Company "C" soldiers under himself to the north). Figure 22. illustrates the general 
locations occupied by both dragoons and infantry. Additionally, Captain Smith wrote 
that it was Lt. Sweitzer and soldiers under him who repulsed the Indian attack on the 
center of the soldier's position when fighting commenced on 27 May 1856. Company 
"E" soldiers, occupying positions on the south/southeast slopes of the kidney-shaped 
ridge line, would have had superior fields of fire on Indians massed and attacking from 
the east. It was Lt. Sweitzer, and soldiers in his charge, who assaulted out of their 
positions on the afternoon of 28 May to assist Captain Augur and Company "G" soldiers 
with their assault on the Indians on the ridge line north of Company "C" defensive 
perimeter (Figure 22.) The counter-attack by Lt. Sweitzer would not have been possible 
had the Indians maintained their threatening position on the eastern slopes of the kidney-
shaped ridge line. Lt. Sweitzer's counter-attack became possible when the Indians 
noticed Captain Augur and the advancing Company "G" on the Big Bend meadow to 
their rear. They realized, that with soldiers to their front and rear, it was prudent to quit 
the fight. 
There is no direct archaeological evidence of Captain Augur's attack across the Big 
Bend meadow due to the rapid movement and the short duration of his company's 118 
advance across the meadow. However, when Company "G" reached the northern edge 
of the meadow near the confluence of Billings Creek and the Rogue River, Captain 
Augur wheeled the company to the west, and began attacking the Indians located on the 
ridge line north of the kidney-shaped landform. They no doubt produced battle artifacts 
during this action that have yet to be found. Company "G" sustained five casualties 
attacking up the slopes leading to where the Indians had their static positions. It is likely 
that battle artifacts do exist on these slopes, but the slopes Captain Augur attacked over 
were out of the primary area of investigation for this project. 
Can the Battle Area Be Defined? 
The term battle area is an inclusive term that includes all the activity areas related to  a 
battle. The Big Bend Battle area includes: the static positions occupied by both the 
soldiers and Indians during the battle, the areas where movement to combat or combat 
took place (i.e., terrain used by the Indians and/or Captain Augur as avenues of approach 
during their attacks), and administrative areas (i.e., pre-battle and post-baffle Indian and 
Army encampments on the Big Bend meadow). The location of the Big Bend Battle 
area is depicted on Figure 21. The battle area was determined from Captain Ord's 
sketch map, as well as Captain Smith's and Augur's reports, 
Company "C" defensive position and the static positions occupied by the Indians 
during the battle, as well as areas of engagement have been addressed (Figure 22.).  The 
one element not yet discussed is encampments. 119 
The following discussion is based solely on a synthesis of historical documents 
relating to the Battle of Big Bend. Due to time and personnel constraints, and the 
extensive land area contained within the battle area, no archaeological investigations 
were conducted to locate encampments. The historical record suggests that the Indians 
were camped on the northern edge of the meadow, near the confluence of Billings creek 
and the Rogue River prior to the beginning of fighting (Augur 1856). Captain Augur 
mentioned in his report that he attacked north across the meadow and put to flight Indian 
women and children who escaped across the Rogue River in canoes. It is highly 
probable that Indian battle casualties were amongst the women and children when they 
escaped across the river. This hypothesis is based on location. The women and children 
could have easily filled the role of the modern day battlefield aid station; they were 
located relatively close to the battle, they were out of harms way, and they were near 
fresh water. Not to mention the fact that the women and children were family and loved 
ones of Indian combatants. 
The locations of Army pre-battle and post-battle encampments is not specifically 
mentioned in the historical record. The record states that Captain Smith's pre-battle 
camp was located on the meadow, from which he relocated to his defensive position on 
the night of 26 May 1856. The 30 May 1856 reports of LtCol. Buchanan, Captain 
Smith, and Captain Augur note that the authors wrote their post-battle reports while 
located at the Big Bend of the Rogue River. However, all three reports fail to mention 
where their camps were located on the meadow. It is likely that their camp was near 
Foster Creek. A structure had been built by miners in that general location prior to the 120 
commencement of the war, and it would have been natural for soldiers to camp near 
where other whites had established themselves and had possibly dug a well. It may be 
possible to locate the soldier's camp archaeologically due to the numbers of soldiers, 
volunteer militia, and Indian prisoners who eventually congregated on the meadow. The 
total numbers of regular Army soldiers camped on the meadow is estimated to be nearly 
250. These soldiers camped at the Big Bend for approximately 13 days after the battle 
(Buchanan 11 June 1856). They were joined by approximately 250 more volunteer 
militia who camped nearby on the Big Bend meadow for approximately 2 days 
(Buchanan 11 June, and 20 June 1856). Although the soldiers and volunteers camped 
only briefly on the meadow, it would have been long enough for them to create a 
temporary hospital, trash dumps, and corrals. They undoubtedly lost buttons, coins, and 
bullets, and likely built fire pits, latrines and buried their dead. Additionally, there were 
277 Indian prisoners encamped in the vicinity of the soldiers who would have created fire 
pits and trash piles as evidence to where they had camped on the meadow (Buchanan 11 
June 1856). 
Thus, based on the historical documentation of the battle, the entire battle area was 
bound on the east by the Rogue River, the south by Foster Creek, the west by the draw 
to the west of Captain Smith's defensive position, the north by Billings Creek and the 
ridge line north of the kidney-shaped ridge line. The battle area includes approximately 
400 acres (Figure 21.), and during the fort night after the battle as many as 500 to 750 
people may have resided within its vicinity. 121 
What Types of Artifacts Can be Expected to be Found? 
Because the site was the location of a military engagement where both sides were 
using firearms, an assumption was made that metal artifacts would be recovered (i.e., 
lead musket balls, lead shot, and copper percussion caps, etc.). Additionally, because the 
site was occupied for less than 48 hours, it was believed that few personal items would 
have been lost or discarded. Consequently, metal detectors became the primary 
investigative tool used during fieldwork. Nevertheless, as a result of an investigation of 
a metal detector alert, non-metallic material was discovered. At the location where 
artifact FS # 41 (2 square nails) was discovered by a metal detector, leather was found in 
association. As a result, Test Unit # 9 was opened and artifacts FS # 44 (2 eyelet's and 
3 square nails), # 45 (leather, thread, square nail), and # 46 (leather) were recovered. 
These finds kindled hope that other non-metallic items might be found in those activity 
areas of the site where static positions had been established. Yet, nothing more was 
discovered. In practice, all but four artifacts collected during fieldwork were discovered 
by metal detectors. As a result of subsequent excavations, only the leather shoe 
fragments mentioned above and one CCS flake were recovered. 
The types of artifacts that can reasonably expected to be recovered from a battle site 
of this scale occupied for approximately 48 hours 150 years ago has been demonstrated 
to be unremarkable. Only battle-related metallic objects from firearms can reasonably be 
expected to be found due to natural deterioration and scavenging. Bonus, non-metallic 
artifacts associated with metal (i.e., artifacts FS # 41, leather with square nails; and 
artifacts # 1, a ceramic smoking pipe with a metal tobacco screen) can be located and 122 
recovered but should not be expected. The numbers of artifacts that can be recovered 
from a battle site is dependent on the numbers of combatants involved, the duration of 
combat, and the distance in time that the event occurred from the present. The fact that 
only 92 battle-related artifacts were recovered suggests the Big Bend Battle Site may 
have been looted in the past. 
What Learned, Patterned Cultural Battlefield Behavior Might (or Should) be 
Discernible? 
Evidence of learned, patterned cultural behavior may be discernible from a short-term 
battle site. This patterned behavior should be consistent with the Army's expectations of 
how a prudent commander would behave, prior to and during a battle, under the 
circumstances that confronted Captain Smith on the evening 26 May 1856. 
The historical record states that Captain Smith had roughly 15 hours to prepare a 
position from which he could defend his command if attacked and/or receive 
surrendering Indians. Captain Smith's actions on the evening of 26 May were calculated 
to provide his command the greatest possible advantage if attacked. Provided the luxury 
of time (15 hours), Captain Smith relocated his command from the meadow to terrain 
that he believed provided Company "C" the best possible opportunity for survival. The 
terrain he choose for his defense was deliberately selected, hence it was a "deliberate" 
defense as opposed to a "hasty" defense. Captain Smith choose the ground on which he 
was to fight. He choose terrain 150 years ago that had attributes that he perceived 
would offer his command advantages, advantages that can be determined today by 123 
studying the terrain. He placed Company "C" on terrain (the kidney-shaped ridge line) 
that was sufficiently large to contain a force the size of his command and that was 
defensible. The archaeological record indicates that Captain Smith placed his soldiers 
and his weapons in areas on the kidney-shaped ridge line where he could use the terrain 
as a force multiplier. Defending steep slopes is much easier and more efficiently 
accomplished than defending flat ground. And, the evidence also indicates he located his 
howitzer in a position on the ridge line that surprised the Indians upon their initial 
assaults. 
Captain Smith's actions (behavior) during 26-28 May 1856 were based on: 
fundamentals of tactical employment of troops, his military training and field experience, 
as well as his personal knowledge of his command's human and technological 
capabilities. On the evening of 26 May 1856, Captain Smith's options were severely 
limited by the convergence of several factors. The return of his pack animals to Oak Flat 
with Captain Augur severely limited his transport mobility; abandoning his supplies in the 
face of a rumored attack was not conceivable; and he could relocate his command from 
the meadow only as far as his men's toil would allow. Captain Smith was also 
constrained by time and his orders to receive surrendering Indians at the Big Bend. 
Consequently, Captain Smith made prudent, practical and timely decisions in order to 
accomplish his mission, and protect his command, and the welfare of his men. 
Captain Smith's actions were highly predictable, grounded on his past experience as a 
soldier and infantry officer. The historical and archaeological record appears to support 
that Captain Smith behaved as he was trained to do. His actions prior to and during the 124 
battle, are entirely consistent with the fundamentals of U.S. military tactics ofmaneuver 
and defense. His actions were patterned, he behaved as the Army had expected him to 
act. 
Conclusion 
Based on a review of the relevant historical documents pertaining to the Battle of Big 
Bend, as well as an analysis of the results of the archaeological data generated during the 
course of the current project, the five posed research questions were addressed to 
varying degrees. 
Captain Smith's defensive position was well defined using the historical record and an 
analysis of the locations from which artifacts were produced. In addition to determining 
the general defensive perimeter, the locations occupied by dragoons and infantry soldiers 
within the defensive perimeter were discovered, and the probable location of the 
howitzer at the beginning of the battle has been suggested. Additionally, the non-use of 
the trench line for its original intent has been addressed. 
No direct archaeological data was found for locating the Indian static positions. 
However, based primarily on the historical record and the reading of topography, and the 
correlation of the two, the Indian static positions on the ridge line and hill slopes have 
been determined. The lack of percussion caps on the ridge line north of the kidney-
shaped ridge line, as well as on the slopes surrounding the landform, suggests that the 
Indian warriors were using muskets with flintlock firing devices. The two percussion 
caps that were located on the ridge line where the Indians had created their cross fire on 125 
Captain Smith's soldiers were probably expended during Captain Augur's attack, or Lt. 
Sweitzer's counter attack near the end of the battle. The fact that not one soldier was 
killed or wounded by an arrow during the battle suggests that the Indians were not using 
bows and arrows. 
Areas of engagements, Indian axis of attack, and directions of movement have been 
determined. The historical record, in conjunction with recovered archaeological data, 
indicated the locations where fighting was conducted. Canister rounds, lead bullets, lead 
shot, and copper percussion caps attested to the areas where the antagonists engaged 
one another in combat. 
The battle area was determined by reviewing the historical record and correlating it to 
the topography. The area covers approximately 400 acres. 
Learned, patterned cultural behavior exhibited by Captain Smith and the men of 
Company "C" has been discussed. The historical record and the archaeological evidence 
attests to soldiers performing as expected by the Army under difficult circumstances. 
Their behavior was patterned on training; training which instilled tactical knowledge and 
fostered discipline within the group. 
There remains a potential to research and find the post-battle encampments of both 
the Army and the Indians on the Big Bend meadow. The Army encampment may be 
found near Foster Creek for the reasons mentioned earlier. But, whether it was located 
close to Foster Creek or not, it would have been of considerable size due to the large 
numbers of soldiers and volunteers assembled at the Big Bend at the conclusion of the 
battle. The Army camp would have left a large foot print on the meadow with its 126 
associated lost personal items, discarded gear, fire pits, latrines, corrals, and trash 
dumps. The site of the post-battle Indian encampment might be more difficult to 
discover. 
The types of artifacts that can be expected to be found at a battle site occupied for 
only 48 hours 150 year ago are metal artifacts associated with combat. Even a limited 
number of battle-related artifacts can produce useful information when used in 
conjunction with the historical record and matched with military tactics of the  era. 127 
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APPENDIX A 
AFTER ACTION REPORTS OF THE BATTLE OF BIG BEND 
On 30 May 1856 after action reports of the Battle of Big Bend were hand written by the three 
commander's involved, LtCol Buchanan, Captain Smith and Captain Augur. The commanders 
prepared the reports while their units were being reconsolidated in preparation for further operations 
and movement towards the coast. Their reports are quoted from microfilmed original documents 
obtained from the National Archieves. Words within the documents that cannot be accurately 
deciphered are replaced with "****", and words that have no current meaning, or in the case of the 
interpretation of the spelling of surnames are followed by 11". LtCol. Buchanan's report included 
Captains' Smith and Augur reports as enclosures, as well as a list of casualties (Appendix D.), and a 
sketch of the battle site (Appendix B.). 
LtCol Buchanan's Report: 
Head Quarters, Camp Big Bend R. Riv Dist. 
Southn. Or. & Nordin Cal. May 30th, 1856 
Sir: 
I have the honor to continue the report of my operations and enclose the reports of 
Capts. Smith, 1st Drags and Augur, 4th Inf of their well contested engagements with 
the enemy on the 27th & 28th instants, with a list of killed and wounded and sketch of 
the battle ground. 
Before alluding further to these reports, it will not be amiss to mention the 
occurrences of the few days immediately preceding them, in order that the chain of 
events may be unbroken. On the 24th I sent Capt. Smith with his Compy. and the 
detachment of "E" 4th Infy to this point, in order that he might meet and receive 
George and Limpy and their people, here, on the 26th, according to their agreement; 
and as the greater part of my animals were with the train at Fort Orford Capt. Augur 
was sent with his company to bring Smith's pack animals back to Oak Grove. He 
returned on the 25th, and on the 26th I broke up my camp at that point, and crossed 
Rogue River at the mouth of the Illinois. On the 27th I dispatched Maj. Reynolds to 
meet Capt. Ord and strengthen his escort to the train, and started myself with Augur's 
Company for the point at which the Fort Orford trail diverges to this place, leaving 
Capt. Lloyd Jones in camp at the mouth of the Illinois. Before reaching the point at 
which I intended to encamp that afternoon an express from Capt. Lloyd Jones overtook 
me with the information that Genl. Palmer, Supt. **** of Indian Affairs was at the 
mouth of the Illinois, and that Capt. Ord was returning with the train by way of the 
South side of Rogue River. I continue on to my camp ground, and just after arriving 
there, an express from Capt. Smith brought me word that he was apprehensive of an 
attack by Old John and many others of the Indians who had promised to come in.  It 
then became necessary for me to concentrate my forces at once at the mouth of the 
Illinois in order to prevent the lower Indians from passing up Rogue River in their 
canoes to John's assistance, to be in position to reinforce Smith if he should actually 
require it - and to reinforce Ord, should any demonstration be made against the train. 137 
I accordingly returned with Augur's Company to Lloyd Jones' camp, and sent 
expresses to Reynolds and Smith, ordering the former to join me the next morning, 
and directing the latter to notify me at once should he be attacked. The latter 
expressman did not return to me until the next morning, when he brought me the 
information that Smith had been fighting all night, and was still fighting when he left 
the point that he had been able to reach, which was only within good hearing distance 
of the battle. As soon as I heard this, I dispatched Capt. Augur to reinforce Smith, and 
am happy to say that his arrival on the ground was most opportune, as it immediately 
changed the face of affairs, and caused the complete rout of the enemy. 
The battle of the 'Big Bend', whether measured by its duration, or by the loss that 
we sustained, must be considered a severe one, and the Officers and men engaged in it 
are worthy of all praise. Capt. Smith's Command, surrounded as it was by an active, 
wily and vindictive foe, sustained itself most gallantly during a fierce conflict of 30 
hours, and is fully entitled to the commendation of the Department - whilst the 
prompt, gallant and well timed charge of Capt. Augur's Company is deserving of 
equal credit. All did their duty nobly, and I would respectfully recommend to the 
especial notice of the Commanding General and through him to that of the War 
Department, the Officers engaged in the action. Capt. A. J. Smith 1st Drags, Capt. 
C.C. Augur, 4th Infy, Asst. Surgn. C.H. Crane, U.S.A., and 1st Lieut. N.B. Sweitzer 
1st Drag. Our loss in the two days, was 11 killed, including 1 Indian boy, servant to 
Lt. Sweitzer; and 18 wounded including Mr. Swett, one of our citizen guides. That of 
the enemy is unknown, though it mist have been considerable, as their attempts to 
carry the position of Capt. Smith were frequent and most daring. Their numbers were 
about 150, whilst Smith had 96 men on the 27th when the battle commenced, and 
Augur's Company when he joined added 54 more. 
I must not omit to mention that Gerd. Palmer, who had joined our camp on the 
27th, volunteered with two other gentlemen of the Indian Department, who were with 
him, Messrs. Olney and Wright, to accompany Capt. Augur, and rendered valuable 
service. The day after the action, the General sent a message to George informing him 
that if he would now come in and deliver up his arms, and do what I required, he 
would be allowed to do so. This afternoon they have come in with a number of their 
people, and say that more are coming. 
Within half an hour after Augur left me on the 28th, Reynolds arrived, and that 
evening Ord reached the Illinois with the train. He joined me the next day, when I 
immediately started with my united force for this place, and, having cut my trail  as I 
moved, reached here today about 11 a.m. with every thing in good order. 
I am, Sir, Respectfully, Your Obt. Servt. Robt. C. Buchanan, Bvt. Lt. Col. Major 
4th Inf. Dept. of the Pac. Benicia, Cal. 
I am, Sir, Respectfully, Your Obt. Servt. 
Robt. C. Buchanan 
Bvt. LtCol Major 4th Inf 
Commanding & [1 Dist. 
To:
 
Capt. F.R. Jones
 
Asst. Adjut. Genl.
 
Dept. of the Pac.
 
Benicai, Cal.
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Captains Smith's Report 
Camp at Big Bend of Rogue River O.T. 
May 30th 1856 
Sir: 
I have the honor to report that in obedience to SpeOrder No. 27, I left Oak Camp 
on the Illinois River on the morning of the 24th of May with my Company "C" a 
detachment of Co. "E" 4th Infantry under command of Lt. Sweitzer 1st Drags., and 
**** Surgeon C.H. Crane to proceed to this point for the purpose of receiving George 
and Limpy's bands and such other hostile Indians as might wish to surrender 
themselves for the purpose of being removed to the new or coast reservation. Taking 
the trail down the Illinois to near its mouth I ascended on the south side of Rogue 
River to a point about two miles from this camp, where my command was **** over & 
the march continued to the Big Bend, which was reached about dark on the first day. 
The following day, the 25th being rainy and disagreeable, the Indians did not come in 
according to promise, and made that excuse which of itself was plausible enough. 
Early in the day, of the 26th, several Indians came into camp and stated that George 
was some nine miles above us, on this river, endeavoring to make his way down with 
all his people including the Applegate, Galise Creek, & Cow Creek bands, and if not 
prevented by Old John & the Klamaths, would reach my camp that day. Late in the 
afternoon I was informed by some Indian boys that had been in my camp for several 
days, that it was the talk **** the Indians that Old John was to attack us early next 
morning, with all the Indians he could muster, on the north side of our camp & the 
Lower River Indians on the south side. Our position being an **** one, I determined 
at once to change camp & sent Lt. Sweitzer to examine our adjacent hill with a view of 
occupying it if found suitable; his report being favorable, I moved camp after dark, 
having to transport my howitzer ammunition, stores, etc. on the backs of my men. 
Early on the morning of the 27th several Indians came in camp, some of them 
George's people, and told me the Indians were coming in, I soon saw a number of 
canoes land and small parties moving up the hill, all apparently friendly, though being 
armed I would not permit them to enter camp, up to ten o'clock in the day their 
number ever increasing, and as soon as I ascertained that many of John's people were 
among them I placed my whole command under arms, not suspecting up to this time 
their treachery. I increased my security on the left brow of the hill that is steep and 
covered with timber and heavy brush with orders not to fire the first gun, by this time 
they had entirely surrounded the hill & their movements seemed hostile. The Indians 
fired the first gun about eleven o'clock and a large body of them were seen moving up 
the northern slope of the hill, and as they appeared above the crest, they were met by a 
discharge of canister from the Howitzer followed by a charge of the men occupying 
that portion of the hill, which drove them out of sight into the thick brush. At the 
same time they attempted to charge the hill on the left and center, but were gallantly 
met by Lt. Sweitzer who had charge of the southern slope of the hill. The Indians then 
took position on a ridge to our left, on the slope leading up to our camp from which 
they procured a cross fire on the men in position on that flank, and succeeded in 
wounding so many in the course of two hours that I had to withdraw them some ten or 
twenty yards behind the crest of the hill from which position a continuous fire was 
kept up during the day and charges made at different times that forced the Indians to 
retire. At the close of the day we had four men killed & 15 wounded besides my 
guide, and an Indian boy servt to Lt. Sweitzer. The Indians kept up their fire until 
after dark, and occasionally through the night. About eleven o'clock at night, Lt. 139 
Sweitzer with all the men that could be spared, commenced a breastwork on the 
southern part of the hill, composed of blankets, saddles, tents, provisions, etc. & with 
the aid of our **** so far completed it by daylight as to form a tolerable protection for 
our wounded & a small portion of the command. On the outside of this work I had 
dug a number of rifle pits to contain from two to five men each & which were found to 
assure the desired purpose. As soon as the Indians discovered our movements they 
raised signal fires and by four o'clock in the morning of the 28th renewed their attack 
which they kept up by brisk fire until 4 p.m. & making several attempts during the day 
to charge us, ****. Capt. Augur with his Company "G" 4th Infy arrived about 4 p.m. 
on the afternoon of the 28th and seeing the Indians at our front and right, gallantly 
charged them & put them to flight; had he know our **** positions his movements 
could not have been better, as to cut the Indians from their canoes & a retreat across 
the river. At the same time I ordered Lt. Sweitzer with detachment of Co. "E" to 
charge the Indians then occupying the hills in our front & ridges to the left, which was 
handsomely done & on his return was ordered to join Capt. Augur. From eleven A.M. 
on the 27 to 4 P.M. on the 28 my men were all actively employed and behaved most 
creditably. Dr. Crane in addition to his ordinary duties with the wounded, when not 
engaged professionally, was always found with rifle in hand, to render me what aid I 
might require. 
It is well known that during the first day a number of Indians were either killed or 
wounded, but it is impossible to state with any degree of accuracy the number as they 
were instantly dragged from the field. 
Number killed  1st day 27th  4 pens Co. "C" Drag.
 
wounded  2nd  28th 11  "  "  "  "
 
Li  Li  1st  27th 5  "  Co. "E" 4 Infy 
4.  2nd  28th  1 "  "  " " " 
I am, Sir,
 
Very Respectfully
 
Your Obt. Svt.
 
A...J. Smith
 
Capt. of Drag.
 
Comp. Det.
 
To: J. G. Chambers 3 Arty. 
Capt. Augur's Report 
Camp 'Big Bend', Rogue River. 
O.T. May 30th, 1856 
Sir, 
I have the honor to submit a report of the operations of my Company ("G" 4th he.) 
on the 28th Inst. Immediately after receiving instructions to that effect from the 
Commanding Officer of the District in person, I left the mouth of Illinois river with 
my Company, consisting of myself and fifty four enlisted men, for the 'Big Bend' of 
the Rogue River; to assist Captain Smith's Command, reported to be contending there 
with a vastly superior force of the upper and lower Rogue River Indians. Owing to the 140 
difficulties of the trail, portions of which I had to cut out, I did not arrive there until 
about 4 o'clock p.m. of the same day. 
On coming into the plain at the 'Big Bend', I discovered Captain Smith's 
command on the top of the first of a range of high hills running obliquely to the 
direction of the river, and terminating at its bank about a mile from where I entered 
the plain, which was nearly abreast of Captain Smith, and about midway between him 
and the river - distant from me about half a mile - I found the crests and river slopes of 
these hills covered with indians, some of them women and children who ran for the 
river at the point terminating the hills so soon as the company appeared. Deeming it 
better not to lose time by going with my command to Captain Smith, I immediately 
started it in double quick time to endeavor to intercept the women and children, but 
before I could reach the river they had all crossed with their canoes. The men still 
remained upon the hill, and kept up a continuous fire upon the company - the scattered 
growth of Oak trees covering the hills affording them ample cover. The company 
being deployed as skirmisher, I faced them to the left, and they charged up the hill 
very gallantly, driving the indians before them at every point. This secured the first 
hill - the indians taking up position behind a second one about fifty yards in advance 
from which they continued to fire upon whoever exposed themselves. My men had 
been marching all day in a very hot sun, and had come the last mile at a run, and were 
nearly exhausted, I therefore rested them here about ten minutes. I then sent a party of 
twenty men under my first Sergt. Kellehard to gain the top of the second hill behind 
which the indians were lying, and to charge down on their right flank. At the same 
time I sent another party under Sergt. Hunter to intercept them in case they should 
endeavor to escape by the foot of the hill. Both parties succeeded very handsomely in 
the duty assigned them, and drove the indians entirely away. They retreated down a 
precipitous and almost impassable ravine, and were seen ascending the mountain on 
the other side, and soon after disappeared. I then returned with my company carrying 
my killed and wounded, and reported to Captain Smith. 
It affords my pleasure to be able to report that my N.C. officers and men behaved 
throughout in a most satisfactory manner, and I beg leave to mention Sergts. 
Killehard, Clifford, & Hunter, Corpls. Cox & Walter & Prints, Boling, Boland, 
Kieman & Smith & Claby & Murray 2°[1. I append a list of killed and wounded in 
this affair and can state confidently that all the men included in it were doing their 
duty most gallantly. 
Very respectfully Sir, 
Your Obt. Servt. 
C.C. Augur. 
Capt: 4th Infy, 
Comy [1 Co G 
To:
 
Lieut. J. G. Chandler,
 
3rd Arty.
 
A. A. A. G. District. 
N. Cal. & S. Oregon. 141 
The list of killed and wounded that Captain Augur referred to in his above report follows: 
Nominal list of killed and wounded of Co. "G", 4th Infy, in the affair with indians at 
the 'Big Bend'. May 28th, 1856. 
Killed: 
1. John Sweeney, private 
2. John Wilkinson, private 
Wounded: 
1. Corpl. William C. Walter (severely) 
2. Pvt. Michael Dolan (slightly) 
3.  "  John Wiht (severely) APPENDIX B
 
CAPTAIN ORD'S SKETCH MAP OF THE BIG BEND BATTLE SITE
 
Captain Ord sketched a map of the Big Bend Battle Site. The sketch was forwarded to General 
Wool as an enclosure to Lt Col. Buchanan's report of 30 May 1856. 
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APPENDIX C
 
LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED AT THE BATTLE OF BIG BEND, 
27-28 MAY, 1856 
Capt. A.J. Smith, "C" Co., 1st Dragoons, prepared a list of soldiers killed, mortally wounded, and 
wounded in the Battle of the Big Bend, 27-28 May, 1856. He appended the list to his after action report 
which was forwarded to higher headquarters as an enclosure to LtCol. Buchann's after action report 
dated 30 May, 1856. Smith's report, dated 30 May, 1856, is quoted below: 
Report of killed & wounded in an action with hostile Indians at the Big Bend of the 
Rogue River on the 27th & 28th of May 1856 
No  Names  Rank  Regts.  Cos.  Killed  Mort- Wo- Killed in action with the 
ally  und- Rogue River Indians at Big 
Wo­ ed  Bend of Rogue River, O.T. 
und- May 27th 1856 
ed 
1  Amos Birch  Pvt.  1st  1  , 28th May 1856 
Drags 
2  Edward  Pvt.  1  ,  27th  " 
Li 
Blair 
3  John  Pvt.  1 
44 
, 27th  " 
Daugherty 
4  Patrick  Pvt.  1 
Gi 
,  27th  " 
44 
Hawlon 
5  John B.  Pvt.  1  ,  27th  " 
Hoover 
6  Mathew  Pvt.  1  Mortally wounded in epigasth-
Brau  ric [ ?] region on the 27th, died 
on the 28th May 1856 
7  John  Pvt.  1  Mortally wounded in upper 
Beading  part of right chest on the 27th 
& died on May 28th 1856 
8  Elijah B.  Pvt.  1  Wounded by gun shot, wound 
Birch  through chest on the 27th 
9  Frederick  Pvt.  1  Wounded by gun shot, wound-
Garrow  ed in right shoulder on the 
27th, joined Co. from desertion 
10  Christopher  Pvt.  1  Wounded by gun shot, wound-
C. Frazer  ed in right shoulder on the 
27th 
11  Joseph Haag  Pvt.  1  Wounded by gun shot, wound 
ed in left shoulder & shoulder 
blade on the 27th, May 1856 
12  Francis  Pvt.  1  Wounded by gun shot, wound-
McGuire  ed in left shoulder and back 
on the 27, May 1856, joined 
Co. from desertion 
13  Michael  Pvt.  1  Wounded by gun shot, wound-
O'Leary  ed in left hip on the 27th 144 
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14  Charles 
Tuanll 
Pvt. 
15  John Turner  Pvt. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Peter 
Rodgers 
John 
Sweeny 
John 
Wilkinson 
William G. 
Walter 
Michael 
Dolan 
John Wiht 
Pvt. 
Pvt. 
Pvt. 
Cpl. 
Pvt. 
Pvt. 
4th 
Inf. 
1 
1 
22 
23 
24 
John 
Grinuniu 
Edward 
Kavanaugh 
George 
Murry 
Sgt. 
Pvt. 
Pvt. 
25 
26 
27 
Timothy 
Murry 
Patrick 
Koache 
Ambrose 
Weitmore 
Pvt. 
Pvt. 
Pvt. 
Total  7 
All the above wounds are from rifles 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
17 
Wounded by gun shot, wound 
ed in left shoulder & blade on 
the 27th 
Wounded by gun shot, wound­
ed in right shoulder & blade 
on the 27th 
Wounded by gun shot, left 
shoulder on the 27th 
Killed in action on the 28th, 
May /56 
Severely wounded in left groin 
on the 28th­
Slightly in right thigh on the 
28th 
Severely wounded in left thigh 
on the 28th­
Severely wounded in left chest 
& shoulder on the 27th 
Severely wounded through arm 
& forearm on the 27th 
Mortally wounded through face 
& neck on the 27th, died on the 
30th of May /56 
Slightly wounded in right foot 
on the 28th 
Severely wounded in right 
shoulder, 27th­
Severely wounded in right hip 
on the 27th 
A.J. Smith 
Capt. 1st Drags. 
Camp 
Captain Smith's report was written in cursive using what appears to be ink and quill. Several words 
are difficult to read or interpret, and are noted above by "[ ?] "following them. 145 
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ARTIFACT CATALOGUE
 
All artifacts collected during fieldwork are listed below. The categories under which they are listed 
are battle-related artifacts and non-battle related artifacts. The non-battle related artifacts category is 
further divided into pre-battle, post-battle, and undetermined. 
BATTLE-RELATED ARTIFACTS 
FS #  Desc  Total	  Location:  Level  Depth  Remarks 
Block #, TU11, 
or MP # 
1  pipe  1	  N 040 / E 060  5 cm  smoking pipe: 
fr NE, 193° @  stem or effigy, tin tobacco 
14.3 m	  screen w/ holes remains in 
bowl, unreadable embossed 
name on pipe stem 
2  SRBL  1	  N 180 / E 100  2 cm  ball: 
fr NW, 120° @  wt = 25.7 grm / 395 grn 
5 in  shape deformed, high 
velocity impact, three buck 
shot forms imprinted on B 
surface, B bw est = .65+ cal, 
wpn + M, .66 cal? 
3  RBL  1	  N 200 / E 120  5 cm  ball: 
fr SW, 050° @  wt = 27 grm 1 407 grn 
14 m  dia = .6525 in. / 16.59 mm 
B bw est = .65+ cal, wpn 
M, .66 cal? buck Sh 
imprinted on surface of B 
4  RCBI  I	  N 480 / E 200  3 cm  ball: 
fr SW, 020° @  1.08 cal / 27.43 mm 
17 m  wt = 74.1 grm / 1153.4 grn 
5  SRBL  1	  N 040 / E 060  12 cm  ball: 
fr NE, 209° g  wt = 12.2 grm / 189 grn 
9.5m  dia = .498 in / 12.5 mm 
.534 / 13.5 mm 
B bw est = .52 - .53 cal, 
wpn = M / P .54 cal? 146 
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6  BuL  1  N 060 / E 040 
fr NE, 242° @ 
17 m 
2 cm  bullet: 
wt = 8.7 grm / 134.3 grn 
dia = .4085 in. / 10.37 mm 
.394 in. / 10.1 nun 
Bu body carved, whittled, 
spent? Bu cal = .40 cal?, 
wpn = P, 40 cal? 
7  SRBL  1  N 060 / E 060 
fr NE, 260° @ 
17m/6 cm 
2 cm  ball: 
wt = 11.4 grm / 179 gm 
dia = 53.95 in. / 13.70 nun 
55.55 in. / 14.11 mm 
B bw est = .54 cal, wpn = P, 
.56 cal? 
9  SShL  1  N 100 / E 040 
fr SW, 280° @ 
12m 
4 cm  shot: 
wt ----- 2.4 grm / 38 grn 
Sh bw est = .30 cal / 7.62 
mm, # 1 buck 
10  SRBL  1  N 120 / E 040 
fr SE, 080° @ 
6 m 
2 cm  ball: 
wt = 14.3 grm / 223.9 grn 
dia = .5375 in. / 13.66 mm 
.5605 in. / 14.23 mm 
B bw est = .53+ cal, wpn = 
M / P, .56 / .57 cal? 
16  met button  1  N 100 / E 060 
fr NE, 200° @ 
2m 
6 cm  button: 
dia = .7 in. / 17.8 mm 
size = 28 lines (lignes) 
4 holes w/ thread, 
one piece cast metal (white 
metal or lead), military or 
civilian trouser, 1800 - 1860 
17  SRBL  1  N 100 / E 060 
fr SW, 060° g 
2 m 
2 cm  ball: 
wt = 25.1 grm / 390 gm 
shape miss formed, low 
velocity impact, B bw est = 
.65+ cal, wpn = M, .66 cal? 
19  SRBL  1  N 060 / E 060 
fr SW, 038° g 
8 m / 4 cm 
2 cm  ball: 
wt = 13.7 grm / 213.5 grn 
shape deformed, high vel­
ocity impact, patch fiber 
imprinted on B from force of 
exploding powder, friction 
caused lead on edge of B to 
fold back as B penetrated 
target, B bw est = .53 cal, 
wpn = M / P, .54 cal? 147 
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20  SS111...  1  N 080 / E 040 
fr NE, 218° @ 
6 m / 10 cm 
2 cm  shot: 
wt = 2.1 grm / 32 grn 
shape deformed, high 
velocity impact, Sh bw est = 
.30 cal / 7.62 nun, # 1 buck 
23  SPc  1  N 160 / E 080 
fr SW, 084° @ 
17m/7cm 
3 cm 
24  SPc  1  N 160 / E 080 
fr SW, 100° @ 
17m/2 cm 
4 cm 
25  SShL  1  N 140 / E 100 
fr NE, 244° @ 
14 m 
6 cm  shot: 
wt = 2.5 gnu / 38 gm 
dia = .30 in. / 7.62 mm, # 1 
buck, Sh bw est = .30 cal 
26  SRBL  1  N140 / E 100 
fr NE, 218° @ 
12 m 
8 cm  ball: 
wt = 24.4 grm / 378.2 gm 
dia = .6510 in. / 16.54 mm 
.6650 in. / 16.65 mm 
shape deformed, low velocity 
impact, B bw est = .63 cal, 
wpn = M, .66 cal? 
27  SShL  1  N 140 / E 100 
fr NE, 208° @ 
11 m 
8 cm  shot: 
wt = 2.9 grm / 40 gm 
dia = .32 in. / 8.13 mm 
miss formed, low velocity 
impact, Sh bw est = .30 cal, 
# 1 buck? 
28  RBL  1  N 140 / E 100 
fr NE, 208° g 
11 m 
8 cm  ball: 
wt = 25.6 grm / 405 grn 
dia = .655 in. / 16.64 mm 
.656 in. / 16.67 mm 
.654 in. / 16.62 nun 
.6615 in. / 16.8 mm 
shape deformed, low velocity 
impact, B bw est = 65+ cal, 
wpn = M, .66 cal? 
29  tool  1  N 140 / E 120 
fr SE, 300° 
m 
10 cm  tool: 
musket ball extractor, worm 
34  SPc  1  N 140 / E 120 
fr NE, 199° 
15 m 
8 cm 148 
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35  SRBL  1  N 120 / E 120 
fr NW, 120° @ 
20m 
9 cm  ball: 
wt = 22.1 grm / 342.5 grn 
dia = .59 / 4.9 nun 
.69 / 17.3 mm 
shape deformed, low velocity 
impact, B bw est = .62+ cal, 
wpn = M, .66 - .69 cal? 
38 
41 
L 
leather + sq n 
sq n 
1 
2 
2 
N 200 / E 120 
fr NE, 200° @ 
8m 
TU 9  1 
2 
6 cm 
surface 
lead slag: 
wt = 7.1 grm 
leather: 
lgth = .77 in. / 19.7 mm 
thick = .11 in. / 2/96 mm 
sq n: lgth = .75 in. / 19.05 
mm 
42  RCBI  1  N 240 / E 060 
fr NE, 226° @ 
13m 
6 cm  ball: 
wt = 75.4 grm / 1188.1 grn 
dia = 1.08 in. / 27.45 mm 
1.15 in. / 29.21 mm 
43  SRBL  1  N 240 / E 060 
fr NE, 232° @ 
23 m 
2 cm  ball: 
wt = 23.1 grm / 356 gm 
shape deformed, high 
velocity impact, B bw est = 
.63+ cal, wpn = M, .64 - .66 
cal? 
44  eyelet's 
sq n 
2 
3 
TU 9  1  0-10 
cm 
eyelet's: 
dia = .1675 in. / 4.26 mm 
sq n: lgth = .75 in. / 19.05 
nun 
45  leather w/ 
thread, nails 
TU 9  1  0-10  leather: 
1.25 in. x 1 x .121 in. 
31.75 x 25.4 x 3.07 mm 
46  leather  1  TU 9  1  0-10  leather: 
.50 x .50 x 0.1555 in. 
12.93 x 12.9 x 3.93 mm 
47  SBuL  1  N 280 / E 060 
fr SW, 023° @ 
18 m 
10 cm  bullet: 
wt = 20 grm / 410 grn 
dia = .4465 in. / 11.34 mm 
.4315 in. / 10.97 mm 
3 groves around Bu body, 
no rifling marks present, 
shape deformed, high vel­
ocity impact, Bu = .44 cal?, 
wpn = P, .45 cal? 149 
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48  SRBL  1  N280 /E 080 
fr NE, 025° @ 
6m/2cm 
4 cm  ball: 
wt = 25.7 grm / 398.8 grn 
shape deformed, B bw est = 
.65 cal, wpn = M, .66 cal? 
56  SRBL  1  N 280 / E 040 
fr SW, 043° 
13.5 m 
6 cm  ball: 
wt = 25.3 gnn / 398 grn 
shape deformed, high vel­
ocity impact, B bw est = .65+ 
cal, wpn = M, .66 cal? 
57  L  1  N 300/E 100 
fr SW, 143° g 
18 m 
5 cm  lead 
wt = 2.5 grm 
63  SShL  1  N 380 / E 120 
fr NW, 124° @ 
5m/ 19 cm 
.5 cm  shot: 
wt = 2.5 grm / 38.4 grn 
Sh bw est = .30 cal / 7.62 
mm, # 1 buck 
65  SRBL  1  N 140 / E 100 
fr NE, 256° @ 
9 m 
10 cm  ball: 
wt = 11.1 grm / 175 grn 
shape deformed, high 
velocity impact, B bw est = 
.49 cal, wpn = M, .50 cal? 
67  RCBI  1  AMP 16 
010° @ 19.7 m 
2 cm  ball: 
wt = 71.9 grm /1135.7 
dia = 1.7 in. / 27.38 mm 
73  SRBL  1  N 260 / E 060 
fr NE, 236° @ 
14 m 
3 cm  ball: 
wt = 13.4 grm / 214 grn 
distinct patch fiber imprint 
on B from force of exploding 
powder, shape deformed, hi­
gh velocity impact, B bw est 
= .53+ cal, wpn = P, .54 cal? 
76  Pc  1  N 340 / E 100 
fr SE, 300° @ 
3 m 
Pc not fired: dropped, fit 
perfectly on the nipple of 
military replica rifle 
80  SRBL  1  A MP 16 
130° g 15 m/ 
1 cm 
3.5  ball: 
wt = 25.7 grm / 399.5 grn 
dia = .629 in. / 5.98 nun 
.659 in. / 6.75 mm 
.6645 in. / 16.81 mm 
shape deformed, low velocity 
impact, distinct buck shot 
print on surface, B bw est = 
.65+ cal, wpn = M, .66 cal? 150 
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81  SRBL  1	  AMP 16  1 cm 
111° g 19 in./ 
25 cm 
84  RCBI  1	  A MP 17  7 cm 
253° @ 11 m / 
20 cm 
88  SShL  1	  AMP 17  1 cm 
189° g17 itt 
19 cm 
89  SRBL  1	  A MP 17  2 cm 
089° g 23 m / 
21 cm 
100  RCBI  1	  N 220 / E 220  5 cm 
fr SE, 365° @ 
10 m 
102  SRBL  1	  N 220 / E 080  4 cm 
fr SE, 330° @ 
12m 
103  SRBL  1	  N220 /E 080  10 cm 
fr SE, 300° g 
19 m 
111  L  1	  N 180 / E 080  2 cm 
fr SW, 018° @ 
22 m 
shot:
 
wt = 6 grm / 92.7 grn
 
shape deformed, high
 
velocity impact, B bw est =
 
.40 cal,
 
wpn = P, .410 cal?
 
ball: 
wt = 77.1 grm / 1205.2 grn 
dia = 1.08 in. / 27.44 mm 
1.12 in. / 28.45 nun 
shot: 
wt = 2.3 grm / 36.8 gm 
dia = .30 in. / 7.62 mm 
shape deformed, low velocity 
impact, Sh bw est = .30 cal, 
# 1 buck 
ball:
 
wt = 13.4 grm / 208 grn
 
dia = .53 in. / 13.46 mm
 
shape miss formed, medium
 
velocity impact, B bw est =
 
.53+ cal, wpn = M / P,
 
.54 cal? 
ball: 
wt = 72.5 grm / 1136.8 gm 
dia =1.6 in. / 26. mm 
1.85 in. / 27.45 mm 
ball: 
wt = 25.4 grm / 392.7 gm 
dia = .63 in. / 16.02 mm 
.67 in. / 17.03 mm 
shape miss formed, medium 
velocity impact, B bw est = 
.65+ cal, wpn = M, .66 cal? 
ball:
 
wt = 25.6 g,rm / 396.3 gm
 
shape deformed, high
 
velocity impact, B bw est =
 
.65+ cal, wpn = M, .66 cal?
 
L slag: 
wt = 11.8 grm 151 
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112  L  1  N 180 / E 080  4 cm  L slag: 
fr SW, 018° @  wt = 2.5 grm 
22 m / 5 cm 
113  L  1  N 180 / E 080  5 cm  L slag: 
fr SW, 018° @  wt = 1 gnn 
22m /10 cm 
114  L  1  N 180 / E 080  2 cm  L slag: 
fr SW, 018° @  wt = 1 grm 
24 m 
116  SRBL  1  A MP T 35S, R  surface  ball: 
11, WWM, Sec  recovered fr rotten log on 
18, 1/4 corner,  ground, lying NW - SE, 
164° @ 88 m  ponderosa pine? 
117  SRBL  1  A MP T 35S, R  surface  ball: 
11, WWM, Sec  recovered fr rotten log on 
18, 1/4 corner,  ground, lying NW - SE, 
164° @ 88 m  ponderosa pine? 
118  SRBL  1  N240 /E020  15 cm  ball: 
fr NW, 130° @  wt = 15 grm / 234 grn 
38 m  shape deformed, high 
velocity impact, B bw est = 
.55 cal, 
wpn = P, .55 cal? 
120  SPc  1  N260 /E 020  4 cm 
fr NE, 230° @ 
20 m 
121  SShL  1  A MP 4  1 cm  shot: 
264° @, 4 m  wt = 2.2 grm / 35.3 gm 
dia = .30 in. / 7.62 nun, 
Sh bw est = .30 cal, # 1 
buck, shape deformed, high 
velocity impact 
122  SPc  1  A MP 4  2 cm 
264 ° @4m /19 
cm 
123  RCBI  1  AMP 4  2-10  ball: 
260°48 m  cm  wt = 75.2 grm / 1182 gm 
dia = 1.08 in. / 27.45 nun 
imbedded in 7 in. tree root 152 
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131  SRBL  1  AMPT 35S,R  3 cm  ball: 
11, WWM, Sec  wt = 15.2 grin / 236.5 gm 
18, 1/4 corner,  shape deformed, high 
160°  velocity impact, patch fiber 
@ 160 m  imprinted 
on B from force of exploding 
powder, B bw est = .55 cal, 
wpn = M / P, .56 cal? 
132  SRBL  1  AMP T 35S, R  4 cm  ball: 
11, WWM, Sec  wt = 13.2 grm / 212 grn 
18, 1/4 corner,  shape deformed, high 
175° @ 89 m  velocity impact, patch fiber 
imprinted 
on B from force of exploding 
powder, friction on B caused 
lead on edge of B to fold 
back 
as B penetrated surface of 
target, B bw est = .53 cal, 
wpn = M / P, .54 cal? 
133  SRBL  1  AMP T 35S, R  6 cm  ball: 
11, WWM, Sec  wt = 12.2 grm / 189 grn 
18, 1/4 corner,  shape deformed, high veloci­
192° g Ito m  ty impact, friction on B 
caused lead on edge of B to 
fold back 
as B penetrated surface of 
target, B bw est = .52 cal, 
wpn = M / P, .54 cal? 
142  SPc  1  N 040 / E 040  2 cm 
fr NE, 222° @ 
14 m 
145  SPc  1  N 180 / E 080  2 cm 
fr NW, 106° @ 
1m/25 cm 
146  SPc  1  N 180 / E 080  2 cm  Pc frag 
fr NW, 114° @ 
2m/20cm 
147  SPc  1  N 160 /E 060  2 cm 
fr NW, 144° g 
3m/35cm 
148  SPc  1  N 160 / E 060  2 cm 
fr NW, 154° @ 
3 m / 33 cm 153 
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149  Pc  1  N 160 / E 060 
fr NW, 184° @ 
7.5 m 
4 cm  Pc not spent 
150  Pc + frag  2  N 160 / E 060 
fr NW, 190° g 
7m/28cm 
1 cm  Pc not spent 
153  SPc  1  N 160 / E 060 
fr NW, 156° @ 
13m/37cm 
1 cm 
154  SS111.,  1  N 160 / E 060 
fr NW, 166 °@ 
14 m / 13 cm 
4 cm  shot: 
vvt = 2.5 grm / 38 gm 
.30 in. / 7.62 mtn, # 1 buck 
Sh bw est = .30 cal, deform­
ed, low velocity impact 
156  SRBL  1  N 140 / E 080 
fr NE, 227° @ 
10 m 
7 cm  ball: 
wt = 13.9 grm / 216 grn 
dia = .548 in. / 13.84 mm 
.531 in. / 13.5 mm 
shape deformed, low velocity 
impact, B bw est = .53+ cal, 
wpn = M / P, .54 cal? 
157  SPc  1  N 140 / E 080 
fr NE, 254° @ 
2 cm 
m 
159  SRBL  1  N 100 / E 040 
fr SE, 280° @ 
12 m 
surface  ball: 
wt = 13.1 grm / 202 grn 
shape deformed, high veloci­
ty impact, B bw est = .51 cal, 
wpn = M, .525 / .53 cal? 
162  SBuL  1  N 040 / E 080 
fr SW, 062° g 
8 m 
1 cm  bullet: 
wr = 12.3 grm / 190 grn 
shape miss formed, high vel­
city impact, no rifling, Bu = 
.44+ cal, wpn = P, .45 cal? 
163  SRBL  1  N 060 / E 060 
fr NE, 244° @ 
11 m 
6 cm  ball: 
wt = 18.2 grin / 281.2 grn 
dia = .603 in. / 15.30 nun 
.5395 in. / 13.72 mm 
irregular shape; spent w/ low 
velocity impact, or made in 
bullet mold that had irregul­
surface (dirty), B bw est = 
.57 cal, wpn = M, .58 cal? 154 
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166  SS1a.  1  N 120 / E 080  1 cm  shot: 
fr SE, 294° @  wt = 2.2 grm / 36 grn 
6m  Sh bw est = .30 cal / 7.62 
mm, # 1 buck 
167  SPc  1  N 140 / E 080  2 cm 
fr SW, 017° @ 
7m 
172  L  1  N 260 / E 120  4 cm  L slag: 
fr NW, 098° @  wt = 7.4 grin 
14 m 
178  SShL  1  N 180 / E 100  5 cm  shot: 
fr SW. 058° @  wt = 2.2 grm / 34 grn 
17 m  shape deformed, high 
velocity impact, Sh bw est = 
.30 cal / 7.62 nun, # 1 buck 
179  L  2  N 180 / E 100  5 cm  L slag: 
fr NE, 033° @  wt = 10 grm 
12 m 
180  L  1  N 180 / E 100  5 cm  L slag: 
fr NE, 041° @  wt = 22.7 grm 
15m/17cm 
185  SRBL  1  N 220 / E 140  3 cm  ball: 
fr NW, 094° @  wt = 13 grm / 201.4 grn 
14m  dia = .517 in. / 13.6 nim 
.535 in. / 13.59 mm 
.538 in. / 13.68 mm 
B surface imprinted with 
form of 3 buck shots, B bw 
est = .51+ cal, wpn = M / P, 
.525, .53 or .54 cal? 
188  SRBL  1  A MP T 35S, R  surface  ball: 
11, WWM, Sec  lodged in wood 
18, 1/4 corner, 
055° 
@30 in 
189  SS111.,  1  N 180 / E 140  2 cm  shot: 
fr NW, 105° @  wt = 2.4 grm / 39.3 grn 
32 m / 10 cm  shape deformed, high vel­
ocity impact, Sh bw est = .30 
cal / 7.62 nun, # 4 buck 155 
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190  RCBI  1	  AMPN220/  4 cm  ball:
 
E 240, 076° @  wt = 74.9 grm / 1177 gm
 
65m  dia = 1.06 in. / 26.93 mm
 
1.11 in. / 28.2 nun 
191  SRBL  1	  AMPN220 /E  3 cm  ball:
 
240, 067° g  wt = 26.1 grm / 402.1 grn
 
66 m  dia = .675 in. / 17.15 mm
 
.627 in. / 15.95 mm 
shape miss formed, low 
velocity impact, 3 buck shots 
distinctly imprinted on 
surface of B, B bw est = .65 
cal, wpn = M, .66 cal? 
192  SRBL  1	  N 220 / E 240  7 cm  ball: 
fr NW, 151 °@  wt = 13.5 gmi / 210 grn 
8 m  dia = .525 in. /13.34 mm 
.57 in. / 14.48 mm 
shape deformed, low velocity 
impact, circular grove (0) 
imprinted into ball surface, 
B bw est = .53 cal, wpn = M, 
.54 - .58 cal? 
NON-BATTLE RELATED ARTIFACTS 
Pre-Battle 
FS #  Desc  Total	  Location:  Level  Depth  Remarks 
Block #, TU #, 
or MI) # 
21  Debitage  1  TU 4  1  9 cm	  CCS flake: 
.2285 x .125 x 0.037 in. = 
5.83 x 3.18 x .98 mm 156 
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Post-Battle 
FS #  Desc  Total  Location: 
Block #, TU #, 
or A MP # 
Level  Depth 
8 
11 
Cart 
Cart 
1 
1 
N 100 / E 040 
fr SE, 340° @ 
7 m 
N 120 / E 040 
fr SE, 076° @ 
5 m 
2 cm 
3 cm 
12  Cart  1  N 120 / E 040 
fr SE, 070° @ 
5 m 
2 cm 
13  Cart  1  N 120 / E 040 
fr SE, 070° @ 
6 m 
3 cm 
14  Cart  1  N 120 / E 040 
fr SE, 070° @ 
7 in 
3 cm 
15  SBu  1  N 140 / E 060 
fr NE, 236° @ 
17 m 
2 cm 
18  coin  1  TU 2  surface 
30 
31 
Bu 
wr 
1 
1 
N 140 / E 100 
fr NE, 190° @ 
9m 
N 140 / E 080 
fr SE, 300° @ 
7m 
5 cm 
6-9 cm 
32  SBu  1  N 140 / E 120 
fr NE, 200° @ 
14m 
14 cm 
Remarks 
Cart:
 
.38 automatic, P, short,
 
centerfire
 
Cart:
 
.22 cal
 
man = Western Cartridge Co.
 
rimfire
 
Cart:
 
.22 cal
 
man = Western Cartridge Co.
 
rimfire
 
Cart:
 
.22 cal
 
man = Western Cartridge Co.
 
rimfire
 
Cart:
 
.22 cal
 
man = Western Cartridge Co.
 
rimfire
 
Bullet:
 
,30 cal
 
coin:
 
US, 1991, nickel (.05 cents)
 
bullet: 
.22 cal 
metal: 
wr 
lgth = 15 in. / 37.4 cm 
thick = .0825 in. / 2.09 mm 
bullet: 
9 mm 
wt = 10 grm 157 
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33  Cart  1  N 140 / E 120 
fr NE, 199° @ 
15 m 
8 cm  cart: 
.30 cal 
brass 
36  t  1  N 180 / E 100 
fr SW, 70° @ 
10m 
2cm  tin: 
1 x 1 x .05 in. 
25.4 x 25.4 x 1.39 nun 
37  Cart  1  N 180 / 080 
fr SE, 063° @ 
12 m 
2cm  cart: 
.22 cal, long rifle 
rimefire 
no head stamp 
39  Cart  1  N200 /E 120 
fr NE, 180° @ 
14 m 
3 cm  cart: 
.22 cal 
man = Remington Arms Co., 
or Union Metallic Cartridge 
Co. rimefire 
40  tfrag  1  N 180 / E 120 
fr SW, 020° g 
6m 
4 cm  tin: 
l x .75 x 1.41 in. 
25.4 x 19.4 x 1.41 nun 
49  metwr  1  N 280 / E 040 
fr SE, 292° @ 
4.5 m 
0-10 cm  metal; 
lgth = 7 in. / 17.78 cm 
thick = .09 in. / 2.28 mm 
50  SBu  1  N280 /E 060 
fr SE, 278° @ 
8.5 m 
1 cm  cart: 
.22 cal 
no head stamp 
51  Cart  1  N300 /E 040 
fr SW, 360° g 
6 m 
.5 cm  cart: 
.30.30 cal 
man = Winchester 
centerfire 
52  SBu  1  N 300 / E 040 
fr SW, 039° @ 
6 m 
.25 cm  bullet: 
22 cal 
no head stamp 
53  met tool  1  N 300 / E 040 
fr SW, 030° @ 
8 m 
surface  metal: 
round file, rusted 
lgth = 10 in. / 24.4 cm 
54  Bu  1  N 280 / E 020 
fr SE, 286° @ 
9.2 m 
10 cm  bullet: 
.22 cal 
copper jacket 158 
55 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
64 
66 
68 
69 
70 
can 
top 
Cart 
Cart 
Cart 
Cart 
Bu 
Cart + Bu 
Bu 
Cart 
Bn 
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1	  N280 /E 020 
fr SE, 286° @ 
9. m 
1	  N320 /E080 
fr SW, 162° @ 
12 m 
1	  N360 /E 100 
fr NE, 264° @ 
12.6 m 
1	  N 420 / E 140 
fr NE, 238° @ 
18.7 m 
1	  N 420 / E 140 
fr NE, 237° @ 
19.2 m 
1	  N 420 / E 120 
fr SW, 090° @ 
3.6 m 
1	  N 380 / E 120 
fr NW, 124 °@ 
7.5 m 
1	  A MP 16 
54° @ 17 m 
1	  A MP 16 
360° @ 23.7 m 
1	  A MP 16 
40° @ 18.9 m 
1	  TU 12 
surface 
surface 
2.5 cm 
3.8 cm 
2 cm 
5 cm 
.5 cm 
2 cm 
1 cm 
2 cm 
1  1-10 cm 
can: 
aluminum, Pepsi, 12 oz 
w/ Bu holes 
can top: 
aluminum 
pull top type 
cart: 
22 cal 
no head stamp 
cart:
 
.38 cal, special
 
man = Western Cartridge Co.
 
centerfire
 
cart:
 
.38 cal, special
 
man = Western Cartridge Co.
 
centerfire
 
cart:
 
.22 cal
 
man = Remington Arms Co.,
 
or Union Metallic Cartridge
 
Co.
 
rimefire 
bullet: 
9 inm 
cart & bullet:
 
man = Federal Cartridge Co.
 
rimefire
 
discarded due to misfire
 
bullet: 
.22 cal 
cart:
 
.38 cal, special
 
man = Western Cartridge Co.
 
centerfire
 
bone:
 
frag, small animal
 159 
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71  Cart  1  TU 12  1  1-10 cm  cart: 
.22 cal 
man = Western Cartridge Co. 
rimefire 
72  Cart  1  N 240 / E 100 
fr SE, 338° g 
12 m 
4 cm  cartridge: 
.44 cal 
rimefire 
no head stamp 
74  Cart  1  N 340 / E 100 
fr SE, 320° @ 
1.5 m 
cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Federal Cartridge Co. 
rimefire 
75  SBu  1  N 340 / E 100 
fr SE, 275° @ 
6m 
bullet: 
.44 cal 
wt = 12.5 gr 
77  Cart  1  N 340 / E 100 
fr SE, 260° @ 
10 m 
cartridge: 
.22 cal 
rimefire 
no head stamp 
78  Cart + Bu  2  N 220 / E 120 
fr SW, 070° @ 
3.5 m 
3 cm  cartridge & bullet: 
.22 cal 
man = Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. 
rimefire 
discarded due to misfire 
Cart 
Cart 
2 
4 
N 220 / E 120 
fr SW, 070° @ 
3.5 m 
N 220 / E 120 
fr SW, 070° @ 
3.5 m 
3 cm 
3 cm 
cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. 
rimefire 
cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Federal Cartridge Co. 
rimefire 
Cart  1  N 220 / E 120 
fr SW, 070° @ 
3.5 m 
3 cm  cartridge: 
head stamp = "D" 
rimefire 
Cart  4  N 220 / E 120 
fr SW, 070° @ 
3.5 m 
3 cm  cartridge: 
head stamp = "H" 
rimefire 160 
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79  Cart  1  N 220 / E 120 
fr SE, 029° @ 
6 m 
1 cm  cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Union Metallic 
cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. 
rimefire 
82  SBu  1  AMP 16 
107° @ 21.5 m 
1 CM  bullet: 
.22 cal 
83  SgS1H  1  AMP 17 
300° g 7.2 m 
1 cm  shell: 
.410 gauge 
SgS1H w/ Bw + P 
85  Cart + Bu  1  AMP 17 
210° g 11.5 m 
1 cm  cartridge & bullet: 
.22 cal, short 
no head stamp 
dropped, not misfired 
86  tfrag  1  A MP 17 
200° @ 18.2 m 
surface  tin: 
1.25 x .75 x .028 in. 
31.75 x 19.04 x .73 nun 
87  tfrag  1  A MP 17 
192° @ 16.3 m 
surface  tin: 
.5 x .75 x .0305 in. 
12.7 x 19.4 x .81 mm 
90  Cart  2  A MP 17 
155° @ 21.5 m 
1 cm  cart: 
.22 cal 
man = Omark Manufacturing 
Co. 
rimefire 
Cart  7  A MP 17 
155° @ 21.5 m 
1 cm  cart: 
.22 cal 
man = Federal Cartridge Co. 
rimefire 
Cart + Bu  1  A MP 17 
155° g 21.5 m 
1 cm  cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Federal Cartridge Co. 
rimefire 
discarded due to misfire 
91  Cart  1  AMP 17 
154° g 16.8 m 
1 cm  .22 cal 
man = Federal Cartridge Co. 
rimefire 161 
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92  Cart  1  AMP 17  1 cm  cartridge: 
126° g 11.4 m  .22 cal 
rimefire 
no head stamp 
93  tool  1  A MP 17  2 cm  can / bottle opener: 
070° @ 17.2 m  lgth = 5 in / 9.7 cm 
type = church key 
94  Cart  1  A MP 17  1 cm  cartridge: 
060° @ 10.4 m  .22 cal 
man = Western Cartridge Co. 
rimefire 
95  Cart  1  AMP 17  1 cm  cartridge: 
054° @ 19.9 m  .30 .30 cal, rifle 
man = Western Cartridge Co. 
centerfire 
96  Cart  1  AMP 17  1 cm  cartridge: 
034° @ 15.1 m  .22 cal 
man = Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. rimefire 
97  SBu  1  A MP 17  1.5 cm  bullet: 
346°@8.4 m  .22 cal 
98  SBu  1  N 220 / E 100  2 cm  bullet: 
fr SE, 322° @  .22 cal 
10 m 
99  SBu  1  N 220 / E 240  4 cm  bullet: 
fr SW, 089° @  .44 cal 
15 m /10 cm  wt = 23.1 gr 
101  SgS1H  1  N 210 / E 080  2 cm  shell: 
fr SE, 320° @  12 gauge SgS1H + Bw 
9 m  man = Union Metallic Cart 
Co. 
104  SgS1H  1  N210 /E 060  10 cm  shell: 
fr NE, 230° @  12 gauge SgS1H + Bw 
2 m  man = Union Metallic Cart 
Co. 
105  met  1  N220 /E 080  2.5 cm  metal: 
fr NE, 290° @  possible wr n, probable wr 
8m  lgth = 1.5 in. / 3.8 cm 162 
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106  Cart  1  N 360 / E 120  2 cm  cartridge: 
fr NE, 120° @  .243 cal 
6 m  man = Winchester Cartridge 
Co. 
107  SBu  1  A MP 15  bullet: 
038°@7m  .22 cal 
108  SBu  1  A MP 15  bullet: 
352°@7m  .22 cal 
109  Cart  1  A MP 15  bullet: 
004° @ 12.5 m  .22 cal 
man = Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co., rimefu-e 
110  SBu  1  AMP 15  bullet: 
356° @ 17 m  .22 cal 
115  SBu  1  AMP 15  bullet: 
200°@25m  9 mm 
119  SBu  1  N 220 / E 080  4 cm  bullet: 
fr SE, 320° @  .22 cal 
12 m 
124  n  1  AMP 4  10 cm  nail: 
068° @ 1.5 m  wr n 
wt = .24 grm 
125  met  1  AMP 4  1 cm  metal: 
194° @ 5 m  ring w/ met staple 
ring dia = 2 in. / 50.8 mm 
staple lgth = 1.25 in. / 31.75 
mm 
wt = 22.6 grm 
recovered from fallen / 
decayed tree 
126  n  1  AMP 4  1 cm  nail: 
190° @ 5.5 m  wr n 
recovered from fallen tree 
128  wr  1  AMP 4  metal: 
194° @ 8.5 m  lgth = 1.25 in. / 31.75 nun 
wt = .1 grm 163 
APPENDIX D (Continued) 
129  Cart  1  A MP 4  cartridge: 
250° @ 17 m  .22 cal 
man = Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. 
rimefire 
130  Cart  1  N 120 / E 040  5 cm  cartridge: 
fr SE, 290° @  .38 cal, rifle 
22 m  man = United States Cart­
ridge Co., production 
period 1869 - 1936 
134  Cart  1  A MP T 35S, R  2 cm  cartridge: 
11, WWM, Sec  7.65 nun, Lugar 
18, 1/4 corner,  centerfire 
195° @108 m  head stamp = "WPA" 
135  Cart  1  AMPT35S,R  1 cm  cartridge: 
11, WWM, Sec  7.65 mm, Lugar 
18, 1/4 corner,  centerfire 
197° @ 108 m  head stamp = "WPA" 
136  Bu  1  AMP 19  bullet: 
058° @ 065m  .22 cal 
137  Bu  1  AMP 19  2 cm  bullet: 
065°@ 058 m  .22 cal 
138  Cart  1  A MP 17  1 cm  cartridge: 
152° @ 20.4 m  .22 cal 
man = Federal Cartridge Co. 
rimefire 
140  Cart  1  N 040 / E 040  2.5 cm  cartridge: 
fr NE, 212° @  .22 cal, extra long 
8m  man = Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. 
rimefire 
141  Cart  2  N 040 / E 040  1 cm  cartridge: 
fr NE, 280° @  .22 cal 
6.5 m  man = Omark Manufacturing 
Co. 
rimefire 
143  foil  6  N 040 / E 040  0-10 cm  foil: 
fr NE, 260° @  aluminum 
6.5 m  wt = 2.2 grm 164 
APPENDIX D (Continued) 
144  Cart  1	  N 060 / E 040  1 cm
 
fr SW, 038° @
 
4.5 m 
151  Cart  1	  N 160 / E 060  4 cm 
fr NW, 176° @ 
14.8 m 
152  Cart  1	  N 160 / E 060  4 cm 
fr NW, 170° @ 
15 m 
155  coin  1	  N 160 / E 060  4 cm 
fr NW, 178° @ 
22.2 m 
158  Cart  1	  N 140 / E 060  1 cm 
fr NE, 260° @ 
10 m 
160  Cart  1	  N 080 /E 040  1 cm 
fr NE, 224° @ 
19 m 
161  Cart  1	  N 040 / E 040  1 cm 
fr NE, 226° @ 
17 m 
164  SgS1H  2  MP 1  3 cm 
196° @ 40 m 
165  brass  1	  N 140 / E 100  2 cm 
fr NW, 097° @ 
3.5m 
cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Omark Manufacturing 
Co. 
rimefire 
cartridge: 
22 cal 
man = Omark Manufacturing 
Co. 
rimefire 
cartridge: 
22 cal 
man = Omark Manufacturing 
Co. 
rimefire 
coin:
 
US, 1979, Lincoln penny,
 
cartridge:
 
.30 cal / 7.62 mm,
 
cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. 
rimefire 
cartridge: 
22 cal 
man = Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. 
rimefire 
shell: 
12 gauge 
h + Bw 
man = Remington Arms Co. 
head stamp = Repeater, 1901 
brass: 
band 
2.1 x .23 x .017 in. 
53.34 x 5.8 x .43 mm 165 
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168  Bu  1	  N 180 /E 100 
fr SW, 068° @ 
4m 
169  Cart  1	  N 160 / E 040 
fr NE, 204° @ 
15.4 m 
170  Cart  1	  N 160 / E 040 
fr NE, 210° @ 
16.1 m 
171  Cart  1	  N 220 / E 120 
fr SW, 17 °@ 
5.4 m 
173  Bufrag  1	  N 000 / E 040 
fr NE, 240° @ 
5m 
174  Cart  1	  N 000 / E 040 
fr NE, 244° @ 
5m 
176  n  1	  N 280 / E 140 
fr SW, 031° @ 
19m 
177  n  1	  N 280 / E 140 
fr SW, 031° @ 
19 m 
181  Cart  1	  N 160 / E 060 
fr NW, 120° @ 
6.6 m 
1 cm 
1 cm 
1 cm 
1 cm 
5 cm 
2 cm 
2 cm 
2 cm 
1 cm 
bullet: 
.22 cal 
cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Omark Manufacturing 
Co. 
rimefire 
cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Omark Manufacturing 
Co., rimfire 
cartridge: 
22 cal 
man = Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. 
rimefire 
bullet: 
L frag 
cartridge: 
brass 
met n: 
wr n 
lgth = 2 in. / 50.8 nim 
met n: 
wr n 
lgth = 1.5 in. / 38.1 mm 
cartridge: 
.22 cal 
man = Omark Manufacturing 
Co. 
rimefire 166 
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182  Cart  5	  N 180 / E 060  1 cm  cartridge: 
fr SW, 058° @  .22 cal 
3 m  rimefire 
3 are man by Omark 
Manufacturing Co. 
2 are man by Union Metallic 
Cartridge Co., or Remington 
Arms Co. 
183  SBu  1	  N 180 / E 060  1 cm  bullet: 
fr SE, 353° @  .22 cal 
16 m  wt = 2.6 gr 
186  SBuFrag  1	  N 200 / E 240  2 cm  bullet: 
fr NW, 151° @  .22 cal 
8m  wt = 2.3 gr 
187  Cart  1	  N 260 / E 040  3 cm  cartridge: 
fr NW, 149° @  .30 cal 
49 m  brass 
Undetermined 
FS #  Desc  Total	  Location:  Level  Depth  Remarks 
Block #, TU #, 
or A MP # 
22  rivet  1	  N 160 / E 080  4 cm  brass rivet: 
fr SW, 084° @  lgth = 1.6 in. / 40.64 nun 
17.7m  dia = .179 in. / 4.54 nun 
127  met  1	  A MP 4  metal, w/ eye:
 
090 ° @5.5m  lgth = 1.5 in. / 38.1 mm
 
139  wr  1	  N 040 / E 040  3 cm  wire:
 
fr NW, 212° @  lgth = 1 in. / 25.4 mm
 
2m  wt = .5 gnn
 
175  met  1	  AMPN340 /E  4-15 cm  mule shoe:
 
140 fr SW, 087°  wt = 141 gnn
 
@ 38.1 m, 084°
 
@ 37.6 m
 
184  met  4	  N 100 / E 040  10 cm  metal tabs
 
fr SW, 308° @
 
17 m
 167 
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LEGEND 
Symbol  Definition  Symbol  Definition 
0  =  degree, azimuth  Sh  =  shot 
Si  =  shell 
A MP #  =  mapping point #  t  =  tin 
@  =  at  TU #  =  test unit 
number 
B  =  ball, musket  vel  =  velocity 
projectile 
bn  =  bone  w/  =  with 
Bu  =  bullet  wpn  =  weapon 
Bw  =  base wad  wr  =  wire 
bw  =  by weight  wt  =  weight 
C  =  canister 
cal  =  caliber 
Cart  =  cartridge 
CCS  =  cryptocrystalline 
silicate 
cm  =  centimeter(s) 
Desc  =  description 
dia  =  diameter 
est  =  estimate 
fr  =  from 
frag  =  fragment 
FS #  =  field specimen 
number 
grm  =  gram(s) 
gm  =  grain(s) 
H  =  shotgun shell 
head, base 
I  =  iron 
in.  =  inch 
L  =  lead 
lgth  =  length 
m  =  meter 
M  =  musket 
man  =  manufacture 
met  =  metal 
min  =  minimum 
mm  =  millimeter 
n  =  nail 
p  =  primer, primer 
chamber 
P  =  pistol 
Pc  =  percussion cap 
R  =  round 
S  =  spent, fired 
Sg  =  shotgun 